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Abstract 
This thesis examines national security/essential security exceptions in the context of 
international investment law (IIL). Security exceptions in IIL had not received 
attention prior to Argentina’s invocation of essential security exceptions to legitimise 
its emergency measures against its economic crisis. Consequently, the Argentine cases 
shed light on the scope of security measures in the IIL arena in that it raised a question 
as to whether a measure to tackle an economic crisis could fall within the ambit of 
essential security interests. 
Although security has been generally understood as closely associated with national 
defence, i.e. military security, factors, such as the emergence of new security threats, 
including energy dependence, economic crisis, and environmental catastrophes, have 
also affected the scope of security measures against foreign investors. While the 
tribunals of the Argentine cases regarded economic security as imperative as military 
security, they did not clearly delineate the scope of legitimate security measures. 
Therefore, in this thesis, I seek to investigate this limitation and to provide a solution 
to it by applying insights from critical security studies, which highlight the evolution 
and broadening of security, into IIL. By applying critical security studies into the IIL 
arena, this thesis critiques tribunals’ interpretation of security exceptions and also 
explores the implications of the broadening of security that would affect the regulatory 
space of host states and thereby the interests of foreign investors. The types of foreign 
investors subject to the potential implications, as a result of the broadening of security, 
encompass corporate foreign investors, government-controlled foreign investors, and 
individual foreign investors. Thus, this thesis examines whether each type of foreign 
investors has distinct security considerations and thus is subject to a different degree 
of scrutiny in terms of security interests. 
The thesis argues that a newly delineated scope of security can also contribute to 
adjusting the dynamics between host states and foreign investors. As the IIL system 
has developed heavily focusing on the attraction of foreign capital, this has led the 
system to fail to highlight the importance of the regulatory space of host states. While 
the concept of national security takes fundamental part in national policies and the role 
of exceptions in IIL is pivotal to secure policy-space of host states, the efficacy of 
 viii 
 
current security exceptions in IIL can be controversial given the strict conditions for 
their invocation. Therefore, the application of a broadened notion of security can help 
host states to secure their policy space in order to tackle a serious and urgent threat to 
national security. Yet, the broadening of security does not signify an unlimited 
expansion of the concept for the legitimacy of security measures. 
Keywords: international investment law, security exceptions, regulatory space 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Background 
Given the lack of domestic capital, states have sought ways to attract foreign 
investment. To become more competitive investment destinations, states have entered 
into international investment agreements (IIAs) and agreed to provide certain 
incentives, including full security and protection to foreign investors. On the one hand, 
IIAs provide substantive and procedural protections to foreign investors, but, on the 
other, they have limited the regulatory space of host states. This is because foreign 
investors often view introduction of new regulations at variance with extant IIAs’ 
provisions by host states as a violation of the latter’s commitments in IIAs. Therefore, 
despite the necessity to implement a measure for the protection of public interests, host 
states are often dissuaded from doing so, due to the possibility of paying compensation 
to foreign investors for the loss caused by the measure. This concern has occasioned a 
debate whether the international investment law (IIL) regime has created an 
asymmetric dynamics between host states and foreign investors.  
Amidst the discussion regarding the dynamics between foreign investors and host 
states, the Argentine government’s invocation of the essential security interests and 
the public order exceptions in its bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with the United 
States drew attention to the scope of legitimate security measures in IIL. First of all, 
the Argentine cases are important given that the examination of the exceptions in IIL, 
especially the “essential security interests” exception, can shed light on the dynamics 
between foreign investors and host states. Such an examination can help secure the 
regulatory space of host states to some degree. The fact that the regulatory space was 
not clearly defined could act in the interests of the host states to maintain certain 
ambiguity in that it does not restrict or confine the regulatory space, but this can give 
rise to challenges and opposition to the scope of legitimate measures. Therefore, whilst 
certain ambiguity is inevitable, it is necessary to delineate and confirm the ambit of 
the regulatory space. Where the regulatory space is not sufficiently secured, the 
examination of the efficiency of derogations and exceptions is imperative in order to 
balance the rights and interests of foreign investors and host states. Thus, this thesis 
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argues that the evolving understanding of security exceptions can contribute to 
readjusting the asymmetric relationship between foreign investors and host states and 
securing the regulatory space of host states with regards to interests that affect the 
survival of states. This understanding, therefore, can allow host states to implement 
measures against a variety of threats to their countries without resulting in the 
obligation to pay compensation.  
Secondly, as the Argentine cases were the first where the security exception was 
discussed at an international tribunal level, the examination of the cases can provide 
the opportunity to clarify the scope and meaning of the exception. In the cases, the 
tribunals recognised that military security interests are not the sole security matters, 
but economic and political security should be treated in the same manner as military 
security (Chapter 2). This could be construed as a breakthrough insofar as tribunals 
officially recognised the incorporation of other types of security within the context of 
essential security interests in IIL, by noting a lack of other types of security would 
have effects as imperil and imminent as military insecurity. This recognition altered 
the traditional notion of security that was jointly understood with national defence 
rather than incorporating other aspects consisting of a state’s survival, such as socio-
economic security. However, a limited understanding of security would fail to 
comprehend diverse security demands. In this thesis, therefore, I intend to explore 
security exceptions and derogations in the IIL context and examine whether diverse 
security interests have been incorporated in policies that have investment dimensions. 
In order to probe the emergence of diverse security interests, the thesis analyses 
theories, state policies, tribunals’ awards and legislation. While this analysis can 
demonstrate discrepancies in understanding security, it can also create room for further 
development of security exceptions and derogations and the implications of the 
evolution of security in the IIL arena. 
2. Research Questions and Contribution 
In order to invoke security exceptions, states need to have a clear understanding of the 
scope of legitimate measures on the grounds of security interests, and the types of 
security that could be considered within the definition of essential security interests. 
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In this thesis, I take issue with the concept of security and examine the following 
research questions.  
(i) What are the implications of the broadened concept of security in the IIL 
context? 
(ii) Can the recognition of broadened security contribute to readjusting the 
dynamics between foreign investors and host states? 
With the aim of further examining those research questions, this thesis explores how 
the notion of security has evolved and been broadened by discussing 
literature/theories, national security and investment policies, and tribunal awards. In 
particular, to investigate the first question more contextually, the thesis examines how 
the broadened notion of security affects the different types of foreign investors, i. e. 
corporate foreign investors, government-controlled foreign investors, and individual 
foreign investors. Moreover, to justify the necessity of readjusting the dynamics, the 
thesis evaluates whether the current relationship between foreign investors and host 
states has been fairly balanced.  
While the examination of theories attests that security is an elusive concept, it can also 
demonstrate which approach is adequate to reflect current security demands. The 
comparison between the theoretical analysis and states’ policies can also indicate 
whether the evolution of security has taken place in states’ security policies or not.  
The theoretical analysis also contributes to the examination of the tribunal awards. On 
the one hand, the analysis can provide the grounds for the interpretation of the 
Argentine cases’ tribunals, which noted that economic security is as important as 
military security. Thus, the traditional understanding of security would be inconsistent 
with the tribunals’ interpretation. On the other, it can also highlight the room for clearer 
interpretation and delineation of the scope of security considerations in IIL. Therefore, 
by applying the theoretical analysis into examining the tribunals’ awards, the thesis 
can help to justify the tribunals’ interpretation, and suggest how security exceptions 
can further develop, which can contribute to achieving coherence among theory, state 
practice and tribunal awards.  
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Moreover, the thesis examines how this newly demarcated/evolving notion of security 
would influence the interests and rights of foreign investors by comparing three 
different types of foreign investors: corporate foreign investors, government-
controlled foreign investors (GCIs), and individual foreign investors. While GCIs and 
individual foreign investors share the implications resulting from the broadening of 
security with corporate foreign investors, it is also true that GCIs and individual 
foreign investors have distinctive security concerns. For example, a host state might 
be concerned that a GCI could be run for a political reason, which could potentially 
create security threats or risks. This concern may legitimise the host state’s formulation 
of more stringent rules for GCIs different from those applicable to corporate foreign 
investors. By highlighting those implications, the thesis can help host states understand 
their policy space in relation to different types of foreign investors, and prevent the 
host states from introducing any arbitrary and discretionary security measures against 
investors. Accordingly, with distinct security features in mind, I make institutional 
recommendations with respect to dealing with each type of investors. 
3. Methodology 
The principal methodology of the study is critical legal studies. I problematise the 
current understanding of security by exploring security studies and analyse legislation 
and cases relevant to security in IIL in order to examine whether the current system 
serves the evolving security interests and demands.  
To be more specific, the thesis undertakes an examination of the evolving meaning 
and scope of security, and a comparative analysis of different security schools to 
investigate contesting views on the scope of security. It also discusses the emergence 
of risks as an extension of security, ensuing from the development of security studies. 
By doing so, the thesis can demonstrate:  
(i) how security has changed;  
(ii) what types of historical events affected this notion; 
(iii) why the broadening of security has taken place; 
(iv) why the traditional approach to security has been challenged for its 
insufficiency; 
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(v) how the emergence/introduction of risk will affect the latitude of the host 
state’s regulatory space in relation to security; and  
(vi) what the possible implications or ramifications of incorporating risk within 
the scope of security are. 
Furthermore, in order to investigate if each country has the divergent security interests 
in states’ policies,1 I adopt a comparative lens. Thus, the thesis compares and contrasts 
security strategy reports of different countries (the United States (US), the United 
Kingdom (UK), Germany and France) and the European Union (EU). This 
comparative analysis corroborates the premise that while every country shares certain 
security interests to some extent, each country has its own unique security demands. 
Thus, states’ approaches to security and types of security measures cannot be uniform. 
This is further supported by the analysis on the EU security strategy, which 
demonstrates the difficulty in harmonising the field of security at the regional level, 
i.e. public security, among the EU Member States. This is because the Member States 
are wary of the diminished regulatory space concerning national security as a result of 
a higher level of harmonisation of public security.  
Moreover, in order to examine how the meaning and scope of security have evolved 
in national understandings, in conjunction with the comparative studies, a 
chronological analysis is applied to the examination of national security strategy 
reports, especially the US from 2001 to 2017 and the UK from 2010 to 2015. This 
chronological examination illustrates the development of the US’s approach to 
security, how its understanding has changed or evolved, depending on the 
circumstances and administration. However, the limitation of this analysis lies in the 
focused discussion of developed countries’ security strategy reports. This is because 
developing countries have a less structured security system and policy, as they are still 
developing their own systems. But developed countries have been more alert and 
interested in security, especially the US and European countries where security studies 
have also been developed, i.e. strategic studies and peace research, respectively, due 
to their historical backgrounds. 
                                                     
1 Policies examined include security strategy reports, policies on critical infrastructures, and 
restrictions imposed on governmental-controlled investment. 
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To determine whether the evolving understanding of security has been incorporated in 
the context of IIL, the research undertakes a case law analysis and, in particular, looks 
at the interpretation of Argentine cases on the point. The examination of the Argentine 
cases is important in that, as mentioned above, they were the first where a host state 
invoked essential security interests to legitimise its emergency measures; thus no 
tribunals had interpreted the clause prior to the cases. The analysis of the tribunals’ 
awards can help establish the currently accepted understanding – although subject to 
criticisms – and shed light onto the aspect of essential security interests in the IIL 
arena, which needs further clarification and development. In other words, the analysis 
can contribute to discerning the area that has room for evolution from the area that is 
well recognised and elucidating the meaning and scope of security in the IIAs context. 
The understanding of security exceptions in IIAs is further achieved by comparing and 
contrasting them with other exceptions and derogations that are used in the IIL arena, 
such as public order and necessity in terms of scope and requirements for invocation, 
and by exploring any difference between national security and essential security 
interests.  
Furthermore, the thesis also applies a comparative lens regarding the discussions of 
GCIs and their status, distinct from corporate foreign investors. Applying the 
comparative lens helps to determine whether the treatment given to GCIs is different 
from the one applicable to corporate foreign investors. Where it is so, it will be 
necessary to examine whether such different treatment is legitimate. In relation to 
GCIs, the thesis also critiques the policies of critical infrastructure because many GCIs 
have invested in industries that are related to critical infrastructure with security 
considerations. To identify whether the understanding of critical infrastructure varies 
by country, I draw examples from different countries, both in Europe and North 
America. Those countries were selected for the case study because they have a 
developed legal framework to stipulate policies regarding critical infrastructure with a 
clear awareness of the importance of such infrastructure.  
While a GCI has a unique status as an investor, an individual foreign investor who 
gains the citizenship of the host state in exchange for investment under a citizenship-
by-investment programme (CIP) also has distinct features. In order to examine if 
security derogations of CIPs significantly differ across the world, I compare CIPs of 
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Caribbean islands countries and European countries. As investors under this type of 
programmes have different aspects of security derogations from corporate investors 
and GCIs, this thesis also adopts a comparative lens to scrutinise different implications 
of evolving security depending on the type of investors.  
4. Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 1 examines the evolving notion of security. I critically examine the traditional 
approach to discuss how the concept of national security has evolved over time and to 
examine security schools’ arguments as to what should be securitised, who should 
securitise, and for whom they need to securitise issues. These questions immediately 
delineate the scope of security, and that is where broadening and deepening national 
security take place. In order to address these issues, I examine several security schools: 
the Realist School; the Copenhagen School with securitisation; the Paris School; and 
the Constructivist School. By examining the schools, I seek to provide a fulcrum for 
explaining how the concept of national security could be broadened and why the 
understanding of security in the IIL arena should also evolve. This is followed by 
discussing risk, which has been assessed as a more efficient tool to tackle some types 
of security matters. 
Whereas Chapter 1 explores security theories, Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4 
examine the application of security in IIL. Chapter 2 contributes to an analysis on the 
Argentine cases which overtly demonstrated the conflict between Argentina and 
corporate foreign investors with regards to the understanding of security interests in 
IIL and the scope of measures, in order to examine how tribunals interpreted national 
security – essential security interests in the BIT between Argentina and the US. With 
the aim of understanding the international interpretation and highlighting the 
differentiation, Chapter 2 not only looks at the terms related to security: public order, 
essential security interests and national security, but also elucidates the relationship 
between security exceptions and a state of necessity under customary international law. 
In addition to the analysis of security exceptions applied to corporate foreign investors, 
Chapter 3 firstly examines national security policy reports of countries: the US and 
European countries, as well as public security reports of the EU in order to gauge their 
understanding of security since differences in their approaches to security can signify 
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a different threshold for each of them to invoke national security. Especially the 
chronological analysis of the US security strategy reports demonstrates how a 
particular aspect of security could be more strengthened or weakened depending on 
the national circumstances. It further assesses security derogations that are particularly 
applicable to foreign investment which is controlled, owned, or sponsored by a foreign 
government, due to the potential significant effect of such investment in national 
security and critical industries. The chapter subsequently discusses how North 
American countries and European countries have applied the concept of national 
security to investment policies in conjunction with GCIs and critical infrastructures, 
and how they define critical industries in their policies pertinent to foreign investment 
since the subject of critical industries is closely linked to national security. Host states’ 
concern regarding the potential significant impact of GCIs on critical infrastructures is 
evidenced by the American intervention in the take-over bid of Dubai Ports Worlds 
for the company having operated US ports in 2006. Additionally, the chapter evaluates 
how the concept of national security is used in investment policies, such as whether an 
exception to restrict foreign investment or a ground for reviews, with cases where a 
government is involved in a takeover transaction on the grounds of national security. 
Chapter 4 shifts the focus from collective investors to individual ones. In particular, it 
examines whether there is any relation between national security and an individual 
foreign investor who becomes a citizen or holds a certain residence permit under a 
special immigration programme. This chapter discusses the controversies surrounding 
such schemes and sheds light on questions about their legitimacy. Following the 
examination, the chapter looks at citizenship-by-investment schemes by country: 
Caribbean countries of St. Kitts and Nevis, and Antigua and Barbuda, and European 
countries including Malta, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania and Ireland. It also examines 
immigrant residence permit programmes for foreign investors. The chapter then 
analyses the implications of both types of programmes in the context of national 
security. More specifically, it probes if those programmes can pose a risk to national 
security and what type of individuals’ citizenship can be revoked on the grounds of 
national security. The chapter also examines (i) whether the broadening of security has 
taken place in this context, (ii) whether the explicit recognition of broadening can 
tackle some problem – possibly based on the risk – as the traditional approach does 
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not incorporate the role of risk (an imminent threat that is taking place at present), and 
(iii) whether the broadening of security would cause any negative repercussions. 
Chapter 5 problematises the current dynamics between foreign investors and host 
states, while calling attention to security interests in IIL to balance their rights. In order 
to gauge the dynamics, the chapter discusses the rights of foreign investors and the 
level of policy space of host states. This discussion highlights the current asymmetrical 
dynamics between foreign investors and host states inter alia where a host state takes 
a measure which affects foreign investment, since the motivation of this thesis arises 
from acknowledging that international and domestic commitments of host states have 
significantly confined their policy-space. The chapter analyses cases, arising out of 
different interpretations of measures concerned – whether regulatory or expropriatory 
– where a foreign investor claims his/her investment is indirectly expropriated, while 
a host state argues that the measures concerned should be justified within the boundary 
of police powers, thus resulting in no obligation to compensate for the loss caused by 
the measures. Therefore, this chapter examines flexibility tools that have been used in 
IIL, especially the police powers doctrine, and demonstrates how the broadening 
security clause can supplement the other clauses, by estimating the scope of measures 
which can be implemented on the grounds of national security.   
Lastly, Chapter 6 assesses a potential policy direction and policy suggestions that a 
host state can contemplate securing its policy space in dealing with foreign investors 
with highlighting the gap in states’ understandings of national security and national 
investment policies which affect foreign investors on the grounds of national security. 
The chapter provides general recommendations for host states in relation to 
securitisation and risks to deal with foreign investors. The recommendations also 
underline the peculiarity of the security interests of each country to demonstrate that it 
is pregnable to create one uniform security model. This is followed by the suggestions 
for law and policy reforms with regards to conceptual and analytical dimensions. By 
analysing potential impacts arising out of the broadening, the chapter provides 
institutional recommendations subject to each type of investor, i.e. corporate, 
government-controlled and individual foreign investors, which is followed by the 
comparison among the different types of investors regarding the gravity of type of 
 10 
 
security. The concluding remarks are contained in the last chapter where I outline the 
overview of chapters and future research.  
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CHAPTER 1  
Which Security Concept Should Investment Law Use? 
 
1. Definition of Security Studies  
As Robert Art states, “security is ambiguous and elastic in its meaning”. 1  This 
statement shows that security can be the subject matter of different approaches and 
interpretations. David A. Baldwin explicitly notes that security has been a neglected 
concept, and advocates the necessity of redefining it.2 Such a redefinition is important 
since security can justify a country’s derogation from its international commitments 
and obligations, including an obligation of peace-keeping against arms racing. 
Baldwin suggests that any definition of security must include two considerations, 
namely ‘security for whom?’ and ‘security for which values?’3 Baldwin’s suggestion 
is crucial in both policy and academic terms. This is because these considerations help 
security schools establish their own identity and create a distinction from other security 
schools.  
Before the Second World War, security was solely used as a concept to tackle external 
military threats in national defence policy. This belief was so widespread and 
predominant that it was taken for granted without any challenge. This is 
understandable because types of threats were not identified and states experiencing 
wars, imperialism, and colonisation placed their top priority on military security. 
Traditionally, security studies were likely to take a state-centric approach. Despite this, 
scholars constantly questioned the legitimacy of the dominant realist perspective 
towards security, as will be further discussed in the following section. An array of 
schools have attempted to influence and change the state-centric approach, thereby 
broadening the scope and deepening the referent object of security ranging from an 
individual to the international level.  
                                                     
1 R. Art, ‘Security’, in J. Krieger (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, New Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1993, p. 820, cited in H. G. Brauch, Environment and Human Security: 
Towards Freedom from Hazard Impacts, UNU-EHS, 2005, p. 8.  
2 D. A. Baldwin, ‘The Concept of Security’, Review of International Studies, vol. 23, no. 1, 1997, p. 8. 
3 Ibid p. 13. 
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In order to define security, Arnold Wolfers distinguishes between security in an 
objective sense and security in a subjective sense. In an objective sense, security 
concerns the absence of threats to acquired values, while in a subjective sense, it 
concerns the absence of fear that such values will be in danger.4 In other words, the 
existence of threats can be objectively evaluated whereas the level of fear where 
security is threatened to the unbearable level can be different depending on many 
variables facing countries. The variables are situations or factors which influence the 
psychology of a state including economic and military power, relationships with other 
states, and hegemonic status. For instance, one state can think that another country’s 
policy has a negligible influence on its interest or security without taking any particular 
actions against it. Another state can react very dramatically where the behaviour is 
viewed as directly threatening its national security. Thus, Wolfers’s definition implies 
the possibility of a state to politicise security issues by interpreting fear in a 
discretionary way. However, Wolfers’s statement regarding the objectiveness of 
threats is still questionable. This is because threats are determined and classified by 
each state based on its own political, social and economic circumstances, which are 
distinct from other states’. This gives rise to different understandings of security 
among states. For example, in terms of military aspects, the gap between states’ 
understandings can be narrower than an economic crisis and environmental 
degradation, as thresholds of economic emergency and environmental threats have not 
been agreed upon to invoke a national security claim. Conversely, the threshold of 
military insecurity is relatively clearer, as the presence of military threat can be 
determined based on a state’s declaration or physical attack. Yet, there is still room for 
discretion and subjective interpretations in which states can interpret behaviour of 
another state or a transnational actor as a threat. 
                                                     
4 A. Wolfers, ‘National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 67, no. 
4, 1952, pp. 481-502. 
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Figure 1 Wolfers's explanation of a state's reaction to another state's policy 
Walter Lippmann states, “a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger 
of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, 
to maintain them by victory in such a war”.5 His explanation is noteworthy although 
his definition is limited to a nation’s ability to defend its territory in a military sense. 
Since there is no agreement on what the core values are, it is not implausible that the 
meaning and scope of core values can be delineated by a state’s arbitrary decision. 
While Lippmann stays with the position that security should be within the military 
context, Richard Ullman argues that the concept of security should be expanded to 
cover natural disasters, such as epidemics, floods, and earthquakes, as a threat.6 
Ullman’s argument is a milestone given that it leaves more room for security studies 
in the context of natural disasters, as well as sparks strong resistance to the part of 
those who oppose the expansion of the scope of security.  
Since the Second World War, security has been the subject matter of different 
perspectives. Some perspectives have attempted to prove that the Realist School’s 
definition cannot reflect the needs of states. David Baldwin once described the period 
preceding the Second World War as ‘the most creative and exciting period in the entire 
                                                     
5 W. Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943, p. 51. 
6 R. H. Ullman, ‘Redefining Security’, International Security, vol. 8, no. 1, 1983, pp. 129-153. He 
questions the traditional understanding of security insofar as such understanding “presupposes that 
threats arising from outside a state are somehow more dangerous to its security than threats that arise 
from within” (p. 133). 
 
A Policy of        
a State 
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Other States 
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history of security studies’7 since many research centres and courses dealing with 
security issues at universities in the US were established. Also, the publication of many 
articles regarding security studies bolstered its emergence as a distinct academic 
discipline. Post-World War, the dearth of a dominant security school, culminated in 
diverse non-military issues being also taken into account. Additionally, scholars made 
an effort to integrate military security and other national objectives such as economic 
development and welfare in the ambit of security studies at this time.8  
Security studies during the 1950s and the 1960s essentially focused on issues pertinent 
to the use of military force in the international system as a consequence of the onset of 
the nuclear age. The emergence of nuclear weapons overemphasised the military 
contexts of security, thereby making other security issues insignificant. The main 
concern during this period was “how to use weapons of mass destruction as 
instruments of policy”.9 Yet, interest in security studies was in parallel with easing the 
tension between the US and the Soviet Union. Additionally, the Vietnam War, which 
led to anti-war sentiment in the US, dampened security studies.10  
In the 1970s and the 1980s, the focus of security studies shifted again to other issues, 
especially economic, mainly because of the truce between the US and the Soviet Union 
as well as the oil shock in 1973. The oil shock which showed America’s economic 
vulnerability illustrated that national security could also be threatened by economic 
sanctions. Yet again the renewed heightened tensions between the US and the Soviet 
Union in the 1980s changed the main focus of security studies into the use of armed 
force.  
During the Cold War, security studies in Europe focused on alternative defence and 
peace research. Despite Ole Wæver’s belief that peace and security are closely 
                                                     
7 D. A. Baldwin, ‘Security Studies and the End of the Cold War’, World Politics, vol. 48, no. 1, 1995, 
p. 121. 
8 B. Taylor, ‘The Evolution of National Security Studies’, National Security College Occasional 
Paper, no. 3, 2012, p. 3.  
9 S. M. Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 2, 
1991, p. 214. 
10 Ibid p. 215-216; and, Baldwin, 1995, supra note 7, p. 124.  
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related,11 during the Cold War, they were regarded as dramatically different.12 Since 
the 1980s, strategic studies which focused on power in the US and peace research 
which was widely done in Europe have been merged while sharing some ground, 
which eventually led to security studies. When peace researchers broadened the 
concept of violence to define peace, they reached a conclusion that anything that 
prevents people from realising their potential is violence.13 The application of the 
concept of violence to security by the peace researchers resulted in ‘the most extreme 
widenings in the history of security thinking’.14 The concepts of peace and security are 
related. Particularly, cases of military interventions, such as the United Nations (UN) 
peacekeepers, are – at least ostensibly – more frequently justified under the pretext of 
peace rather than for security. Despite their contribution and influence, the peace 
researchers are enjoined to participate in practices so as to complement lack of 
empirical grounds.15 
Figure 2 Development of security studies 
In the wake of the Cold War, security became aligned with the concept of 
development. Many scholars argued that the field of security studies should be no 
longer limited either to reduce the risk of nuclear war or to deter any superpowers. 16 
Rather, emphasis should be placed on a broadened agenda which widens the scope of 
                                                     
11 O. Wæver, ‘Peace and Security: Two Concepts and their Relationship’, in S. Guzzini and D. Jung 
(eds.), Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research, London: Routledge, 2004, 
pp. 53-65. 
12 C. A. S. E. Collective, ‘Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked 
Manifesto’, Security Dialogue, vol. 37, no. 4, 2006, pp. 461-2. 
13 J. Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.’ Journal of Peace Research, vol. 6, no. 3, 1969, 
pp. 168, 170. 
14 Wæver, 2004, supra note 11, p. 62. 
15 C. A. S. E. Collective, 2006, supra note 12, p. 462. 
16 S. M. Lynn-Jones and S. E. Miller, Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International 
Security, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995, p. 4. 
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WW II 
security to include not only military security, but also a variety of security issues such 
as environmental, economic, societal, and political security. This is believed to 
diversify the referent objects ranging from human security to international security 
beyond national security.17 The nexus between security and development was taken 
mainly by the UN and the World Bank for implementing many initiatives. The 
development angle transformed the focus from national security towards global human 
security. The idea of human security was adopted in the UN Development Programmes 
and used to conceptualise ‘greed and grievance’18 and ‘failed states’ dealing with 
societal conflict and unrest. Security was no longer understood only within the context 
of military and politics. For example, human rights can be violated without regard to 
any wars or political struggles. Biological wants and needs cause people to be at risk 
with chronic threats. This distress has justified intervention in underdeveloped 
countries by international organisations and developed countries,19 which eventually 
led to a controversy that damaging sovereignty can be legitimate by intervention.20  
   
                                                     
17 Ibid. 
18 See further M. R. Berdal and D. Malone, Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. 
19 This is often undertaken as ‘armed’ humanitarian intervention by military force, for example, Haiti 
(1994) and East Timor (1999). See further, N. Thomas, and W.T. Tow, ‘The Utility of Human 
Security: Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention’, Security Dialogue, vol. 33, no. 2, 2002.  
20 J. M. Welsh (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, Oxford University Press 
on Demand, 2004, pp. 34, 52. 
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2. The Evolution of Security  
To understand the evolution of the definition of security, it is necessary to evaluate 
each school of security studies starting from the traditional perspective of realism and 
neorealism. 
2.1. The Realist School 
The Realist School which focuses on traditional security studies, also recognised as 
strategic studies, examines what the real threats are, how best those threats can be dealt 
with, and how security actors manage and mismanage security policy. In other words, 
scholars of traditional security studies look at security issues from an objectivist 
perspective.  
Traditional approaches put military security at the core of security issues and focus on 
international relations rather than domestic affairs. Strategic studies have maintained 
that national security is only jeopardised by military-based threat, taking the state-
centric perspective. Thus, according to the strategic studies approach, a security 
concern arises only where a core value of a state is threatened by another state’s 
military means. This implies that national security concerns a conflict between states, 
and there should be a material military threat which amounts to damaging the core 
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values. Since the orthodox perspective had prevailed before the end of the Cold War, 
it could be taken for granted that security issues are to be limited to military security 
matters.  
Historically, realism was developed through the ideas of Thomas Hobbes’s 
Leviathan21 and Machiavelli’s The Prince. Hobbes saw the human nature as selfish 
and non-reliable, which leads the state of nature, without any controls, inevitably to be 
‘A war of all against all’.22 This state of nature makes a social contract between a state 
and citizens necessary, and this gives the state sovereignty.23 Whereas Hobbes justified 
the exclusive sovereignty, Machiavelli established a state’s right to implement 
excessive measures where necessary. Machiavelli’s main argument is “the end justifies 
the means”.24 Therefore, no matter the means, as long as it leads to a good end, it is 
legitimised. This consideration directly influenced the International Relations (IR) 
studies to deal with the situation of wars or military conflict between states. Thus, to 
keep other states from attacking one state’s territory and damaging the state’s core 
values, it is permissible to take any measures to remove the threat. 
Realists view the international system as anarchic. Here, the meaning of anarchy is the 
stage where there is no international authority which controls each state’s behaviour, 
rather than chaos in society. They also believe that national power defines the 
international system. National power involves economic wealth, population, and 
technology which enable the state to have more developed military forces.  
The characteristics became analysed and developed further by different variants of 
realism, such as neorealism (structural realism). Neorealism was first outlined by 
Kenneth Waltz in his work Theory of International Politics. 25  According to his 
argument, a state is an entity which is independent (self-help) and tends to pursue its 
own interest (survival), since a state cannot trust other states.26 Without any intentions 
to expand its own territory or to be hegemonic in the international system, a state 
                                                     
21 The original version of Leviathan was published in 1651. 
22 G. S. Kavka, ‘Hobbes's War of All against All’, Ethics, vol. 93, no. 2, 1983, p. 292.  
23 Ibid p. 296. 
24 D. N. Jones and D. L. Paulhus, ‘Machiavellianism’, in M. R. Leary and R. H. Hoyle (eds.), 
Handbook of Individual Differences in Social Behaviour, New York: Guilford Press, 2009, p. 93. 
25 K. N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Waveland Press, 2010 (originally published in 1979).  
26 Ibid pp. 91-105. 
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develops its military force. 27  Thus, a state tries to enhance its relative power by 
developing military or economic power. To sustain its sovereignty within its territory, 
a state can establish its own military for the sake of its security. Another state which 
does not regard the action in question as purely driven by a defensive objective can 
also develop its military forces further. This is where security dilemma28 appears. The 
uncertainty in other states’ behaviour eventually leads states to enter into arms races 
since states’ intentions are distortedly interpreted.  
Waltz claims that internal balancing and external balancing should be used to tackle 
this security dilemma and eventually to realise security. 29 Internal balancing is carried 
out by the state through the development of its own capabilities in economy and 
military while external balancing refers to the state’s entering into alliances or 
accessing to international organisations to check the power of other states.30  The 
balancing approach to security with cooperation is developed as “defensive realism” 
by Sean Lynn-Jones.31 Contrary to this defensive realism which emphasises balancing 
and cooperation as a solution, offensive realism by John Mearsheimer 32  places 
emphasis on maximising a state’s power. Although power remains a means to an end 
rather than an end in itself, offensive realism argues that maximising power is the best 
way to ensure a state’s survival. States need to assume the worst about other states’ 
intentions; thus alliances are not feasible. Mearsheimer, however, claims that the 
powerful states also have constraints. Although they want to pursue more power, 
before taking an offensive action, they consider other states’ potential reaction to their 
behaviour, thus contemplating the benefits and the risks of their actions.33 In short, 
neorealists argue that states do not trust one another and that they exist in international 
anarchy which gives rise to fear. Given that states are sensitive to their relative position, 
                                                     
27 K. Waltz, ‘The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory’, in R. I. Rotberg and T. K. Robb (eds.), The 
Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 43. 
28 J. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, vol. 2, no. 2, 1950, 
pp. 157-180. 
29 K. N. Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security, vol. 25, no. 1, 2000, 
pp. 5-41. 
30 Ibid. 
31 S. M. Lynn-Jones, ‘Realism and America’s Rise: A Review Essay,’ International Security, vol. 23, 
no. 2, 1998, pp. 157-182. 
32 J. J. Mearsheimer, ‘Structural Realism’, International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 
2007, pp. 75-77.  
33 J. J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
2001, p. 37.  
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cooperation between states is necessarily short-lived, which eventually leads to the 
predatory and self-help nature of the diplomacy system.34  
This argument does not reflect the reality of international relations which is premised 
on international and regional state cooperation in that cooperation exists at the regional 
and international levels, for instance, the EU and the UN. More specifically, there had 
been many wars, and territorial conflicts between European countries before the 
European Community was established in spite of many failures. By building up 
economic and political interdependence, states wish to escape from the chaotic 
international system and to embrace co-operation. Economic dependence is regarded 
as the most efficient tool that hinders states from triggering a war since their economy 
would be at stake.  
 
Another weakness of neorealism is that it does not fully explain the cause of war and 
conflicts in history. Most wars and tensions between states in the past emanated from 
the quest for territorial expansion, which is not necessarily the case these days. In fact, 
it could be argued that military threats are not the cause of tensions, but their result. 
Economic, societal, and political factors tend to bring about military threats. For 
example, there has been an array of wars caused by religion, ideology and the 
                                                     
34 Ibid pp. 51-53.  
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ownership of natural resources under the pretext of nominal reasons such as 
humanitarian or democracy. Focusing only on the military reason for national security 
without considering other motives of war will amount to trying to find a solution 
without contemplating the reason and the process.  
The main objective of the traditional approach to security is to preserve the status quo, 
rather than to enhance the level of security. Accordingly, neorealism focuses on 
identifying possible ways of coping with the world and international security 
environment, while refraining from incorporating radical changes or broadening and 
deepening horizons of security. For example, Paul Dibb once said “when every 
international worry becomes a security threat, the meaning of national security is 
trivialized.”35 Also, Stephen Walt criticises an attempt to consider non-military issues 
as a security agenda, claiming that “defining the field in this way would destroy its 
intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these 
important problems.”36 The main criticism of broadening security as espoused by the 
Realist School is this incoherence issue. If many sectors are covered in the scope of 
security, there can occur incompatibility and conflicts in standards between different 
issues. Yet, in order to solve the incoherence issue, it is suggested that security be 
invoked only with more strict and specific criteria so that they do not bring about any 
inconsistency.37 Traditionalists tend to think that other security threats do not involve 
the same urgency and potential ramification that a military threat portends. 
Nonetheless, a narrow approach to security issues may well miss global vicissitudes 
and render security studies outdated. Rather, security studies should evolve in parallel 
with the emergence of future urgent and dramatic security issues. A state should not 
only focus on defeating its adversary in military terms, but must also devise ways to 
disable the adversary’s economy and infrastructure, as evidenced during the Second 
World War, through economic sanctions. Even if the focus is placed on military threats, 
the state-centric view cannot deal with contemporary military issues, which are no 
longer limited between states but extending to those between a transnational network 
                                                     
35 P. Dibb, ‘Climate Change is no Strategic Threat’, The Spectator Australia, June 9, 2010, 
https://www.spectator.co.uk/2010/06/climate-change-is-no-strategic-threat/ (accessed August 4, 
2018). 
36 Walt, 1991, supra note 9.  
37 B. Buzan, O. Wæver and J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1998, p. 5. 
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and a state,38 including terrorist groups. The very gap between strategic studies and 
reality necessitates rethinking security studies, as noted below. 
2.2. The Copenhagen School and Securitisation 
The Copenhagen School originates from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute 
(COPRI) which was established in 1985. The COPRI, which was more empirically 
driven, tries to devise a new concept to comprehend security dynamics in Europe, 
rather than placing importance on theoretical disputes within IR.39 The Copenhagen 
School is linked to the idea of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s securitisation and 
desecuritisation.  
Wæver distinguished security and insecurity: the former refers to a case where there is 
an existential threat with sufficient counter-measures to deal with it, whereas the latter 
means that there is a threat but there are not sufficient measures available to tackle it.40  
Both security and insecurity are always relative because the determination whether 
there exists a sufficient measure would be likely influenced by a subjective judgement. 
Further, Wæver considers that security creates the opposite of normal politics which 
includes haggling and dialogue.41 
The Copenhagen School seeks to broaden and deepen the concept of security beyond 
military security and aims to devise a new concept which can explain and understand 
the reality better. When it comes to defining security, however, the Copenhagen 
School is influenced by the Realist School’s approach. In the book, ‘Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis,’ Buzan et al. argue that “security is about survival. It is when 
an issue is present as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object.”42 
This traditional approach which stems from the concept of military-political security 
helps the Copenhagen School to define security. However, for the Copenhagen School, 
                                                     
38 T. Barkwi, and M. Laffey, ‘The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies,’ Review of International 
Studies, vol. 32, no. 2, 2006, p. 330. 
39 C. A. S. E. Collective, 2006, supra note 12, p. 448. 
40 O. Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in R. D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 56-7. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Buzan et al., 1998, supra note 37, p. 21. 
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the referent objects are not confined to states, but include government, territory and 
society.  
The Copenhagen School’s two main focal points are a sectoral analysis of security by 
Buzan Barry and securitisation by Ole Wæver. Buzan sectoralises security by adding 
political, economic, societal and environmental security to traditional military security. 
His work articulates each security issue in its own contextual term, with practicality 
and applicability. Buzan’s sectoral-based analysis of security questions the boundary 
of security studies which was considered to be confined to national military security. 
In addition, Buzan claims that a state should not be the only key actor for security since 
security issues go beyond national military security. By expanding referent objects to 
an individual, the Copenhagen School finds it necessary to discuss security issues of 
identity and culture of a particular group of people such as religious or local 
communities. It is noteworthy that though Buzan accomplishes the sectoral analysis, 
he does not seem to examine whether one sector should be prioritised over others, as 
another security scholar has underlined a series of contradiction between sectors in 
terms of standards.43 Yet, the contradiction to some extent appears to be inevitable 
since the threshold for each sector to be securitised will vary.  
Wæver and Buzan argue convincingly that security is a socially and politically 
constructed product of a securitisation process which is enunciated by a policy actor. 
A security issue is not necessarily required to be a real threat. What is important is that 
it is framed as an existential threat by the enunciator. Ole Wæver elects a term of a 
speech act to explain securitisation. A speech act in this context means security issues 
are the political results from an illocutionary act of security agents.44 Then, the central 
questions of securitisation, Wæver argues, are “who can securitise what, and under 
what conditions?” 
The speech act enables a policy-maker to give a particular issue a special status with 
the label of security, thereby legitimising extraordinary governmental measures. An 
enunciator declares an issue has a real existential threat regardless of whether that is 
true or not. Although the speech may result in a social contest and disagreement against 
                                                     
43 D. Bigo, ‘International Political Sociology’, in P. D. Williams (ed.), Security Studies: An 
Introduction. New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 123. 
44 Wæver, 1995, supra note 40, p. 57. 
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it, if it becomes socially and politically accepted, then the issue is classified as an 
existential threat as the audience accepts it. This speech act, later on, was developed 
into securitisation and desecuritisation. Wæver coined the term “securitisation” to 
indicate the process of an issue becoming securitised. An issue can start from non-
politicised where people are not aware of the issue nor handle the issue. Then, it gets 
through politicised, where states can manage the issue by resource and governance, 
while the public is also aware of the issue, then to securitised where government cannot 
manage the issue anymore, thereby articulating the politicised issues as an ‘existential 
threat’ which needs to be security issues. The successful speech act combined with 
securitisation accords discretion to decide the enemy or to implement exceptional 
measures to remove the threats by all means beyond the normal realm of politics to the 
government. The idea of securitisation thus legitimises government’s implementation 
by all means since a government’s measure is not defined and demarcated. 
Securitisation always leaves room for abuse. As long as a government or a securitising 
actor is persuasive enough, the scope of security is unnecessarily broadened without 
any international consensus either to achieve the hegemonic goal of authority or to 
realise another purpose other than security. However, broadening the concept of 
security does not necessarily mean that more issues become threats and thus the higher 
frequency of invoking security takes place. In order to prevent an increasing number 
of threats, Wæver highlights the importance of desecuritisation.45 Wæver argues that 
invocation of security should be used at a minimum and a policy actor should aim to 
relabel a securitised issue as politicised, once the issue becomes manageable within 
the political sphere. In other words, the ultimate goal of securitisation, Wæver argues, 
should be desecuritisation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
45 Buzan et al, 1998, supra note 37, p. 4. 
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In addition to securitisation, the Copenhagen School claims, in Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis, that national security should be replaced with international 
security. This is because the term ‘national security’ implies that security studies 
should be state-centric. Considering that security should not be confined to only a 
nation, but can range from an individual to the globe, it is preferable to use the term 
‘international security.’ Additionally, the Copenhagen School adds that, given the 
relational nature of security characterised by security dilemma, power balances, and 
security regime, focusing on one isolated object, that is, the state is of little interest.  
The Copenhagen School has expressed scepticism about the inclusion of economic 
sector into the scope of security. It contends that market economy which is influenced 
by neo-liberalism allows for ups and downs in the economy and this inherent insecurity 
encourages competitions, which leads to increased efficiency and productivity. 46 
Moreover, the Copenhagen School argues that economic issues are not strictly separate, 
but rather pertinent to other sectors such as development issues, famine, and 
independence in military production. The Copenhagen School claims that a threat to 
national survival in the economic sector is more likely to arise from other security 
reasons such as war and cannot be understood as a serious threat unless the survival of 
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the whole population is at stake. Summing up, it argues that securitising economic 
issues is part of the political-ideological policy debate and can be construed as taking 
a nationalist and protectionist approach in economic policy. However, other security 
issues, as well as economic security issues, have multifaceted dimensions. Societal 
insecurity can arise out of chronic hunger and failed policies, while military insecurity 
is caused by economic tensions between states. That is why underestimating economic 
security, on account of its relationship with other sectors, cannot be justified.  
Buzan et al. argue that there should be different referent objects depending on places, 
times and issues. Buzan and Wæver devise a notion of societal security which is 
distinct from national security. Societal security, for Buzan and Wæver, is not a 
substitute for state security, but rather complementary to state security. Societal 
security then captures issues such as migration emphasising ‘concerns about identity’. 
Although the Copenhagen School widens security to societal security, it still argues 
that the main actor is a state and state elite who are able to securitise the issue and 
make policies.  
2.3. The Paris School 
The Paris School’s approach to security can be explained by two main characteristics: 
securitisation and governmentality. As suggested above, the Paris School shares an 
idea with the Copenhagen School regarding securitisation of a speech act to some 
extent. Didier Bigo, the most prominent scholar in the Paris School, agrees with the 
interpretation of security made by Ole Wæver in that anything can be enunciated as 
(in)security given occurrence of new types of fears even if one dominant actor decides 
the definition and the scope of security. Bigo’s starting point is to highlight the role of 
security. Security leads to legitimacy followed by politics which is situated at the heart 
of the meaning of security. Then the definition of security will depend on how the key 
actors legitimise various security issues. Since it is impossible for everyone’s interest 
to be taken into account at the same time, there are constant competitions between the 
capable actors to decide whose security is important and whose security can be 
sacrificed considering a case where violence conducted by one state can be interpreted 
as a way to serve the defence while the same violence can be understood as insecurity 
from the perspective of another state. The notion of sacrifice and its importance on the 
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process of securitisation led Bigo to conclude that the main questions should be “who 
is performing an (in)securitisation move or countermove, under what conditions, 
towards whom, and with what consequences?”47 Accordingly, Bigo suggests that it is 
necessary to clarify a policy actor, circumstances which enable securitisation, referent 
objects which are to be protected, and objects whose interest is compromised by the 
process of securitisation, and results caused by the securitisation.  
From the perspective of the Paris School, security and insecurity are the ramifications 
of a process of (in)securitisation. Bigo and Tsoukala argue that an actor who attempts 
to securitise an issue cannot precisely expect the final result since the result can vary 
depending on how to define the superiority of security among the actors and on how 
the audience will accept the definition. 48  Bigo and Tsoukala also criticise the 
Copenhagen School’s approach which focuses only on discursive forms of a speech 
act, which eventually leads to overlooking the processes and practices causing 
(in)securitisation.49 Beyond addressing an issue as a speech act, they argue that it is 
imperative to analyse the means and technologies used to securitise the issue by 
professionals.50 Their analysis on security professionals is not limited to government 
constituents, but also covers private agents and their practices. 
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Figure 5 The Paris School’s process of securitisation 
The difference between the Copenhagen School and the Paris School can also be found 
in the securitisation process. While the Copenhagen School insists that securitisation 
is realised by a particular speech act, the Paris School contends that routinised practices 
of professionals of security enable securitisation. Many actors can intervene in 
defining (in)security with different (in)securitisation moves. They should have enough 
credentials with the authority to declare an issue as a threat to securitise. Security and 
insecurity are the consequences of securitisation process led by a successful claim 
arising out of the competition and the struggles between actors. The successful claim 
is not always the same as what the actors expected it to be, as shown in Figure 5. This 
justifies the argument of the Paris School which lays great stress on the process.  
While the Copenhagen School is rooted in IR, the Paris School starts with analysing 
the relationship between a state and its citizens. 51 This approach is mainly influenced 
by the works of Michel Foucault. The concept of governmentality, suggested by 
Foucault, indicates how a government controls its citizenship with “the ensemble 
formed by the institutions, procedures, analysis and reflections, the calculations, and 
tactics.” 52  In other words, a state makes use of its bureaucratic means such as 
institutions so that the state can make a certain idea or a form into a norm.  
The Paris School suggests that security can be treated as a technique of government.53 
The Paris School also focuses on the outcomes of power games rather than intentions 
of the actors.54 Its main focus is placed on “practices, audiences and contexts” which 
determine the production of governmentality instead of emphasising speech acts per 
se. In other words, security is influenced by the discursive ability. Bigo more clearly 
states the process of securitisation is inevitably connected to ‘a field of security 
constituted by groups and institutions that authorise themselves and that are authorised 
                                                     
51 M. Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds.), The Foucault 
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52 Ibid p. 102. 
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54 J. Huysmans, ‘Migration and the Politics of Security’, in S. Body-Gendrot and M. Martiniello 
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to state what security is’.55 Eventually, the actors define security and, in so doing, they 
allow themselves to implement extreme measures with legitimacy. This is why for the 
actors, the successful securitisation stems from their discursive ability in order to gain 
legitimacy. Meanings which professionals of security produce and the productive 
power of their practices are the main foci of the Paris School.  
The Paris School also underlines the importance of the potential role of 
desecuritisation56 as an attempt to reframe security by understanding the limits of 
security and resistance. The Paris School argues that the widening approach also needs 
critical analysis by questioning “Who needs to survive and to be protected and from 
what” by sacrificing whom.57 Bigo also believes the sacrifice always ensues as a result 
of operating security. Thus, it is implausible to achieve a global security. 
Bigo articulates the inseparability of the process of securitisation and of the 
insecuritisation.58 Institutions securitise societal issues, by insecuritising the audience, 
thereby calling for certain protection for the audience. In other words, insecuritising 
the audience is a pivotal part of securitising social issues of which the objective is to 
legitimise certain excessive actions of institutions/state agencies. Bigo also argues that 
a concept of insecurity and threat helps agencies “to affirm their role as providers of 
protection and security.”59 More securitisation does not mean that the audience feels 
more secure. For instance, by addressing that one issue becomes a threat to a society, 
the actors or agents are permitted to intervene in an extreme way. Some coercive or 
abnormal actions taken by the agencies will increase a feeling of insecurity. The 
security dilemma, thus, is no longer limited to international relations, but it exists 
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domestically and internationally. Then the underlying intention for the act does not 
affect the level of security.  
The Paris School goes beyond the Copenhagen School’s understanding of 
securitisation process which gives rise to a dramatic change in the decision-making 
process and justifies the political exceptions. It analyses the bureaucratic political 
decisions, taking the Weberian rationalisation approach. 60  The rationalisation 
suggested by Max Weber results from scientific and technological advances as the 
process of modern society, which triggers people to behave by reason and rationality. 
Rationalisation tends to turn things into numbers and demands the use of technology 
with the aim of controlling human behaviour.61 Following a Weberian approach that 
focuses on the notion of utilising high technologies for communication and 
surveillance, Bigo and Tsoukala examine how the movement of populations is 
governed within the EU. They argue that the factors securing the borders of Europe 
are not limited to the discourses of the politicians, but expand to different transnational 
networks of professionals of (in)security. 62  These transnational professionals 
designate the priorities of security and urgencies of threats, which involve competition 
about the definition and the scope of security. 63  Bigo and Tsoukala mention that 
private actors, beyond politicians, such as the professionals of management of 
(in)security, and the private agencies of risk management, are involved in 
securitisation by their routines.64 They add that because some (in)securitisation moves 
are embedded as a routine, they are understood as the continuum of the routine rather 
than a particular speech act. 65 
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<The Paris School> 
Figure 6 Comparison between the Copenhagen School and the Paris School in 
securitisation 
Finally, the Paris School distinguishes itself from the Copenhagen School on the 
grounds of orientation. 66 While the latter advocates international security and makes 
use of the concept of survival, the former places emphasis on internal security – less 
international-oriented – and amalgamates the internal security with external one, 
which is contrary to the approach which sees a clear division between external and 
internal security. 67 
In that sense, distinct from other schools, the Paris School focuses more on policing 
practices, the development of internal security, and securitisation of migration in 
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Europe from the socio-political perspectives based on socio-political theory. The Paris 
School analyses politicisation of societal insecurities especially border controls and 
migration issues, incorporating different academic disciplines of criminology and 
political sociology of security.68 As it mainly examines societal and political security 
issues, it remains uncertain how its approach can be applied in the economic and 
environmental sectors.  
In conclusion, the Paris School takes a closer look at the structuring practices of 
security professionals, governmental rationality, and the effects of security technology 
and knowledge used by the security actors.69 However, because it emphasises the 
relationship between citizens and government or professionals of security and internal 
security rather than international politics relations by focusing on sociological theory, 
it is questionable if it can be applicable in realpolitik to deal with economic recessions 
or trans-border environmental conflicts involving states diplomacy.  
2.4. The Constructivist School 
Despite the new approach and the achievement of the Paris School, it neither 
sufficiently addresses the problem of the established concept of security, nor 
challenges the concept. On the contrary, the Constructivist School’s starting point is 
to question the constructed concept of security. In this section, two perspectives which 
take a constructivist perspective towards security will be demonstrated: Critical 
Security Studies (CSS) and the Welsh School.  
Contrary to strategic studies which are military-focused and state-centred, the critical 
approach takes a dynamic view of the security environment with a critical 
understanding of the relationship between theory and practice. CSS was influenced by 
the Frankfurt School’s critical studies which argue that all knowledge is produced 
socially and politically, thereby playing a role of serving interests of a particular group 
of people; hence, knowledge is a social process. Also, Robert Cox who articulates 
necessity of applying the critical theory in IR states that knowledge (theory) is “always 
                                                     
68 Ibid. 
69 C. A. S. E. Collective, 2006, supra note 12, p. 449. 
 33 
 
for someone and for some purpose.”70 Based on Cox’s words, regressive theories are 
for those who are currently in power for the sake of their maintenance in their power 
and position. 
Critical theorists contend that a socially constructed concept such as society and 
politics should be denaturalised. In other words, the objective of critical theory is to 
reject belief and knowledge which are widely taken for granted – naturalism – and to 
grasp the way society is organised root and branch.71  The critical theorists expect that 
destructuring and questioning can lead to social progress. Max Horkheimer argues that 
this social progress eventually brings about emancipation. For Horkheimer, 
emancipation is the freeing of individual human beings from suffering to pursue their 
happiness. In reality, however, the circumstances surrounding human beings hinder 
possibilities for a better life since the way the society is organised is not conducive to 
realising the possibilities, but rather serves the interest of capital. 72  Although his 
analysis mainly focuses on criticising capitalism, his attempt to understand society 
from different angles by questioning the prevailing order and politics provides the 
ground for critical security studies.  
Unlike traditional approaches laying emphasis on what security really is and what 
threats are (objective fact), CSS starts from questioning what strategic studies takes 
for granted, namely, the referent object of security is only state and security studies 
only concern military threats. Traditionalists determined the referent object as a state 
and this idea was taken for granted, so CSS’s starting point was to question the 
traditional perspective to security studies focusing on a state as an actor, and to 
deconstruct their predominant ideas of security. Security by CSS is understood in 
different contexts including how it can be variously represented, which involves a 
political debate dealing with different issues. CSS has begun in earnest with 
questioning the referent object of security by Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams.73  
Rethinking who or what is to be secured and for what reasons leads to an attempt to 
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broaden the security agenda. Where the referent object involves not only a state but 
also other referent objects such as an individual, the scope of security is also widened 
because it is necessary to consider how the security of the other referent objects can 
be achieved, which is not necessarily related to physical security against war.74  
Distinct from Krause and Williams’ study,75 Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones have 
been another phase of critical studies, the Welsh (Aberystwyth) School. 76  Booth 
underlines the dynamic interaction between ideas and reality in human relations.77 He 
pointed out the two main problems of the traditional approach to security. First, the 
military-focused security approach does not solve the security dilemma. It rather leads 
to high spending on the defensive military establishment. Second, other threats and the 
well-being of people arise as new security issues. For instance, daily threats such as 
chronic hunger and societal instability that some people suffer in failed states are not 
dealt with in the context of the traditional security perspectives.78 The new challenges, 
including ethnic rivalry, political oppression and economic recessions, are primarily 
the results of governmental policies rather than of other states’ desire to expand their 
territory. He adds that if those issues were not treated, more instability within the 
territory would ensue. In addition to this, issues of refugees and violence occurring at 
borders have increased tensions between states. Booth compares developing countries 
with wealthy countries, arguing that there has not been a war between developed 
countries since the Second World War.79 His comparison explicates that the countries 
which did not achieve democracy and economic freedom are more exposed to the 
possibility of wars and conflicts.  
Booth argues that a critical approach should be an attempt to move beyond prevailing 
structures and ideologies surrounding the issues in question by understanding many 
different perspectives including political and historical. Moreover, he asserts that in 
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order to understand security, one needs to embrace ideas pertaining to different 
referent objects and threats and to conduct an analysis at different levels. The ultimate 
referent object, for Booth, should be individuals, while states can be a means to provide 
security. Booth says “it is illogical to privilege the security of the means as opposed to 
the security of ends.”80 This reiterates Booth’s argument that individual’s security, 
which is the end, should always take precedence over states’ security. It implies that 
each individual’s sacrifice to achieve a state’s security such as war to defeat 
adversaries cannot be justified.  It is logical to think that the ultimate referent object of 
security should be each individual, but the appropriate referent object can differ on a 
case-by-case basis. From Booth’s perspective, security is emancipation, not given by 
power and order which are exclusive of individuals. He thinks ‘security means the 
absence of threats.’  When people are free from not only physical constraints caused 
by war but also from basic human needs and wants including poverty, and poor 
education. The critical security approach can better reflect demand in reality and 
escape from the Western-centric view. Nevertheless, the emancipation idea fails to 
suggest how the recognition of issues and such demand can become a policy to fulfil 
the basic human needs. Booth argues that those who have been ignored by the 
traditional security studies should be considered as security subjects. By doing so, the 
scope of (in)security includes human rights abuses, minority issues and 
marginalisation of women and powerless groups of people.81  
Booth and Wyn Jones82 have clearer answers when there is a clash between different 
securities. They, especially Booth, argue that the pivot of security studies is the 
individual emancipation which is prior to other security issues involving power and 
order.83 Prioritising power and order may well entail the sacrifice of some people. 
When security means the absence of threats,84 Booth argues that constraints which 
prevent people from carrying out their desires are threats, and military threats are just 
one of those constraints.85 He concludes that states should not be the main referent 
objects of security in spite of their importance in the world politics because they are 
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“unreliable, illogical, and too diverse in their character”.86 The history has shown that 
states sometimes do not behave in a reliable way, which is evidenced by the two World 
Wars, and failed states which oppress their own citizens. Also, since he puts 
individuals or groups of security at the heart of the studies, it is illogical that states’ 
security should have primacy. Lastly, the character of each state cannot be explained 
and described in homogenous terms. That is, each state faces its own unique 
circumstances in economic, political and societal contexts. Therefore, simply 
determining a state as the main referent object can lead to standardising characteristics 
of states, thereby disregarding different variables between states. Booth situates the 
reciprocity of rights at the heart of his argument of emancipation. Freedom and well-
being of one depend on those of another. He does not demarcate the boundary between 
external and internal security.87 While understanding realism has played a role to deal 
with inter-state wars, he points out that violence is not only a consequence of wars; it 
is performed by states towards populations for a number of reasons.88  
3. Risk 
The notion of security has been studied and analysed, as it plays an important role in 
determining types of security measures (or emergency measures) that can be 
legitimised in order to tackle threats or abnormal situations. However, it has been 
increasingly suggested that risk than security can better grasp the post-Cold War era.89 
Buzan and Hansen argue that risk analysis has been considered as a better way to tackle 
terrorism and migration issues. 90  In addition to those issues, the concept of risk 
assessment has been also widely used in the decision-making for locating an 
investment. Once risk analysis influenced security studies, embracing risk as part of 
security studies is deemed as a reflexive way to approach security in that coping with 
current and existential threats is no longer sufficient to achieve security. Risk analysis 
is based on the estimation of threats in the future. Hence, the objective of the analysis 
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is to predict future threats and devise rational measures or policies which can diminish 
or even remove the risk.91  
As defined in dictionaries, risk means the possibility of something bad and unpleasant 
happening. Jaeger et al. define risk as “a situation or event in which something of 
human value (including human themselves) has been put at stake and where the 
outcome is uncertain.” 92  In this definition, uncertainty is closely related to the 
existence of risk. Henry N. Pollack also clearly expresses the inseparability between 
uncertainty and risk, claiming that risk arises out of uncertainty and even with the most 
developed technology and scientific methods, absolute certainty cannot be expected.93 
Risk is not a present threat, but a threat which has a possibility to happen in the future. 
The development of risk analysis began in the 1990s when scholars argued that risk is 
a socially constructed concept by questioning the objectiveness of risk as a simple 
mixture of harm and probability.94 Ulrich Beck argues that risks are generally invisible, 
but they can only exist when they are defined by institutions which possess knowledge, 
such as the mass media, legal systems and science.95 The institutions who can define 
risks are also able to redefine and adjust the level of risks. In order to illustrate the 
aspect of risk as a socially constructed concept, Beck articulates relations of definition 
which means that actors who have the power to define risk can “maximise risks for 
others and minimise for themselves”.96 He added that this is evidenced by the attempts 
of Western governments and non-governmental actors such as credit rating agencies 
to define risks for others. 
Beck also contends that experiencing a negative event in the past leads to predicting 
the wrong type of risk. Thus, focusing on one risk, as a result of the negative event in 
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the past, can lead to overlooking other risks since a catastrophic event does not arise 
out of our expectation and calculation in relation to the past.97 Although risk analysis 
was at first grounded on the premise that risks are measurable and calculable, 
according to Beck’s theory of risk society, in modern society, risks can go beyond 
calculable repercussions and compensability. Diversified security threats, such as 
transnational terrorist groups and economic and environmental threats, not only 
increase the security threats but also make security risks complex and less 
predictable.98 Therefore, from Beck’s perspective, the concept of risk is not static, but 
socially constructed and open to changes by reflecting the societal events.99 By the 
same token, Niklas Luhmann argues that risk is an indicator to calculate the ‘likelihood’ 
of that negative occurrence, but it cannot predict what will exactly happen in the future 
since there are many causes which hinder things from going as predicted and it is not 
plausible that rational calculation can take all causes into account.100  
Beck also analyses the relevance of technology and risk. In modernity (risk society), 
technology gives rise to unpredictable events which cannot be insured against since 
those events have “unimaginable implications”, which makes the future uncertain.101 
Adding to Beck’s argument, other scholars also claim that the progress of technology 
was expected to develop the society better, but the unintended results of modernisation 
have increased risk concerns.102 For example, with respect to the 9/11 terrorist attack, 
by pointing out the unpredictability of such an event, Beck underlines that society has 
become less competent to ensure its own security. Given the inability, Beck suggests 
that transnational threats can be only tackled by cosmopolitanism, which indicates all 
states should be involved in the process of dealing with the risk in question.103 Despite 
the ideal aspect of cosmopolitanism, it is difficult for all states to have the same 
perspective on transnational risk issues. Whereas terrorism is something all countries 
should regard as a threat, some issues such as migration and environment policies still 
remain controversial. Moreover, any issues which affect one national interest, 
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 39 
 
especially of powerful countries, hardly can be labelled as a universal threat even if 
the risk is deemed as threatening the rest of world.  
In a situation where risk is less calculable and predictable, analysing how people 
perceive risk and how institutions govern it becomes fundamental. Mary Douglas and 
Aaron Wildavsky analyse how culture can affect people to perceive risk by applying 
the cultural theory (CT) in their book, Risk and Culture. They contend that risk 
perception about social and environmental concerns is socially and culturally 
framed. 104  Individuals are living in a society which frames individuals’ values, 
attitudes and worldviews. Where one event occurs, an individual does not recognise 
the event based on his/her individual cognitive processes but based on socially shared 
values. 105  Since values determine the interpretation of information, people with 
different values tend to interpret differently on the same issue and accept fear 
selectively.  
In CT, Douglas and Wildavsky argue that risk perception is closely related to ‘cultural 
adherence’ and ‘social learning’. 106  To understand cultural adherence and social 
learning, they built grid-group typology. Grid index (control) refers to what degree 
individuals’ behaviour is restricted and group index (commitment) refers to what 
degree one individual is bonded to a social group he/she belongs to. Depending on the 
level of grid and group, worldviews are classified into individualistic, egalitarian, 
hierarchical, and fatalistic. For instance, individualists (low grid, low group) see the 
world as self-governing and understand risk as part of life and an opportunity having 
a potential to enhance their lives. They consider anything that can impede their 
freedom as a risk. Likewise, egalitarians (high group, low grid) dislike social structures 
which are defined by a small group of elite and they think the structures should be 
open to negotiation. They fear inequality within their society and see it as a risk which 
will damage the future generations. Those with the hierarchical worldview (high group, 
high grid) determine which risk is acceptable and which is not, depending on 
                                                     
104 M. Douglas and A. Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and 
Environmental Dangers, California: University of California Press, 1982. 
105 A. Wildavsky, and K. Dake, ‘Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why?’, Daedalus, 
vol. 119, no. 4, 1990, pp. 41–60. 
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culture and surroundings. Social learning indicates a process that a member of society learns certain 
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 40 
 
governmental authorities’ decisions. If the risk is legitimised by the government, they 
believe the risk is acceptable. The fatalists (low group, high grid) also share some 
commonalities with those with the hierarchical worldview insofar as they show full 
compliance with socially assigned rules, but they tend not to challenge anything if they 
believe they cannot.  
The classification analysis demonstrates that depending on the worldview, people can 
perceive one event differently. Cass R. Sunstein explores how Americans perceive 
terrorism and climate change, both of which can cause catastrophic repercussions.107 
They show a high level of fears and concerns against terrorism, while climate change 
was less likely to be regarded as a severe threat. In view of the grid/group typology, 
Americans are less egalitarian and more individualistic given that they do not fear 
climate change which involves the welfare of future generation, while they show a 
high level of concerns against terrorism which will directly affect their freedom and 
lives. Accordingly, Sunstein concludes the risk perception mainly stems from ‘cultural 
cognition’ or ‘cultural orientations’.108  
Beck’s explanation on how risk is constructed and the work of Douglas and Wildavsky 
analysing risk perception effectively challenge risk’s objectivity; risk always has room 
for an arbitrary definition and people react differently to the same issue not because of 
the risk’s characteristic but because of their cultural value or the intent of policy elite. 
The real question is how the theory of risk society and the cultural theory should 
interact in politics. The limitation of risk analysis lies in dealing with consequences of 
governmental measures towards risk. If the risk is defined by institutions which retain 
authority, this feature always gives discretion for labelling political adversaries as 
future threats. Since the potential damage is expected to be significantly high, 
politicians are more likely to overreact than underestimate risks in order to avoid 
political responsibility.109 If a powerful country imposes a sanction against a powerless 
country probably because a policy or behaviour of the country seems suspicious, a 
problem arises where the impact of measures taken outweighs the perceived 
misbehaviour. It is also problematic where the decision to impose sanctions per se is a 
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misjudgement in the first place or where the behaviour proved not to be a threat. 
Therefore, the next step of risk analysis should aim to deal with consequences, more 
specifically, compensation issues. For example, a host state implements a measure 
based on its risk analysis and assessment, which adversely affects foreign investment, 
but if the risk turns out as false or the measure concerned proves inappropriate, the 
foreign investors will be entitled seek to adequate compensations.  
Furthermore, as Beck suggests, it is necessary to bring a question of defining risks to 
the table, despite the difficulty in reaching an agreement. Since measures on risk are 
pre-emptive, they should always be under the close scrutiny of all states to ascertain if 
they are not used as a means to achieve other objectives. Therefore, delineating scope 
and level of governments’ action towards risk should be also discussed at the 
international level to prevent governments’ arbitrary measures although this should 
not be used as a barrier to achieving security and public welfare of one state.  
4. My Approach 
The Realist School’s approach has clearly demonstrated its limitations to the extent 
that it cannot reflect the evolving security demands in preparation for emerging 
security threats and risks. Their sole emphasis on the existential interstate military 
threats would prevent states from taking measures against other types of national 
exigencies, such as an economic crisis, and diminish the importance of enhancing 
preparedness and resilience against risks with potentially catastrophic ramifications. 
Consequently, the inability of incorporating diverse security interests leads to 
questioning the legitimacy of security studies. Therefore, in this thesis, I draw on the 
Copenhagen School since it relies on the broadened notion of security, based on the 
sectoral analysis and the speech act theory. The sectoral analysis can provide the 
grounds for widening security – the incorporation of political and socio-economic 
security – and this resultantly can expand the scope of legitimate security measures. 
The speech act analysis is also adequate to explain how an issue, which was not 
recognised as a threat, becomes politicised and securitised. However, the Copenhagen 
School does not explain which type of security should take precedence where different 
security interests are in conflict. The school also does not discuss the possibility that 
securitisation could develop against its initial enunciated plans. Thus, given the 
Copenhagen School’s limitations, I blend its insights with other schools’, such as the 
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Constructivist School and the Paris School. Based on the Constructivist School’s 
approach, where different security interests are in conflict, a state should prioritise 
individuals’ security over others, as they are the essential security referent object. 
Moreover, regarding securitisation, insights from the Paris School and the 
Constructivist School can help to scrutinise the process of securitisation by questioning 
the intention of securitisation and assessing whether the result of securitisation is 
consistent with the initial plans, which can be used as a basis to determine the 
legitimacy of measures.    
5. Conclusion  
A security clause exempts a state from international obligations in case of an urgent 
situation which threatens the core values of the state so that international obligations 
are not to be used as a barrier to the pursuit of national welfare. The implied importance 
of security bolstered scholars to pursue a clearer understanding of security and 
minimise government abuse of security. These security studies have implications for 
investment law, as the incorporation of such an understanding can provide better 
guidelines for host states to introduce measures related to security that affect foreign 
investors and foreign investment. 
As shown above, over the decades, the focus of security studies has varied. If 
international tension, such as the Second World War and the Cold War, is aggravated, 
the external military threat may well be regarded as primary threats whereby 
significance of other threats can be diminished. The sequent events of the two world 
wars and the Cold War justified the Realist School’s argument that military security 
was the top priority. Following the Cold War, security scholars began to question the 
legitimacy of the Realist School’s perspective and sought to delineate the scope of 
security and referent objects which should be incorporated into the realm of security 
by broadening and deepening security studies. This effort led to redefining security. 
One conclusion which can be inferred from the attempts to redefine security is that, 
given the political characteristic and inherent ambiguity, security cannot be easily 
defined. The two specifications – security for whom and security for which values - 
which were suggested by Baldwin to define security are seminal because they can 
provide the ground to define security. Obviously, threats and core values are pivotal 
concepts for determining security. However, these concepts are subject to ambiguity 
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and subjectivity since threats and fears of a state are determined by its specific 
variables. 
The Realist School denounced broadening the scope of security and expressed its 
concern over trivialisation of security issues, while underestimating urgency and 
ramifications of other security issues. Despite the Realist School’s argument, other 
security issues such as economic, societal, political and environmental insecurity can 
give rise to consequences which are as formidable as military threats. In addition, 
military threats are not simply caused by political conflicts between states, but by 
economic and ideological reasons. That is why focusing only on military issues can 
lead to overlooking the main cause of the threats. Thus, military security cannot simply 
take precedence over other security concerns.  
Security schools including the Copenhagen School, the Paris School, and the 
Constructivist School challenged the Realist School’s narrow approach due to the 
latter’s inability to recognise other security demands. 
The Copenhagen School seeks to broaden the scope of security by sectoral analysis 
and diversify the referent objects from a state to society. Moreover, it demonstrates 
how an issue becomes politicised and securitised (securitisation) by a speech act. The 
Copenhagen School’s objective was not to unconditionally incorporate all the issues 
into the category of security. Instead, Wæver argues that invoking security should be 
minimised and issues should be tackled within the normal politics, if possible, by 
encouraging desecuritisation.  
The Paris School also illustrates how an issue becomes securitised. Distinct from the 
Copenhagen School, the Paris School’s securitisation involves competition between 
actors and gives rise to security and insecurity since securitisation does not always 
proceed as planned on account of contingencies in the process. The Paris School does 
not confine security actors to a government but expands to other professionals. The 
Copenhagen School and the Paris School have the same view of defining security 
insofar as any issue can be classified as security as long as the actors are persuasive 
and audiences accept it. When it comes to securitisation, while the Copenhagen School 
places emphasis on how an issue is securitised, the Paris School explains tactics of 
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securitisation which are accompanied by governmentality and usage of 
(in)securitisation as a tool to reaffirm a role of the actors.  
Lastly, the Constructivist School (CSS and the Welsh School) criticises the 
predominant view – the Realist School – in that the realist approach cannot solve 
security dilemma, and the narrow view cannot respond to other new threats. The 
Constructivist School does not confine its view into one specific approach. It rather 
incorporates many different perspectives to determine what should be considered a 
threat and what should be secured from the threat within the realm of security. The 
Constructivist School points out that where countries experience societal instability, 
they are more exposed to wars and conflicts, which shows that certain level of social 
stability is a prerequisite to achieve security. It also claims that the ultimate referent 
object are individuals, not states because states exist for individuals (nationals). Yet, 
the Constructivist School argues that depending on the type of issues, the referent 
object can vary. This approach looks at security in a more flexible and reflexive way.  
 
The 
Realist 
School 
The 
Copenhagen 
School 
The Paris 
School 
The Constructivist 
School  
(The Welsh School) 
 
Definition 
of 
Security 
Survival 
Survival 
(Societal 
survival) 
Defined 
by actors 
Emancipation 
(Absence of threats) 
Threat 
Military 
threats 
damaging 
core 
values 
Declared by 
policy actors 
Declared 
by actors 
Constraints which 
prevent people from 
carrying out their 
desires 
Referent 
Object 
State 
State, 
government, 
territory, society 
State 
Individuals 
(however, it can be 
decided on a case-
by-case basis) 
Scope 
Military or 
military-
related 
Economic, 
Military, 
Environmental, 
Societal, and 
Political 
Mainly, 
political 
and 
societal 
Not limited, both 
international, 
national, and 
individual level 
Table 2 Comparison of Schools’ views towards security 
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Although the coverage of security studies became diverse, it was convincingly 
suggested that security is not sufficient to make the best of the current situation since 
security has a reactive characteristic. Put differently, if there occurs an existential 
threat which has catastrophic ramifications, the result of the threat is unrecoverable. 
Accordingly, this calls for risk analysis with a pre-emptive action.   
Risk analysis started with the premise that risk is calculable, so it has an objective 
characteristic. However, this objectivity has been challenged by an array of analyses. 
Beck’s ‘relations of the definition’ provides understanding that risks can be labelled 
by those who possess power and knowledge. The cultural theory by Douglas and 
Wildavsky also illustrates that risk is not objectively recognised, but rather it is 
perceived based on the cultural value of a society where an individual belongs or the 
intent of policy elite. Beck’s explanation and the risk perception analysis of Douglas 
and Wildavsky proved that risk has space for an arbitrary definition and manoeuver. 
Security studies should be directed towards not only security issues but also the 
process of securitisation. Furthermore, if security studies fail to reflect security 
demands, the studies will become obsolete and government can be potentially hindered 
from pursuing their security. As will be shown in the following chapters, the 
understanding of current or evolving security demands is pivotal. This is because cases, 
following emergency measures taken by the Argentine government, which affected 
the interests of foreign investors, illustrate that economic security is as imperative as 
military security. Thus, the limited approach to security would create contradiction 
between security studies and current security demands, at least in the IIL area. The 
evolution of security is not limited to currently existing threats, but extends to threats 
in the future, and, if necessary, it can become wider and narrower. Therefore, security 
should evolve in parallel with the development of threats, core values and demands in 
reality. The next chapter will examine how this evolution of security has been 
incorporated in national security policies.   
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CHAPTER 2  
The Notion of Security in International Investment Law 
and Policy 
 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter problematised the concept of security and analysed different 
schools’ theoretical approaches to security. The attempt to demonstrate the evolution 
of security and to analyse the security schools is imperative in this thesis in that it 
demonstrates how security has been conceptualised. The analysis shows that the 
concept of security should continue to be probed because it is constantly evolving. In 
addition to examining each security school, the previous chapter provides a basis to 
justify the argument of this thesis on which security school’s approach adequately 
reflects real contemporary demands, especially regarding the interpretation of security 
exceptions in IIL.  
My main argument in the previous chapter is that the limited approach to security can 
no longer reflect the real demands of the international society and states’ interests in a 
globalised world. Hence, a new approach is necessary. Security concerns are not 
confined to only military conflicts between states, but cover economic and political 
stability and social matters. What is more, conflicts between states or between social 
groups do not always stem from one simple reason. Therefore, a comprehensive 
approach which can reflect contemporary security issues is needed in national arenas 
and in IIL. 
While the concept of security has evolved in the national security area, it was not 
widely discussed in IIL prior to the Argentine cases. The Argentine cases originated 
from certain emergency measures the Argentine government took against its economic 
crisis. These cases shed light on the evolving concept and scope of security, more 
specifically on essential security interests in IIAs as well as the economic aspect of 
necessity under customary international law. Tribunals of the Argentine cases were 
requested to determine if the measures taken against economic exigencies could fall 
within the scope of essential security interests and if certain emergency measures could 
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be excused due to the Argentine crisis. Importantly, the Argentine cases interrogate 
whether a measure aimed at tackling an economic crisis could be legitimised on the 
grounds of essential security interests in IIL (ex-post). At the same time. The cases 
create further room for discussion regarding the legitimacy of any policies and 
measures for protecting public needs and essential security interests that affect foreign 
investment prior to any economic or financial crisis (ex-ante).1  
Given the importance of the Argentine cases regarding the interpretation of essential 
security interests and necessity, this chapter will show the broader approach to security 
of international judicial bodies on national security exceptions in IIL. Firstly the 
chapter contributes to the analysis of the Argentine cases. Furthermore, this chapter 
will look at the terms related to security: public order, essential security interests, and 
national security by comparing how they have been used in international law and 
construed by judicial bodies. This chapter will also elucidate the relationship between 
security exceptions and a state of necessity. The basic argument of thie thesis is that a 
host state should be able to take security measures against economic insecurity, such 
as an economic crisis, on the grounds of essential security interests in IIAs. The thesis 
also argues that a clear demarcation of security exceptions can help secure the policy 
space of a host state in relation to foreign investment and also prevent arbitrary 
measures implemented by a host state.  
2. Interpretation of Security in International Investment 
Agreements 
2.1. Background of the Argentine Cases 
CMS, Enron, LG&E, and Continental Casualty Company (“the Claimants”, which are 
American foreign investors) respectively commenced arbitration proceedings against 
the Argentine Republic before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID).2 The Claimants claimed that their rights under the 1991 Bilateral 
Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning 
                                                     
1 The discourse on the relationship between foreign investment and security in ex-ante terms includes 
permission issues on establishment or mergers and acquisitions of certain industries, mostly, critical 
industries by foreign investors, which does not involve emergency situations.  
2 Continental Casualty Company invested in CNA Aseguradora de Riesgos del Trabajo S.A. (CNA), 
an insurance company. 
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the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment (the Argentina-US BIT),3 
the essential security interests clause is reserved only for military considerations as 
opposed to economic and political ones. 4  Therefore this chapter will examine 
Argentine emergency measures in relation to the cases of CMS v. Argentine Republic,5 
LG&E v. Argentine Republic,6 Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic7 
and Enron v. Argentine Republic.8  
The cases are closely linked to Argentine Economic Reforms in 1989,9 which included 
economic liberalisation, privatisation of critical industries, and negotiation of bilateral 
investment treaties in order to foster foreign investment and international trade.10 To 
privatise Gas del Estado, a state-owned gas entity, the Argentine government enacted 
the Gas Law (Law 24.076)11 in 1992 and the Gas Decree (Decree 1738/92)12 on gas 
transportation and distribution for the implementation of the Gas Law. Thus, to 
implment the privasation, Gas del Estado was divided into two gas transportation and 
eight distribution companies.13 CMS Gas Transmission Company (CMS) invested in 
Transportadora de Gas del Norte (TGN), one of the gas transportation companies. 
Enron Corporation (Enron) invested in Transportadora de Gas del Sur (TGS), the other 
transporation company. LG&E Corporation invested in gas distribution companies, 
while Continental Casualty Company invested in the financial sector. The Argentine 
government also enacted the Convertibility Law in order to stabilise the Argentine 
peso and encourage foreign investment. From 1992 to 2001, Argentina pegged the 
Argentine peso at par with the US dollar. 14  While Argentina pursued vigorous 
                                                     
3 Treaty between United States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investment (1991).  
4 LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp, LG&E International Inc v Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, Oct 3, 2006, (hereinafter LG&E Decision), paras 217-219.  
5 CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, September 2005 
(hereinafter CMS Award). 
6 LG&E Decision, supra note 5. 
7 Continental Casualty Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9, September 5, 2008 
(hereinafter Continental Award). 
8 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
May 2007 (hereinafter Enron Award). 
9 Law No. 23.696 of 1989 on the Reform of the State. 
10 J. Bambaci, T. Saront and M. Tommasi, ‘The Political Economy of Economic Reforms in 
Argentina’, The Journal of Policy Reform, vol. 5, no. 2, 2002, p. 75.  
11 Law No. 24.076 of 1992 on the Privatization of the Gas Sector (Gas Law).  
12 Decree No. 1738/92 on the Implementation of the Gas Law (Gas Decree). 
13 J. Crawford, K. Lee and E. Lauterpacht (eds.), ICSID Reports (vol. 14), Cambridge University 
Press, 2009, p. 165.   
14 Law No. 23.928 of 1991 on Currency Convertibility and Decree No. 2128/91. 
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privatisation of critical industries further to its economic plan, a severe economic crisis 
struck Argentina at the end of the 1990s. To tackle the crisis, the Argentine government 
enacted economic measures including restricting the right to withdraw money from 
bank accounts (pesos 250 or US $250 a week).15 Despite these measures, the crisis 
worsened whereby the government declared a default on its foreign debt.  
Emergency Law No. 25.561 was enacted in January 2002 which declared a public 
emergency until December 10, 2003. The Emergency Law effected a reform in the 
foreign exchange system16 and abolished the Convertibility Law.17 The calculation of 
tariffs in US dollars was abandoned, the peso was devalued, and different exchange 
rates were applied to different transactions. CMS, Continental Enron and LG&E 
claimed that the Argentine government took the following emergency measures:  
i) Termination of the Convertibility Law (1 Argentine peso=1 US dollar) and 
devaluation of the peso; 
ii) Restriction on the right to withdraw deposits from bank accounts; 
iii) Prohibition on free transfer of funds out of its territory; 
iv) Pesification of US dollar-denominated deposits;18 and 
v) Default on governmental debt. 
The Argentine government requested a discussion with the Claimants over a 
suspension of a tariff adjustment in accordance with the United States Producer Price 
Index (US PPI) because an increased tariff in the energy sector might well deepen the 
economic recession. After gas transportation companies including CMS and Enron 
agreed on the suspension, ENARGAS, the national gas regulatory entity, and the 
Argentine government decided to continue the suspension of the tariff adjustment 
based on the US PPI. Moreover, tariffs which had been denominated in dollars were 
redenominated in pesos at par while governmental or private debt was converted at a 
rate of 1.40 peso to one US dollar.  
                                                     
15 Decree No. 1570/2001, December 3, 2001. The limitations on cash withdrawal are called “the 
Corralito”. 
16 Law No. 25.561 of 2002 (Emergency Law). 
17 Ibid and Decree 260/02 of the National Executive Power, February 8, 2002. 
18 Private or governmental debt was calculated at a rate of 1.40 peso for each nominal US dollar and 
others were converted at par. 
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Following the implementation of those emergency measures, the foreign investors 
claimed that the Argentine government’s promises and guarantees in the BIT and 
licences were not fulfilled, especially in light of a real return in dollar terms and the 
adjustment of tariffs (based on the US PPI),19 and that the devaluation of the peso made 
a negative impact on cost structures. In addition, CMS asserted that the value of the 
shares that it acquired in TGN dramatically decreased and that this occurred because 
tariff adjustments did not take place and tariffs had been calculated in pesos, not in US 
dollars, which led to a severe decrease in the tariff revenue. The Claimants, thus, 
claimed that the measures taken by the Argentine government violated commitments 
made to foreign investors, such as the calculation of tariffs in US dollars, the 
adjustment of tariff in accordance with the US PPI, and the general adjustment of 
tariffs every five years in order to keep the real value of tariffs in dollars.20 Besides, 
the License agreement stipulated that when any regulations on tariffs occurred, the 
companies in which foreign investors invested would be entitled to compensation for 
the loss incurred by such regulations and that the rules for the License shall not be 
changed without licensees’ agreement.21  
In addition, Continental, which invested in the financial sector, alleged that the Public 
Emergency Law 25.561 and measures adopted impaired its interests by abolishing the 
Convertibility Law, which resulted in forced conversion to pesos of all dollar-
denominated financial instruments, indebtedness, and contracts. Continental further 
claimed that Argentina violated Article IV (expropriation) and Article II(2)(b) (fair 
and equitable treatment) of the BIT by declaring a default on Argentine internal and 
external debt. 22  In response to this claim, Argentina asserted the measures were 
legitimised “because of the economic, social and institutional crisis precipitated in the 
Argentine Republic, which was the gravest of the country’s history”23 and the adoption 
of the measures was “absolutely exceptional”24 “for the recovery of the country’s 
economic, financial and social situation”.25  
                                                     
19 CMS Award, supra note 6, para 68. 
20 Ibid para 85. 
21 Decree No. 2255/92, December 2, 1992 (License), para 18.2. 
22 Continental Award, supra note 8, paras 100, 101. 
23 Argentina’s Counter-Memorial on the Merits, May 8, 2006, paras 19-20. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid para 369. 
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Similarly, CMS argued that it was entitled to the application of the agreed tariff and 
that the government measures violated the investment protections under the Argentina-
US BIT. They also claimed that Argentina expropriated CMS’s investment without 
proper compensation, violating Article IV (expropriation) of the BIT and failed to 
provide fair and equitable treatment on Article II(2)(a) and (b).26 In response, the 
Argentine government argued that transportation and distribution of gas is a national 
public service with considerable social needs.27 This would imply that industries with 
public interests should be treated in a different manner. Transportation and distribution 
of gas or other types of energy sectors have frequently appeared on many national 
security strategy reports of many countries as energy security although countries have 
not clearly specified how they will accommodate the energy security.28 The Argentine 
government, as demonstrated in Ole Wæver’s speech act theory,29 by labelling gas 
industries as having a national essential security interest, claimed that the measures 
which influenced the transportation and distribution of gas industries were inevitably 
implemented for the protection of particular social needs, i.e. essential security 
interests. Hence, to protect essential security interests, the measures should be justified 
and the government was obligated to control the undertaking of the contract. 
Therefore, Argentina denounced the CMS’s claim by arguing that:  
(i) the government was entitled to regulate tariffs for social and other public 
purposes;  
(ii) there were no governmental guarantees to maintain economic or exchange 
rate policies; and  
(iii) risks resulting from such policies are not attributable to the government.  
By referring to a national emergency and particular social needs, the argument of the 
Argentine government is considerably reliant on the national security exception clause 
(Essential Security) on the BIT and a state of necessity under customary international 
law.  
                                                     
26 CMS Award, supra note 6, para 88. 
27 Ibid para 93.  
28 This is discussed in the following chapter on National Security Approaches of Countries. 
29 See Chapter 1.2.2. The Copenhagen School and Securitisation. 
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Each article in the BIT is not specifically titled, but Essential Security appears in the 
United States 2012 Model BIT. 
 Article 18: Essential Security specifies, 
 Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed: 
1. to require a Party to furnish or allow access to any information the 
disclosure of which it determines to be contrary to its essential security 
interests; or 
2. to preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for 
the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own 
essential security interests.30 
By stating that a Party shall not be precluded from taking measures “if the Party 
considers measures necessary”, this article grants a state the discretion to determine 
the necessity of measures adequate to the situation. Moreover, the expressions, such 
as “international peace or security” and the “protection of its own essential security 
interests”, are usually aligned with essential security interests. Although there is no 
further explanation on those terms, the distinction between international peace or 
security and its own essential security interests is clear insofar as the former indicates 
a global scale of threats, while the latter targets domestic concerns.  
Likewise, the Argentina-US BIT contains a similar clause. With the goal of 
legitimising the emergency measures taken and being exempt from the obligation to 
compensation, Argentina invoked Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT which specifies: 
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures 
necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations 
with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, 
or the protection of its own essential security interests. 
Despite the absence of a title on Essential Security in the BIT, when compared to the 
provisions of the US Model BIT, it can be understood that the article in question 
                                                     
30 United States 2012 Model BIT, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.  
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provides essential security interests. As above, exceptional clauses often take a 
negative form because they ought to show that the clause in question is only to be 
invoked in an exceptional and infrequent manner. Simply put, the article provides that 
either Party, in this case, either the US or Argentina, can take measures which are 
regarded as necessary for its essential security interests. At first glance, the difference 
is whether the clause is self-judging or not. Article 18 of the US Model BIT is a self-
judging as a government would have the discretion as to if it is necessary to introduce 
a measure, whereas Article XI of the BIT provides that “the application of …measures 
necessary…” shall not be precluded, which means the government may not have the 
discretion to determine the necessity. And this matter would be determined by a 
tribunal.  
Argentina argued that the national economic and political crisis had to be addressed 
and therefore the measures were necessary “for the maintenance of public order” and 
“the protection of its own essential security interests” by invoking Article XI of the 
BIT. While it is imperative to understand the definition and scope of essential security 
interests in this context, distinguishing between public order and essential security 
interests in IIAs is also crucial. Such distinction can help delineate the scope of 
essential security interests, i.e. whether their scopes overlap or they exist in different 
spheres. Thus, before examining the tribunals’ awards, it is important to point out the 
meaning of public order in IIL and the relationship between public order and essential 
security interests. Additionally, if there is any substantial difference between essential 
security interests and national security in BITs.  
2.2. Public Order 
Public order is widely used as a legal term of national law in the constitutions of some 
continental European countries, such as France, Italy and Switzerland, although the 
interpretation of the concept is subject to the specific national jurisprudence.31 In 
Germany, public order is understood as an orderly life of the people in a community, 
which is commonly used with public security whereas, in the US, the term can often 
be found in criminal law, described as a condition with the absence of widespread 
                                                     
31 OECD, ‘Security-Related Terms in International Investment Law and in National Security 
Strategies’, OECD, Mar 2009, p. 3.   
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criminal and political violence.32 Sometimes, the term is used in conjunction with 
public health33  and public morals,34  while in some cases it appears with national 
security or sound development of national economy.35 Thus, the concept of public 
order plays various roles in different countries. On the other hand, in international law, 
there is no certain category to classify public order or tool to interpret the term. This 
is further discussed in the OECD 2009 report on “Security-related Terms in 
International Investment Law and in National Security Strategies” (the OECD 2009 
report), which finds no evidence that treaties have the same interpretations or 
definitions of public order. This is because the term has neither been explicitly defined 
nor had an exhaustive list.36 This indicates that a state can use the term differently in 
various contexts, thus highlighting the need for further clarification of the term in IIL. 
Without a common meaning of public order, it could be argued that international 
private law principles propose that the diverse uses of public order by country be the 
standard for international use to some extent.37 Accordingly, public order can be more 
flexible insofar as, barring agreed governing law, a country’s law covering public order 
can be the standard for invocation, given that as public order has no internationally 
recognised definition.  
The OECD 2009 report, in effect, explores the meaning and the usages of public order. 
The report explains that the term “public order” originated from “ordre public” in 
French, and points out that if the term is accurately translated into English, it is close 
to public policy rather than public order.38 However, it has been used in different 
wordings as public order, public policy or ordre public even in English text. In 
European Community (EC) law, the meaning of public policy39 has not escaped the 
                                                     
32 Ibid.  
33 Article 3(i) of OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements 2018 (hereinafter OECD 
Investment Code); Article 36 of the Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2016/C 202/01. 
34 Article 3(i) of OECD Investment Code; General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (1994), 
Article XIV (a); Article 30 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2002/C 325 /01 
(public morality, public policy or public security). 
35 Protocol 3 of Agreement between Japan and the People’s Republic of China Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (1988).  
36 OECD, 2009, supra note 32. 
37 Ibid p. 15.  
38 Ibid pp. 3, 6-8.  
39 This is the preferred translation of public order in EC law and frequently used alongside with public 
security. 
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attention of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).40 Although the ECJ acknowledged 
that the content of public policy is subject to each country’s definition,41 the ECJ has 
sought to minimise the possibility for EU Member States avoiding from their 
obligations by defining public policy interests as interests only “crucial for the 
protection of the political, social or economic order in the Member State”.42 The ECJ 
held that member states may invoke public order and security if there are overriding 
public interests.43  
In Regina v. Pierre Bouchereau, the ECJ noted that the concept of public policy 
provides for a situation of “a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the requirements 
of public policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of society.”44 The ECJ’s 
approach to public order is also found in IIAs including Article 16 (d) of the BIT 
between Japan and the Republic of Korea (2002), which states that: 
Each Contracting Party may take any measures necessary for the maintenance 
of public order. The public order exceptions maybe invoked only where a 
genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental 
interests of society.45 (Emphasis added.) 
Although the scope is not clearly defined, the interpretation of ECJ and the BIT 
indicates that the existence of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the 
fundamental interests of society can be the determinant for the legitimacy of the 
measure concerned. In line with this understanding, the OECD 2009 report also notes 
that although the ECJ admitted that, depending on the situations, some concerns 
regarding public policy might legitimise certain government’s undertakings, it 
underlines the importance of a narrow and restrictive interpretation of public order and 
established that economic grounds could not justify any measures to prevent the free 
                                                     
40 Ibid pp. 7-8.  
41 Case C-54/99, Eglise de Scientologie v. France [2000] ECR I-01335 (“measures must provide clear 
indications as to the specific circumstances in which the measure will be applicable”); Case 153/78, 
Commission of the European Communities v. Germany [1979] ECR 02555 (“…cannot reserve an 
exclusive area of competence for Member States”); Case 36/75, Rutili [1975] ECR 1219 
(“[derogations] cannot be invoked to service economic ends”); See, in addition, the Court's judgments 
in Case 7/61, Commission v Italy [1961] ECR 317 and Case 72/83, Campus Oil [1984] ECR 2727. 
42 Case C-369/96, Arblade [1999] ECR I-08453, para 30. 
43 Ibid para 60. 
44 Case 30/77, Regina v. Pierre Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999, para 35. 
45 Article 16 (d) of Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the 
Government of Japan for the Liberalisation, Promotion and Protection of Investment (2002).  
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movement of capital. 46  In Eglise de Scientologie, the ECJ stated that “…those 
derogations must not be misapplied so as, in fact, to serve purely economic ends”47, 
by denouncing any measure used as economic grounds to create a barrier to the free 
movement of capital. Simiarly, in Campus Oil, by explicitly stating that public policy 
must be “interpreted in such a way that its scope is not extended any further than is 
necessary for the protection of the interests which it is intended to secure (the EC 
Treaty)”,48 the ECJ has sought a narrow interpretation of public policy to prevent 
arbitrary derogations.  
The tribunal of Continental, one of the Argentine cases, attempted to define public 
order. The tribunal states that “…public order is intended as a broad synonym for 
public peace, which can be threatened by actual or potential insurrections, riots and 
violent disturbances of the peace.”49 Therefore, actions were necessary to prevent 
disturbances that can threaten social peace and legal order.  
The analysis of public order in international, regional and national frameworks shows 
that public order has been used in diverse contexts with a meaning that can be country-
specific. However, although public order (public policy in EC law) involves contexts 
which are different from essential security interests, they share certain requirements. 
For the invocation of such clauses, there should be a certain serious threat or distress 
to a social framework which gives rise to adverse effects on essential or fundamental 
interests of society or state. Therefore, it is challenging to determine if the scope of 
public order is narrower than security or vice versa, or even if public order and 
essential security interests exist in different categories when it comes to application 
and interpretation.   
2.3. National Security and Essential Security Interests 
Contrary to the dynamic between public order and essential security interests, it is even 
more complicated to differentiate essential security interests from national security. 
The Argentine government referred to essential security interests in the Argentina-US 
                                                     
46 Case C-367/98 Commission v. Portugal, ECR [2002] I-04731, para 52. 
47 Eglise de Scientologie, supra note 42, para 17. 
48 Campus Oil, supra note 42, paras 32-37. 
49 Continental Award, supra note 8, para 174. 
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BIT. The BIT adopts the expression of essential security interests rather than national 
security. The preference of adopting essential security interests over national security 
is prevalent in IIL. For example, Article 3 of the OECD Codes of Liberalisation of 
Capital Movements 2013 takes the same approach. 
  Article 3. Public Order and Security  
The provisions of this Code shall not prevent a Member from taking action 
which it considers necessary for: 
i) the maintenance of public order or the protection of public health, 
morals or safety;  
ii) the protection of essential security interests; or 
iii) the fulfilment of its obligations relating to international peace and 
security. (Emphasis added) 
Article 3 (Public Order and Security), in similar terms with the Argentine-US BIT, 
uses the term “essential security interests” rather than national security. On the 
contrary, Article 2.3 of the BIT between Hungary and the Russian Federation (1995) 
adopts the term “national security” among other emergency situations, and provides: 
This Agreement shall not preclude the application of either Contracting Party 
of measures, necessary for the maintenance of defence, national security and 
public order, protection of the environment, morality and public health. 50 
(Emphasis added.) 
This contrast then begs the question whether there is a meaningful difference between 
national security and essential security interests.   
According to the findings in the OECD 2009 report, while the terms essential security 
interests and public order have frequently been incorporated in IIAs, the term “national 
security” has rarely appeared in IIAs.51 Rather, national security is more likely to be 
used in national security strategy (NSS) reports, as will be shown in Chapter 3 
regarding the examination of security policies. Threats that appear in NSS reports 
focus mostly on terrorism, WMD, attacks by foreign countries, global pandemics, 
                                                     
50 Article 2.3 of the BIT between Hungary and the Russian Federation (1995). 
51 OECD, 2009, supra note 29, p. 6.  
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natural disasters and man-made emergencies as well as energy security, failed states 
and organised crime in the absence of security issues pertinent to an economic crisis 
or foreign investment.52 This may indicate that the term national security is preferred 
in ‘national’ reports rather than in ‘international’ agreements.  
By examining the security exception clauses of different BITs, it can be also found 
that essential security interests and national security do not coexist in one article. This 
may mean that they share the same scope of situations. Another hypothesis could be 
that removing ‘national’ in national security may be intended to diversify referent 
objects to secure such as individuals, governments and societies as well as nations. 
The UNCTAD in its report also poses a similar question whether the two terms cover 
the same circumstances or if there is any fundamental difference between them.53 It 
could be contended that the term essential can result in making the scope of essential 
security interests narrower than that of national security. However, the UNCTAD 
report suggests that it is not evident that Contracting Parties intended such a distinction 
by choosing between essential security interests and national security, and called for 
further clarification by arbitration tribunals.54 Yet, unless there is a situation where a 
state invokes both national security and essential security interests, which is highly 
rare – since BITs or IIAs do not incorporate the two terms in the same exception – 
dispute settlement bodies are less likely to distinguish the terms. Despite the difficulty 
in clarifying the distinction between the two terms, it can be argued that, by adding 
‘essential’ to security, contracting parties may wish to safeguard their measures to 
protect certain interests during their emergencies with additional shields. According to 
the Oxford Dictionary, essential means “absolutely necessary; extremely important; 
fundamental or central to the nature of something.” Thus, provided that ‘essential’ 
security interests are at stake, a state should take measures to protect national interests 
which are fundamental or central to the nature of the state. As mentioned in Chapter 
1, by a speech act that security agents give a label of security, a state declares that a 
particular issue becomes securitised, thereby legitimising extraordinary governmental 
measures. Likewise, a state can retain regulatory space to define what is essential by 
                                                     
52 Ibid p. 11.  
53 UNCTAD, ‘The Protection of National Security in IIAs’, UNCTAD Series on International 
Investment Policies for Development, New York and Geneva, UN, 2009, 
(UNCTADDIAE/IA/2008/5), p. 73. 
54 Ibid.  
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labelling national interests as such. This can be utilised as an impregnable excuse for 
a state to be exempted from its international obligations as long as they meet the 
requirements for invocation of the exceptions. Yet, it is unclear if the addition of 
essential was devised out of such intention. 
The distinction between national security and essential security interests is not 
addressed in the awards of the Argentine cases since the clause invoked provides for 
essential security interests and no claim for clarification of the distinction was 
requested. Rather, the tribunals showed a certain relationship between a necessity 
exception and an essential security interest exception. The next section will 
demonstrate how the tribunals interpreted necessity and essential security interests in 
the Argentina-US BIT. It will also interrogate if the emergency measures taken by the 
Argentine government were justifiable.  
2.4. The Tribunals’ Awards  
The Argentine government, the respondent in the cases, claimed that the state should 
be exempted from liability on the grounds of a state of necessity under customary 
international law or public order and essential security interests in the BIT for the 
emergency measures against its crisis. Accordingly, in CMS, Enron, LG&E and 
Continental Casualty Company, the tribunals examined if the emergency measures 
were implemented to protect Argentina’s essential security interests. The tribunals 
discussed the scope of Article XI of the BIT, the essential security interests exception 
and found that essential security interests are not limited to military or political 
concerns,55 but take major economic crises into consideration.56  
As mentioned above, because the justification of the emergency measures taken by 
Argentina hinges upon necessity under customary international law as well as essential 
security in the BIT, the tribunals found that a state of necessity is relevant to essential 
                                                     
55 CMS Award, supra note 6, paras 359-360. 
56 In Chapter 1, it was discussed that the Copenhagen School, the Constructivist School questioned the 
limited approach to security only focusing on military security, expanding the scope of security to 
political and economic issues. See further Chapters 1.2.2, 1.2.4. 
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security interests in the BIT, and analysed if the claim should be legitimised as an 
essential security interest based on the conditions of necessity.57 
The International Law Commission (ILC) outlined the requirements for a state to 
invoke necessity in Article 25 of Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts. First, necessity may not be invoked unless the act is 
“the only” means available for the State “to safeguard an essential interest from a grave 
imminent peril.”58 This condition is strengthened by the ILC Committee on State’s 
Responsibility stating that the “essential state interest” for the invocation of necessity 
should be an interest which directly relates to a state’s “political or economic 
survival, 59  the continued functioning of its essential services, the maintenance of 
internal peace, the survival of a sector of its population, the preservation of the 
environment of its territory or a part thereof, etc.”60 
The second condition is that the act should not seriously impair an essential interest of 
the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international 
community as a whole. Third, if the State has contributed to the situation of necessity, 
necessity may not be invoked. 61  The ILC in its comments clearly expresses that 
“necessity will only rarely be available to excuse non-performance of an obligation 
[...] and subject to strict limitations to safeguard against possible abuse”.62 Also, the 
claim cannot be justified if there is either explicit or implicit exclusion of necessity on 
the agreement.  
By imposing stringent conditions for invoking necessity, the ILC attempts to lower the 
possibility for necessity to be invoked. However, the scope of necessity is not clearly 
restricted. As mentioned above, the ILC Committee did not confine the scope to a 
certain national concern but rather took into account economic, political and ecological 
                                                     
57 OECD, International Investment Perspectives: Freedom of Investment in a Changing World, Paris: 
OECD, 2007, Chapter 5 (especially, p. 102). 
58 Article 25 of International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Articles on State Responsibility, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10 and Corr.1, 2001. 
59 The ILC’s approach to necessity is in the same line of the Copenhagen School’s definition of 
security in that the ILC stated that the interest should be directly pertinent to a state’s political and 
economic survival.  
60 UN, ‘Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its Thirty-Second 
Session’, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. 2, Part 1, A/CN.4/SER.A, 1980. 
61 OECD, 2009, supra note 29.  
62 Ibid.  
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importance as vital interests. This understanding can be found in the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros case. The case concerned a joint investment project between Hungary and 
Slovakia to produce hydroelectricity in Hungary by building a dam. Although Slovakia 
fulfilled its obligation, Hungary attempted to terminate the contract by claiming that 
the project would cause ecological risks such as artificial floods and extinction of 
various flora and fauna. After the continuing conflict, they submitted the dispute to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ held that the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
project having a possibility of ecological damage could cause an imminent peril,63 
although it concluded that the Hungarian governmental action, that is, the 
abandonment of the project, was not the only way to protect its essential interest.64     
In the case of CMS and Enron, the tribunals examined, drawing upon the conditions 
of necessity, (i) if Argentina had contributed to the emergency situation, and (ii) if the 
governmental measure seriously impaired an essential interest of the party towards 
which the Argentine international obligation exists. The tribunals believed that 
Argentina’s contribution to the severe emergency situation was substantial and the 
measures in question seriously damaged the essential interest of the Claimants.65  
On the contrary, the LG&E tribunal held that Article XI of the BIT sufficed to address 
Argentine government’s implementation and that the measures were also in 
conformity with conditions of necessity. It also concluded that Argentina did not 
contribute to the emergency and “the only means available” in Article 25 indicates that 
a government has no choice but to act.66 In Continental, the tribunal noted an essential 
security interests clause “as a specific provision limiting the general investment 
protection obligations…bilaterally agreed by the Contracting Parties, is not necessarily 
subject to the same conditions of application as the plea of necessity under general 
international law” 67 and referred to Article XX of GATT 1947 under the WTO as both 
the BIT and the GATT deal with the context of economic measures.68 In terms of 
severity of emergency that can justify a security measure, the Continental tribunal held 
                                                     
63 The case concerns a joint investment project to produce hydroelectricity. Hungary claimed that the 
project would cause ecological risks such as artificial floods, and extinction of various flora and fauna. 
64 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary v. Slovakia, ICJ GL No. 92, 1997, paras 44-45. 
65 CMS Award, supra note 6, para 329; and Enron Award, supra note 9, para 342. 
66 LG&E Decision, supra note 5, para 239.  
67 Continental Award, supra note 8, para 167. 
68 Ibid paras 192-193. 
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that essential security interests in Article XI of the BIT does not require total collapse 
of the country or a catastrophic situation that has already occurred as long as there is 
“powerful evidence [that the crisis] could not be addressed by ordinary measures.” 69 
Lastly, the Continental tribunal noted that the measures are justified by necessity 
within the meaning of BIT as there were no alternatives available.70 
Although interpreting “the only means for the State” in Article 25 of the ILC’s Draft 
Articles on State’s Responsibility is different from judging whether or not Argentina 
had contributed to the situation, all the Argentine cases’ tribunals concurred that 
excluding economic crises from the scope of Article XI (essential security provision) 
leads to an unbalanced understanding of the article.71   
To sum up, the ICSID tribunals recognised the economic aspect of security noting that 
economic security is as vital as military security. Depending on the tribunals’ 
approach, the distinction between necessity and security claims can be either clearer 
or trivial in the Argentine cases. If the conditions of necessity under customary 
international law should be applied to an essential security claim exactly, the 
invocation of the latter is to be justified only if the government measure in question is 
the only means available to the government. Since the thresholds of necessity are very 
high so that states can utilise necessity as a last resort, given that different concerns 
from environmental to societal appear as security interests, it remains a question if the 
conditions of necessity should be met to invoke essential security, especially in a 
situation where the interpretation of “the only means available” is controversial. 
Moreover, a state of necessity for international investment disputes can be invoked, 
unless an agreement explicitly or implicitly excludes the application of necessity. 
Therefore, the intention to include an essential security interests clause or national 
security clause in IIAs in addition to the option to invoke necessity may imply that 
there shall be certain difference in the application of necessity and national security or 
that states wish to secure their policy-space while giving up some by concluding 
international agreements. To shed light on the difference between essential security 
                                                     
69 Ibid para 180. 
70 Ibid paras 204-205. 
71 CMS Award, supra note 6, para 360; Continental Award, supra note 8, paras 173-174. 
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interests in IIAs and necessity in general international law, the next section discusses 
necessity more in-depth.  
2.5. Necessity 
The history of necessity for a state to derogate from its international obligations is 
long.  As military security was predominant in the realm of national security, the 
doctrine of necessity initially started as a means of military self-defence. In a situation 
where a government has to act in self-defence, a necessity of self-defence must be 
“instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for 
deliberation.”72 A state of necessity “permits an otherwise illegal act in an emergency 
not of the perpetrators’ making and with severe consequences if the act is not done.”73 
This implies a state may invoke necessity to protect its vital or essential interests by 
derogating from its international obligations during an emergency period. As the 
concept of security has evolved, the scope of necessity has also expanded from military 
to other fields, just as the ILC Committee on State’s Responsibility confirms.  
There has been an attempt to draw a line between necessity and an essential security 
interest, but, their application, in reality, can be combined. The Argentine cases 
tribunals referred to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to 
interpret the case aligned with any related agreements, that is, in case of an essential 
security interest, necessity can be relevant customary international law. Although the 
LG&E tribunal understood necessity and essential security as two separate claims, it 
still referred to necessity to interpret Article XI of the BIT as relevant law. This shows 
that necessity can play a complementary role, if not more. For both defences, the 
discretion to decide if the situation needs an emergency measure belongs to a state, 
unless a treaty specifies otherwise. The essential security interests provision seems to 
give carte blanche to each government to take any measures which a state considers 
necessary for the protection of national security. However, adjudicative bodies will 
eventually have teeth to decide if the measures were appropriate or if the situation 
                                                     
72 State Secretary Daniel Webster, British and Foreign State Papers 29, 1840-1841, p. 1129, cited in 
J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text 
and Commentaries, Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
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amounted to threats to an essential security interest from their perspectives. Also, the 
strict requirements of exceptional clauses prevent states from excusing the violation of 
their obligations. Since, in most cases, a measure or action taken by a government fails 
to protect foreign private entities, so as to justify a necessity claim, the interests which 
are to be protected by sacrificing the private entities’ interests, should have higher 
values. For this reason, necessity claims are highly likely to have two faces. Firstly, to 
strike a balance between foreign investors’ rights and a state’s essential interests by 
retaining certain regulatory space. Secondly, to excuse its measures for protectionism 
against foreign investors.  
In addition to the ICSID tribunals’ interpretation of necessity, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) panels and the WTO’s Appellate Body (AB) have also 
interpreted the concept of necessity. 74  The interpretations necessity by the WTO 
panels and the AB are not confined to the narrow scope, but cover a comprehensive 
understanding.75 Although the thresholds for a state to invoke a necessity defence are 
very high, both institutions have developed ways to enable invocation of necessity.76  
Before engaging with the WTO’s interpretation on necessity, it is imperative to note 
the related articles under the WTO system. Article XX of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) specifies general exceptions:  
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(c) … 
                                                     
74 C. C. Galvez, ‘Necessity, Investor Rights, and State Sovereignty for NAFTA Investment 
Arbitration’, Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 46, 2013, p. 145. 
75 A. Alvarez-Jimenez, ‘New Approaches to the State of Necessity in Customary International Law: 
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(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating 
to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under 
paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade 
marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices. (following 
paragraphs omitted) 
In addition to Article XX, Article XXI of the GATT provides security 
exceptions:  
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed, 
(a) …  
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it 
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests 
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which 
they are derived; 
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements 
of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is 
carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying 
a military establishment; 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations; or 
(c) … 
One of the differences between Article XX and Article XXI is the existence of the 
chapeau. While measures based on general exceptions are subject to the requirements 
that they must not be applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner and that they 
should not be used as a protectionist tool, Article XXI on security exceptions does not 
have this chapeau. This means that government measures according to security 
exceptions in GATT Article XXI can be applied in a discriminatory or arbitrary 
manner. However, the essential security interests illustrated in this article are very 
narrowly defined, with focus only on military security. Since the article was drafted in 
a way to minimise trade restrictions and curb protectionism with a narrow approach to 
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security, such requirements are absent to allow states to implement measures against 
severe military threats or any relevant threats. For the contemporary understanding of 
necessity, Article XX appears more relevant to the extent that it involves national 
regulatory space by referring to “necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.” The 
application and interpretation of Article XX can be found in the Korea – Beef case. In 
this case, the Korean Government took measures which affected the importation, 
distribution and sale of beef from the US and Australia in relation to Korea’s dual retail 
system on beef. The dual retail system allows for a separate sale regime for domestic 
beef and imported beef. Korea contended that the dual retail system was necessary to 
secure Korea's Unfair Competition Act. Against these measures, Australia and the US 
claimed that Korea violated GATT Article 3.4 (National Treatment). 
In the Korea – Beef case, the WTO AB explained the meaning of “necessary” on 
GATT Article XX (d): 
We believe that, as used in the context of Article XX(d), the reach of 
the word “necessary” is not limited to that which is “indispensable” or 
“of absolute necessity” or “inevitable”. Measures which are 
indispensable or of absolute necessity or inevitable to secure 
compliance certainly fulfil the requirements of Article XX (d). But 
other measures, too, may fall within the ambit of this exception. As 
used in Article XX (d), the term “necessary” refers, in our view, to a 
range of degrees of necessity. At one end of this continuum lies 
“necessary” understood as “indispensable”; at the other end, is 
“necessary” taken to mean as “making a contribution to”. We consider 
that a “necessary” measure is, in this continuum, located significantly 
closer to the pole of “indispensable” than to the opposite pole of simply 
“making a contribution to”.77 
The WTO AB added that “necessary” requires the weighing and balancing of 
regulations, calculating to what extent the measures contribute to law enforcement and 
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how significant the interests and values which are to be protected are by influencing 
the law on trade.  It also requires that a contracting party needs to devise a measure 
which is the least trade restrictive.78 The AB found that the dual retail system was not 
justified as a necessary measure to secure compliance with the Korean national law in 
question because the system did not have necessity under the meaning of Article 
XX(d). It noted that Korea failed to show that alternative measures would not achieve 
the end. This AB’s approach is reiterated in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres79 where the AB 
found that the Import Ban on retreaded tyres could be considered “necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life”80 based on weighing and balancing test. The necessity test 
is also discussed in the EC – Asbestos case. The AB held that “the more vital or 
important the common values pursued, the easier it would be to accept as “necessary” 
measures designed to achieve those ends.”81 As the values pursued in this case were 
related to human life and health, the AB found that the prohibition on asbestos would 
fall within the meaning of necessity.82  
The interpretation of the WTO AB provided a guideline to better understand necessity 
in the article insofar as the measures could be taken in the event of not absolute 
necessity although it was found that a necessary measure should be closer to 
“indispensable” rather than to “making a contribution to”. To some extent, this may 
lower the thresholds so as to invoke necessity regarding the measures that a 
government can implement. This interpretation approach to necessity may be caused 
by the desire for the WTO AB to make the exception article more viable so that states 
can utilise it, only if necessary. Whereas a state of necessity under customary 
international law shall be invoked to safeguard an essential interest from a grave 
imminent peril, necessity of Article XX contributes to harmonising national law with 
                                                     
78 Ibid paras 164, 166. 
79 WTO, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS332/AB/R, December 3, 2007, para 141.  
80 Ibid para 212.  
81 WTO, EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-containing Products, Report of the 
Appellate Body, WT/DS135/AB/R, March 12, 2001, para 172. 
82 Ibid para 175. In addition to those cases, in Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), the AB evaluated 
the necessity of customs and fiscal measures on cigarettes from the Philippines, which are inconsistent 
with national treatment. By referring to the Korea – beef case, the AB held that it would be necessary 
to consider whether a WTO-consistent alternative measure to the Member was available (footnote 
275) and concluded that the measure was not justified on the grounds of necessity (para 223). See 
further, WTO, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, Report of 
the Appellate Body, WT/DS371/AB/R, June 17, 2011.   
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the WTO system by securing some policy-space instead of examining urgency of the 
issue. Despite this distinction, both exceptions aim at the least restrictive measures in 
order to diminish a negative influence on the interests of the states who obligations are 
exempted.  
In conclusion, although the WTO AB’s interpretation of necessity cannot be directly 
applied to necessity under customary international law, the AB’s lenient approach to 
necessity has broadened the ambit of necessity to some degree and helped provide a 
better understanding for necessity.  
  3.  Conclusion 
The examination of Argentine cases demonstrated the different approaches of foreign 
investors and host states to the concept of essential security interests in the IIL realm. 
It also underscored that the tribunals’ approach to interpreting the meaning and scope 
of security interests. The Argentine cases tribunals acknowledged the economic aspect 
of national security in IIAs, noting that excluding economic security from the scope of 
national security may well lead to an unbalanced understanding of the security 
exception clause. This is because the consequences of an economic crisis is as grave 
and imperilling as those arising from military threats or social and political instability. 
The relationship between public order and essential security interests was also 
addressed. Examining public order in domestic and international settings shows a 
certain overlap with security exceptions in IIAs to the extent that both of them may be 
invoked only where a serious threat impacts the essential interests of society or a state.  
Necessity played a vital role in the tribunals’ interpretation of security in the 
Argentine-US BIT. The tribunals’ interpretation even markedly differed on the 
meaning of “the only means” available among conditions for invocation of necessity 
and in the attitude over the relationship between necessity and essential security 
interests. The question is whether if essential security interests should comply with 
necessity requirements or if necessity requirements complement the interpretation of 
the exception. The controversial interpretation of the requirement led to the different 
conclusions in the awards. This phenomenon calls for further clarification of the 
condition and of the relationship between necessity and security exceptions. Although 
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the tribunals took divergent approaches, they all acknowledged the close relationship 
between necessity and security exceptions.  
The WTO AB’s interpretation of necessity helped to understand the concept of 
necessity insofar as the AB did not confine the scope of necessity to an absolute 
necessity or the indispensable. The WTO AB’s finding helped in expanding the 
latitude of necessity, thereby lowering the high threshold of invoking necessity and 
making the exception more viable. Since the objective of the WTO is to pursue free 
trade and economic liberalisation in the global economy, the agreement was drafted in 
the manner which reduces implementing trade restrictive measures to a minimum. 
Given this feature, the WTO dispute settlement bodies attempt to clarify the meaning 
of terms and apply their interpretations to claims in disputes through a weighing and 
balancing approach. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Security in Foreign Investment Policy and Security Strategy 
Reports and Government-controlled Investment 
 
1. Introduction 
The discussion in Chapter 2 examines how international tribunals have interpreted 
essential security interests in IIAs. It also underlines the broadening of the concept of 
security to include economic considerations. The economic considerations are not 
limited to economic prosperity, but include the protection of critical infrastructures 
and domestic strategic industries.1 
Following the 9/11 attack, James K. Jackson argued that the concept of national 
security in the US dramatically changed, leading to a change in attitudes not only 
regarding security policy in general, but also to foreign investment policy on critical 
infrastructures. 2 The belief that foreign ownership of national critical infrastructures 
may render a country more vulnerable to external attacks propelled the initiative. The 
analysis of countries’ national security strategy reports in the previous chapter showed 
the role that critical infrastructures play in society and governments’ reservations. In 
the past, critical infrastructures played a minor role in the domain of national security 
because the main focus was placed on military security. However, as a new type of 
investors emerged, such as those sponsored or controlled by foreign governments, 
states became more protective towards critical industries which affect vital national 
interests. This concern is an offshoot of the perception that decisions of foreign 
companies can be an extension of their home government’s policy drive, rather than 
the pursuit of companies’ profits. For example, Gazprom, the Russian energy 
company, stopped gas supplies to Ukraine in 2006, which was interpreted as a decision 
motivated by political considerations.3 This implies the possibility that the operation 
                                                     
1 In this thesis, critical infrastructures and critical industries are used interchangeably. The reason why 
both of them are used is because some critical industry can be a strategic industry rather than a critical 
infrastructure. Nevertheless, their importance in countries’ policy is equally high.  
2 J. K. Jackson, ‘Foreign Investment and National Security: Economic Considerations’, Congressional 
Research Service, April 4, 2013, p. 15. 
3 J. Stern, ‘Natural Gas Security Problems in Europe: The Russian-Ukraine Crisis of 2006’, Asia-
Pacific Review, vol. 13, no. 1, 2006, p. 32. 
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of industries, in particular those providing public services, can be interrupted when a 
diplomatic or political conflict occurs between a host state and a home state. In parallel 
with this development, host states have become significantly protective of such 
industries by preventing foreign investments in those industries. 
As regards protecting critical infrastructures, host states became agitated with several 
attempts by foreign investors, especially investors owned or controlled by foreign 
governments, to acquire local businesses in critical industries. For instance, Dubai 
Ports World, owned by the United Arab Emirates, planned acquisition of a company 
which operated US ports in 2006.4 In the end, Dubai Ports World sold its business 
operating the ports to AIG Global Investment Group, an American company which 
lacked any experience in ports operations. Similarly, in 2005, the US hindered 
CNOOC, the Chinese national oil company, from acquiring the US energy firm Unocal 
on the national security grounds, including the risk of technology leakage. In addition, 
the French government also blocked the acquisition of Suez by ENEL, the Italian 
electricity and gas company whose major shareholder is the Italian government 
(25.5%) in 2015. Although Suez merged with Gaz de France, a French company, 
which was promoted by the French government, and became Gaz de France and Suez,5 
the issue of foreign ownership, especially foreign investment which is owned or 
controlled by government have raised national security concerns. 
This chapter will demonstrate how the concept of national security has been applied 
to investment policy in European countries and North American countries. Certain 
cases will be reviewed, to delve into US policy and to explore how countries define 
critical industries in their policy regarding foreign investment, given that the concept 
of critical industries is akin to national security. Given the significant effect of such 
investment in national security and critical infrastructures, the concept of foreign 
investment, which is controlled or owned by a foreign government, will be examined. 
Before the examination of policies in relation to critical infrastructure and GCIs, in 
order to assess the evolving perception of security by states and the relationship 
                                                     
4 Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Foreign Ownership of US Infrastructure’, Feb 13, 2007, 
http://www.cfr.org/business-and-foreign-policy/foreign-ownership-us-infrastructure/p10092, 
(accessed May 3, 2018). 
5 UNCTAD, ‘The Protection of National Security in IIAs’, UNCTAD Series on International 
Investment Policies for Development, UN, New York and Geneva, 2009, 
(UNCTADDIAE/IA/2008/5), p. 11. 
 72 
 
between national security and critical infrastructure, this chapter explores various 
countries’ national security strategy reports. 
2. Security as an Evolving or Static Concept in National Policies? 
Following the Second World War, states began to question the narrow approach to 
security, which focuses only on military security, and to rethink ways to achieve 
international peace, 6  such as increasing economic dependency and establishing 
powerful international organisations. 7  And apart from economic dependency, 
developed countries deemed the economic aspects of security and stability relatively 
immaterial since their economies prospered during the second half of the 20th century. 
Rather, the developed countries regarded their economy as a major instrument of 
diplomacy in international relations, thereby using their economic resources to expand 
their influence.8 Because economic stability is a prerequisite for a country to achieve 
political and societal stability, countries, particularly, market-sensitive economies, are 
vulnerable to economic coercion. Economic sanctions – such as imposing a higher rate 
of tariffs or banning exports of essential goods to countries which are regarded as 
causing international disruptions – have been a preferred way to resolve conflicts, as 
powerful countries were unwilling to use military force to tackle such disruptions.9 
The powerful countries, especially the US, continue to believe that building greater 
military power and alliances and prioritising military security over other types of 
security considerations were the prerequisites to counter interstate military threats as 
well as to ensure national and international security. 10 This belief was based on the 
claim that alliances with great military security and economic dependency would 
facilitate international peace. 11  Notwithstanding, the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001 
                                                     
6 D. A. Baldwin, ‘Security Studies and the End of the Cold War,’ World Politics, vol. 48, no. 1, 1995, 
pp. 123-5. 
7 K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘Why States Act through Formal International Organizations’, in P. F. 
Diehl (ed.), The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent 
World,3rd edn., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.  
8 M. P. Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
1980; P. Liberman, ‘Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains’, International 
Security, vol. 21, no. 1, 1996.   
9 E. S. Rogers, ‘Using Economic Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts’, Security Studies, vol. 5, no. 
4, 1996, p. 43; G. A. Lopez and D. Cortright, ‘Economic Sanctions in Contemporary Global Relations’, 
in D. Cortright (ed.), Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World?, 
Routledge, 2018.  
10 R. F. Weigley, The American Way of War: a History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, 
Indiana University Press, 1977.  
11  H. D. Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950. 
Especially, on p. 75, Lasswell argues that “our greatest security lies in the best balance of all instruments 
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altered the global predominant view that international peace could be achieved by 
diplomacy and economic interdependence through economic sanctions.  
Recent trend illustrates that the economic aspect of security has become multi-faceted 
more than a situation involving economic diplomacy. For instance, terrorist groups 
cannot be dealt with by interstate economic sanctions because their finance relies on 
transnational and illegal economic resources such as arms trafficking. In addition, 
states started to pay close attention to ‘critical infrastructures’. Although the scope of 
critical industries by each country varies, countries share the fear as to whether their 
critical infrastructure would be adversely affected by a certain threat.12 This could be 
either a military attack on critical industries or takeovers of such industries by foreign 
investors with particular nationalities. This can become worse in a situation where a 
terrorist group is, in any way, connected to a home state’s government which has 
control over critical industries. Accordingly, the foreign ownership of industries with 
national essential security interests can pose a potential threat to a host state. Thus, the 
host state can ensure neither military security nor socio-economic security. This 
discourse is not confined to a terrorist group. Where a foreign government owns or 
sponsors an industry which is essential to another country – for instance, by means of 
a take-over – the situation can be assumingly used as political leverage. That is why 
contemporary issues are not always able to be solved by normal diplomacy.  
This concern can be found in the US economic policy about foreign investment. 
Despite its leading role to spread the value of neoliberalism and market deregulation, 
there are a few industries in the US which foreign investors are not allowed to invest 
in. This is because control over such industries has a vital effect on essential security 
interests of the US. 13  Notwithstanding, those restrictions are applied to mainly 
mergers, acquisitions and take-overs rather than new establishments (Greenfield 
investment). 14  According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) report on “Protection of ‘Critical Infrastructure’ and the Role 
                                                     
of foreign policy, and hence in the coordinated handling of arms, diplomacy, information, and 
economics.”  
12 The analysis on the relationship between critical infrastructure and security can be found in Chapter 
3.4. National Security in Domestic Investment Law and Critical Infrastructure.  
13 This will be further discussed in Chapter 3 on the US’s restriction on foreign investment. 
14 J. K. Jackson, ‘Foreign Investment and National Security: Economic Consideration,’ Congressional 
Research Service, April 2013, p. 15. 
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of Investment Policies Relating to National Security”,15 strategies on national security 
cover not only the roles of a government, such as accountability and transparency, but 
also highlight private sectors’ roles on critical infrastructure.16 While countries have 
vigorously presented their concerns on certain types of security, such as border 
security and energy security, most countries do not include investment policy-making 
in their national security strategies. Exceptionally, France and the US mentioned the 
role of investment policy-making in their plans, but the significance of other roles takes 
precedence over that of investment policy roles.17 
In addition to economic aspects of national security, security concerns have been 
diversified ranging from spread and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
through space security, climate change and global infectious disease to 
cybersecurity.18 This is because different types of threats emerged to the extent that 
different subjects of threats, such as transnational terrorist groups, other than states 
have been regarded as threats. Additionally, risks have been included in the discourse 
of threats since the scope of threats has been widened.19 Put differently, threats include 
not only a present threat but also a risk which has not yet occurred, but has the 
possibility to bring about a grave effect on the society. The following sections will 
demonstrate this in detail by focusing on specific countries and the EU.  
2.1. United States  
In the report of ‘US National Security Strategy (NSS) 2015’,20 the security concerns 
of the US are illustrated, ranging from threats, its national prosperity and values that 
the US aims to protect. The scope of national security involves terrorism, its capacity 
to counter dangerous ideologies, mostly extremists and to prevent conflicts, WMD, 
climate change, space security, and global health security. The report does not merely 
state that the US is required to establish the systems to react and tackle threats at 
                                                     
15  OECD, ‘Protection of ‘Critical Infrastructure’ and the Role of Investment Policies Relation to 
National Security’, OECD, Paris, May 2008. 
16 Ibid pp. 5, 6, 9.  
17  OECD, ‘Security-Related Terms in International Investment Law and in National Security 
Strategies’, OECD, Paris, May 2009, p. 12.  
18 European Union, ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy’, Brussels, 11 
December 2008, S407/08, p. 8 
19 United States, ‘National Security Strategy 2015’, the White House, February 2015, p. 2.  
20 Ibid.  
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present, but also emphasises that the US needs to strengthen its ability to prevent 
outbreaks of those threats; threats which are happening at present are no longer the 
only concerns to deal with. Thus, based on the approach taken by the US, even if a risk 
has been neither specified nor certain, the US Government is willing to take actions 
which are considered as necessary to prevent the risk from becoming a real threat. 
Observing this trend leads to the conclusion that managing risk plays a pivotal role in 
contemporary American security.  
Regarding managing risks, Tine Munk classified three related concepts: prevention, 
precaution, and pre-emption.21 According to her, prevention is the tool to stop events 
which are known through its previous occurrence from happening again or to minimise 
the possibility of occurrence of such events. The implementation of such measures 
against the potential events should be based on convincing evidence and information. 
Moreover, it should be certain that if measures are not taken, certain damage will 
occur. Therefore, prevention does not emphasise obtaining more information of risky 
events, because preventive actions are taken on the premise that scientific knowledge 
suffices to support such actions. The range of actions is also delineated to the extent 
that the risk is calculated based on clear knowledge, hence the adequate level of 
measures. On the contrary, precautionary actions may be taken without sufficient 
knowledge and certainty. The principle of precaution originated from the phrase 
“better safe than sorry”. 22  In the precaution algorithm, waiting for sufficient 
knowledge is not a justifiable reason not to take precautionary actions because 
delaying such actions may well result in risks converting into threats. 23  The 
ramification of the potential risk is catastrophic, which makes actions justifiable to 
some extent despite the lack of knowledge and certainty while it is improbable to 
predict if damage will occur absent such actions. Further, Munk argues that precaution 
and pre-emption are closely linked insofar as pre-emption involves a drastic and 
                                                     
21 T. Munk, ‘Cyber-security in the European Region: Anticipatory Governance and Practices,’ PhD 
Thesis, University of Manchester, 2015, p. 90. 
22 P. Sandin, ‘The Precautionary Principle and the Concept of Precaution’, Environmental Values, vol. 
13, no. 4, 2004, p. 462. The legitimacy of precautionary action is based on the premise that “nothing is 
safe, as long as it has not been proven harmless”.  
23 J. Stern and J. B. Wiener, ‘Precaution against Terrorism’, Journal of Risk Research, vol. 9, no. 4, 
2006, p. 397. 
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temporal type of precaution.24 Just like precaution, pre-emptive decisions on risks are 
expected to be justified because the consequence of the risks is estimated 
unrecoverable. Governments have used the notion of pre-emption in order to prevent 
grave and imminent harms especially caused by military conflicts and wars as self-
defence, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.25 Given the 
catastrophic consequences of the 9/11 terrorist attack, the US has become keen on such 
anticipatory governance. By declaring the War on Terrorism, the US, during the Bush 
administration, adopted the logic of pre-emption although this decision generated 
controversies and criticisms that the threat was not sufficiently imminent to initiate a 
pre-emptive war.26  
In the past, the US believed that its great military and economic power would protect 
it from external dangers.27 However, terrorists who operate with a small scale of 
military forces that can give rise to disastrous results made the US not rely on such 
power any longer. The NSS 2002 report,28 which was published after the 9/11 attack, 
mainly focuses on terrorist threats and military security. The report justifies the 
preventive and pre-emptive actions against an imminent threat, especially terrorists, 
“to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country”.29 The US has 
prioritised combatting threats posed by terrorism, given that its most imminent threat 
has been an attack from a terrorist group since the government and its citizens 
confronted the grave result of the 9/11 attack. On the other hand, the report made a 
remark on energy security, alliance and economic growth through free markets and 
free trade, but it does not refer to any economic security, such as economic stability or 
the importance of improving critical infrastructures in the US.30  
                                                     
24 B. Hebenton and T. Seddon, ‘From Dangerousness to Precaution: Managing Sexual and Violent 
Offenders in an Insecure and Uncertain Age’, British Journal of Criminology, vol. 49, no. 3, 2009, p. 
345. 
25 Especially the United States, since the 9/11 terrorist attack, has highlighted pre-emptive actions 
alongside with risk management; yet many other countries such as the UK also began to incorporate 
risk management in their security strategy reports and policies.  
26 G. W. Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on the September 11 Attacks’, Selected Speeches of George W. 
Bush 2001-2008, Washington, D.C., September 11, 2001, p. 58.  
27 Lasswell, 1950, supra note 8. 
28 United States, ‘National Security Strategy 2002 of the United States’, the White House, September 
2002.  
29 Ibid p. 6. 
30 Ibid p. 19. 
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On the contrary, the 2001 NSS report31  before the 9/11 attack takes an approach 
different from the 2002 report and the 2015 report. Although it stresses how imperative 
military security is for the US, and how the US should respond to increasing terrorist 
groups,32 it covers diverse security concerns such as preventing conflict, democracy, 
regional integration, sustainable development, and energy security as well as WMD.33 
The threats in this report include the proliferation of weapons, terrorism, drug 
trafficking, and potential threats to critical infrastructure, such as computer network 
attack, i.e. cyber-security.34 The report points out that US’s economic, social and 
military success hinges upon advanced information technology infrastructure. What is 
noteworthy is that the report acknowledges the importance of critical infrastructures 
in the US and further suggests a guideline to advance critical infrastructures,35 which 
attests to the US’s interest in the role of critical infrastructures in the American society.  
The report divides American national interests into three categories: vital, important 
and humanitarian. One of the vital interests is “the protection of our critical 
infrastructures – including energy, banking and finance, telecommunications, 
transportation, water systems, vital human services, and government services […]” 
from disruption which “cripples” their operation. 36 And it further remarked that for 
the sake of the protection of such interests, the use of military force, including 
unilateral action might be involved if necessary or appropriate. The second category, 
important national interests include environmental issues, infrastructure disruptions 
which destabilise, not cripple, smooth economic activity,37 crises which could cause 
destabilising economic turmoil or humanitarian movement. Those particular interests 
may partly stem from the fact that the administration was the Democratic Party, which 
is interested in establishing a fundamental social system, while the administration 
during and after the 9/11 attack was the Republican Party that pursues non-
                                                     
31 United States, ‘National Security Strategy 2001: A National Security Strategy for a Global Age’, the 
White House, December 2000. 
32 Ibid pp. 7-11.  
33 Ibid p. 6.  
34 Ibid p. 12. 
35 Ibid pp. 30-32.  
36 Ibid p. 9 on “Protecting our National Interests”.  
37  In this report, if infrastructure disruptions “cripple” economic activity, it is regarded as “vital” 
interests while if such disruptions “destabilise the economic activity, it is deemed as “important” 
interests.  
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governmental intervention in the market.38 Therefore, the 2002 report placed emphasis 
on economic freedom and hence economic growth, whereas the 2015 report by the 
Obama administration which is the Democratic Party makes reference to the 
importance of developing infrastructures in economic security, underlining that critical 
infrastructure is imperative for further economic growth although it does not dictate 
how critical infrastructure should be fostered or what kind of measures will be taken 
against threats to critical infrastructure. 
As shortly mentioned in the beginning, the 2015 report covered a variety of security 
concerns. In comparison to the 2010 NSS report, the 2015 report highlights the US’s 
prioritisation for the top strategic risks to its interests: catastrophic attacks on the US 
homeland or critical infrastructure; threats or attack against US citizens abroad and its 
allies; global economic crisis or economic slowdown; spread of WMD; outbreaks of 
global infectious disease; climate change; significant energy market disruptions; and 
security issues arising out of failing states such as mass atrocities, transnational 
organised crime, etc., noting that the 2010 report aimed at dealing with current threats 
rather than focusing on risks.39  
Besides, whereas a robust military is considered a prerequisite to national security, the 
report stresses that building capabilities in science and technology is essentially 
required to gain an ascendancy over any adversary for sustainable national security.40 
This implies that certain industries which retain cutting edge technology and pertain 
to the high level of scientific development can be excluded from the free trade 
discourse.41  
In preparation for potential economic crisis, the report claims that it is inevitable to 
reshape the economic order. The effort is accompanied by preventing the risky 
behaviour and addressing economic issues such as state capitalism (sovereign wealth 
funds, SWFs) and market-distorting behaviours.42 The 2015 strategy report does not 
mention ways to deal with state capitalism or certain types of economic protectionism. 
Rather, it stresses on the importance of the US obligation to protect the values of 
                                                     
38 Importantly, the main reason for such difference is that the country had experienced terrorist attack. 
39 United States, ‘National Security Strategy 2015’, the White House, February 2015, p. 2.  
40 Ibid p. 8. 
41 Ibid p. 15. 
42 Ibid p. 17. 
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capitalism and neoliberalism to increase the efficiency and accordingly eradicate 
poverty. 43  The open market is one of the values which should be protected as a 
foundational regime of the US. That could be why the report does not cover solutions 
of economic (financial) crisis which may well taint the value of the US but rather 
attempts to devise a way to prevent such crisis with revised policy framework.  
Furthermore, the gravity of military security is still far heavier in the report. The report 
outlines concrete strategies for national military defence, and discusses terrorist attacks 
and relevant issues in detail. However, regarding the economic dimension of security, 
it simply refers to economic prosperity and significance of critical infrastructures 
without including any concrete plans. It is evident that the US, regardless of time, tends 
to prioritise military security over other types of security and economic welfare has 
been deemed as a condition and means for further military security. Notwithstanding, 
while highlighting the military role in security, the NSS 2017 report, which was 
released following the election of Donald Trump, takes a clearly distinct approach 
from the previous ones insofar as the document suggests more explicit targets based 
on US interests.44 The key objectives are as follows: 
(i) To protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of 
life; 
(ii) To promote American prosperity; 
(iii) To preserve peace through strength; and 
(iv) To advance American influence.45 
The key objectives of the 2017 report overlap with those of the 2015 report regarding 
strengthening the military power and enhancing American prosperity. However, the 
2017 report is more emphatic in highlighting the role of military power than the 2015 
NSS report, by stating that the US will rebuild its military “so that it remains 
preeminent, deters our adversaries and if necessary is able to fight and win” and 
“advance American influence.”46 Thus, this statement would denote the rebirth of 
                                                     
43 Ibid p. 15. 
44 The expression of “America first” repeatedly appear in the NSS report.  
45 United States, ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of American’, December 2017, the 
White House, Washington, D.C., pp. 3-4.  
46 Ibid p. 4; such expression is not found in the NSS 2015 report.    
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traditional security approach.47  While the report emphasises military security and 
economic prosperity, it does not discuss climate change. The report, however, 
proposes that the US will aim to oppose an energy agenda against economic growth 
that is “detrimental to US economic and energy security interests”.48 Additionally, the 
report states that the US will take a more balanced approach for the protection of 
energy security, economic development, and environmental protection. Essentially, 
the priority is placed on developing the economy than countering climate change.49 
This shows that the economic aspect is more highlighted in the 2017 report than in the 
2015 report in parallel with strengthening military power. 
The chronological analysis of the US NSS reports shows that the attitude of the US 
security does not stagnate, but evolves. The evolution of security and threats in the US 
NSS reports can attest to the framing of security and threats by a speech act, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1. The society adapts to evolving threats, but the question 
remains as to how far the US is willing to embrace the evolving concept of security 
threats. The inclusion of “prosperity” in the NSS report demonstrates that national 
security and economic prosperity are closely connected. However, US attitude towards 
economic concerns is rather seen as neo-liberalism with de-regulation supported by 
the free market. The ethos of the US is market economy that removes inefficiencies in 
the global market.  
2.2. European Countries 
This section considers the United Kingdom, Germany and France under the European 
countries heading. The UK’s security service institution MI5 describes threats against 
national security and its role as “the protection of national security and in particular its 
protection against threats such as terrorism, espionage and sabotage, the activities of 
agents of foreign powers, and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine 
parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means”.50 The term “in 
particular” in the description shows that the list is not exhaustive, but illustrative. The 
                                                     
47 See further Chapter 1.1. and 1.2.1. The Realist School.  
48 United States, NSS 2017, supra note 19, p.  22.  
49 The 2017 report places less emphasis on international security and more on national security, which 
is evidenced by the comparison of the number of references to “international”, 25 times in the 2017 
report and 77 times in 2015.  
50 United Kingdom, Security Service Act 1989, Chapter 5, Article 1(2). 
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term “national security” is not clearly defined under UK law, but, according to the 
MI5, the term generally refers to the security and well-being of the UK as a whole, 
which does not necessarily suggest a better understanding. According to the MI5, the 
term “national security” intentionally is intentionally left undefined “in order to retain 
the flexibility necessary to ensure that the use of the term can adapt to changing 
circumstances”. 51  This approach is grounded on the premise that the meaning of 
security evolves and the scope of security broadens as circumstances change; hence, 
the UK has to act upon such changing circumstances. 
The UK National Security Council published a document, “A Strong Britain in an Age 
of Uncertainty: the National Security Strategy 2010”52 and determined a priority list 
of risks to national security by tiers based on the possibility of occurrence and potential 
impact of risks. Tier One consists of international terrorism affecting the UK or its 
interests, hostile attacks upon British cyberspace, a major accident or natural hazard, 
and an international military crisis. Tier Two covers an attack on the UK or its 
Overseas Territories by another state – with chemical, biological, radiological or 
nuclear (CBRN) weapons; risk of major instability, insurgency or civil war overseas 
which can amount to threatening the UK; and severe disruption to information 
transmitted by satellites possibly as a result of a deliberate attack by another state. Tier 
Three comprises a large conventional military attack (not with CBRN), disruption to 
oil or gas supplies to the UK, short to medium term disruption to international supplies 
of resources. 53 
The UK NSS report 2010 does not highlight any overt attempt to include economic 
concerns in the national security context. It is mainly a military-based notion focusing 
on terrorism, cyber-attack, and an international military crisis, although it refers to a 
major accident or natural hazard which can result in disruption to UK utility services 
including telecommunications, electricity, water or energy supplies. The document 
does not exclude the possibility of dealing with economic concerns in the context of 
security. However, by prioritising military threats, including terrorism and natural 
                                                     
51  United Kingdom, Security Service MI5, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-
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52 United Kingdom, ‘A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy’, HM 
Government, 2010. 
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disasters, as fatal risks, the importance of other security concerns is diminished. 
Nevertheless, it shows its awareness of energy security by mentioning that the 
emergence of new powers, such as China and India, has heightened competition over 
rare resources, 54  which directly influences utility service industries. Moreover, 
including disruption to UK utility services in the category of Tier Three implicitly 
indicates the importance of energy security and the potential catastrophic consequence 
in the absence of it. 
The UK formed the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy in 2005 to 
discuss the previous NSS documents and to recommend way-forward for the UK 
regarding national security. The report of “The Next National Security Strategy 
2015”55 submitted by the Joint Committee argues that the NSS needs to address a wide 
range of questions by taking a broad approach to security.56 This is because different 
types of threats and increasing economic instability called for a new approach to 
national security from many different angles. By widening the scope, resilience and 
preparedness can be achieved insofar as where the scope of national security is broader 
than military defence. Accordingly, the choice of measures to ensure national security 
should be wider than “military, diplomatic, development, intelligence and other hard 
security measures.”57 This means that the incorporation of diverse security concerns 
can bring about increased preparedness in order to tackle new threats more promptly 
by supporting contingency planning.   
Moreover, the report underlines energy security, referring to cases of Russia and the 
Middle East which have posed political and physical threats to energy supply in the 
UK due to Britain’s energy dependency.58 Regarding the concern on energy security, 
the report states that the Prime Minister mentioned the National Security Council 
would be considering the issue of foreign ownership of energy infrastructure.59 The 
report also shows concerns on economic shifts. Economic unpredictability and shifts 
in economic power given economic stagnation in the Eurozone have posed economic 
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and political challenges.60 Although the Joint Committee on the National Security 
Strategy is an advisory institution without the power to draft NSS reports or enforce 
measures about national security, its opinions on this report suggest the direction of 
improvement in the UK NSS and are taken into consideration for security policy. It is 
important to note that the report mentions that the UK Parliament is aware of concerns 
of foreign ownership over energy infrastructures caused by increasing instability in 
countries exporting oil or gas and the UK’s energy dependency on such countries.61 
This discourse may not be confined to energy infrastructure. It can include other 
critical infrastructures, such as water supply, transportation or telecommunication, 
which have a direct influence on national public interests and well-being of any 
country. Besides, since the 2008 global economic crisis, economic instability has 
become the common concern for most countries – even a country which does not have 
a volatile economy can be adversely influenced by another country’s economy, due to 
economic dependency. And this has made countries more aware of foreign ownership 
of critical infrastructures and economic stability. Changes in economic powers and the 
international political system are also regarded as part of changing circumstances. For 
the UK to adapt to the current situation, the Joint Committee highlights the necessity 
of understanding the changing situation and embracing the new challenges and threats 
into the realm of national security policy. 
There is a similar debate over security strategy in Germany. One policy suggestion, 
drafted by the CDU/CSU party62 on 7 May 2008, demonstrates new challenges to 
German national security. The document suggests that Germany should prepare a new 
security paradigm to respond to changing situations and that a security strategy 
includes “economic matters and energy, the environmental and fiscal policy”63 in 
addition to the classical issues. The document does not define the concept of security. 
Instead, it refers to threats, such as terrorism, organised crime, energy and resource 
dependency, the proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, failed states, etc. Those 
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threats were covered in the US security strategy reports as well as the UK report, which 
implies the existence of common security interests. Similar to the British and 
American strategy reports, the German report shows concern on infrastructures of 
transport, energy and financial markets, since Germany has opened critical 
infrastructures market to foreign investment. The report suggests taking a 
comprehensive approach to security strategy, which can cover economic, energy and 
environmental policy as well as foreign and defence policies.  
It also notes that “the goal must be to minimise security risks pre-emptively and be in 
a position to intervene quickly and effectively anywhere crises that may affect our 
security are coming to a head in conflict”.64 Thus, the government can implement 
measures to lower the possibility for a risk to become a real threat or to deal with the 
risk although the risk in question has not been materialised nor certain, confirming the 
willingness for Germany to be alert towards potential threats to national security.   
Similarly, France has outlined three priorities of its defence strategy: protection, 
deterrence and intervention.65 The threats and risks specified in the French report 
include aggression by another state against the French territory, terrorist attacks, cyber-
attacks, damages on scientific and technical potential, organised crime, major crises 
originating from natural, health, technological, industrial or accidental risks, and 
attacks on French nationals abroad.66 The French government acknowledges that its 
policy direction is in coherence with most of the European Union’s priorities. Thus, it 
is crucial to consider the EU’s approach to security.  
2.3. The European Union 
The European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted by the European Council in 2003. 
The ESS proposes the EU’s policy direction on Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The ESS report, ‘A Secure 
Europe in a Better World’ 2003 specifies the EU’s security challenges and key threats 
as: terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, failed states and organised 
crime. The report also addresses strategic objectives for the EU, including: specifying 
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the threats, promoting effective multilateralism and building security in the 
neighbourhood (Balkans, Mediterranean, Southern Caucasus, and the Middle East).67 
In the Hague Programme 2004, the EU asserted that it would take a militaristic 
approach68 in dealing with illegal immigration in the EU.69 It also highlighted the role 
of preventive actions in order to minimise the possibility of conflicts, as part of 
anticipatory governance. The importance of international cooperation was also 
emphasised to tackle global threats. 
In the 2008 Review of the ESS, cyber security, energy security, climate change and 
pandemics were added to the previous list of threats.70 However, the 2008 Review was 
criticised in that it failed to take a strategic approach to security and to recommend 
clearer security aims and implementation tools to achieve security.71 The reason for 
such failure was attributable to the inclusion of the new Member States in the EU, 
which led to simply illustrating general principles of security rather than broadening 
the scope of common security policy.  
The EU’s CFSP contains an economic aspect of security since its measures are not 
limited to military means, but comprises an adequate combination of military, political 
and economic considerations. However, the EU’s security policy does not specifically 
discuss economic security; rather it adopts the concepts of economic sanctions and 
“soft power” 72  instruments, including withdrawing foreign financial assistance or 
initiating restrictions on trade. The 2014 Annual Report on the main aspects and basic 
choices of the CFSP highlights the EU’s effort to utilise a wide range of tools to tackle 
new challenges and threats by contemplating a long-term strategy and taking into 
account emerging global changes. The report also emphasises the importance of taking 
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a comprehensive approach with a diversity of policy instruments, including 
humanitarian aid. 73 Similarly, the report “An Open and Security Europe: Making it 
Happen”, states that security policy should be directed with predicting new challenges, 
promoting the EU’s values and complying with international human rights obligations, 
especially to deal with migration. 74  
The European Commission reinforced this direction in the European Agenda on 
Security 2015. 75  This report underlines the complementary relationship between 
security and fundamental rights, which include democratic values based on the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights.76 The report further stresses security measures should conform 
to principles such as necessity, proportionality and legality with accountability and 
judicial redress through strict tests conducted by the Commission.77 It is also argued 
that the internal security of the EU and the external security are mutually reliant, so 
the EU’s approach has to be comprehensive by taking both internal and external 
dimensions of security into consideration.   
However, the main focus of the Agenda lies on military security and cybersecurity 
given that the Agenda prioritises combatting terrorism, organised crime and 
cybercrime.78 It does not make any reference to the economic aspects of security such 
as economic measures against economic crises or non-Member States’ ownership over 
certain industries. This is understandable since the EU has tried to minimise economic 
regulations within the EU and each Member State retains the authority to implement 
measures appropriate and necessary against an economic crisis and to define certain 
sectors as critical infrastructure which foreign investors are not permitted to invest in 
or which foreign investors are subject to more restrictions and regulations to invest in. 
Thus, while the EU focuses on the due process of applying security measures by 
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ensuring that such measures comply with aforementioned principles, including 
proportionality, Member States can implement policies and measures which are 
necessary for their countries’ circumstance.  
 
3. Foreign Investment Owned or Controlled by a Government in 
Investment Agreements 
The OECD Working Paper entitled ‘The Policy Landscape for International 
Investment by Government-controlled Investors’ is an important document for 
considering a government’s foreign investment. The Working Paper is concerned with 
states’ policy in relation to foreign investment by foreign government-controlled 
investors (GCIs), such as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or sovereign wealth funds 
(SWFs).  The Working Paper highlights that reference to GCIs in IIAs has recently 
become frequent because the participation of GCIs has increased in the international 
investment market and also because little attention had been paid to GCIs until their 
active participation.79 Most BITs do not make explicit reference to investors owned or 
controlled by a government. Additionally, they do not provide for different treatment, 
nor do countries apply separate policies on foreign investment, based on ownership 
structure, whether privately-owned or government-controlled. However, some 
countries have implemented policies which specifically apply to GCIs.  
Less than 1% of the surveyed IIAs contain explicit reference to GCIs or SWFs.80 
Interestingly, BITs tend to define investors in general terms. For example, one BIT 
defines an investor as “a legal person or any entity […] whether private or government-
owned or controlled”.81 Another BIT defines enterprises as “any entity […] whether 
privately or governmentally owned”.82 The OECD Working Paper defines a state-
owned or state-controlled entity as “a department of government, corporation, 
institution or undertaking wholly or partially owned or controlled by government and 
engaged in activities of a commercial nature”.83 Thus, in defining investors, any legal 
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entity which is owned or controlled by a government includes not only an entity which 
is wholly controlled by government, but also partially controlled ones. Therefore, if a 
government has certain control over such an entity, it is regarded as a state-controlled 
or government-controlled investor. 
Despite the infrequent explicit inclusion of SOEs in IIAs, the Working Paper notes 
that three Panama BITs expressly exclude SOEs of Panama within the category of 
enterprises. The BITs state that “companies mean all juridical persons constituted in 
accordance with the legislation in force in Panama […] which have their domicile in 
the territory of the Republic of Panama excluding State-owned enterprises”. 84 
However, the exclusion of SOEs is not applied to SOEs from its treaty partners – the 
UK, Germany and Switzerland. 85  Therefore, SOEs of the UK, Germany and 
Switzerland are recognised as enterprises, whilst Panama’s SOEs are not recognised 
as companies.86 The Working Paper suggests that the recent trend shows that treaties 
have increasingly made explicit reference to GCIs, especially SOEs, in defining 
investor so that states which have a large size of SWFs can expect and ensure the 
protection coverage which extends to investors controlled or owned by governments.87 
Countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have 
a great scale of GCIs and are willing to consider GCIs as investors, in order to be 
within the protection purview. Those types of foreign investment are only mentioned 
in IIAs of the countries where a government is either playing a direct and significant 
role as a GCI or engaged in foreign investment markets as a foreign investor. In the 
India-Saudi Arabia BIT, the effort to include GCIs as an investor is evident. Saudi 
Arabian investors include “the Government of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its 
financial institutions and authorities such as the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 
public funds and other similar governmental institutions existing in Saudi Arabia”.88 
There is no such reference to the Indian government as an investor in the BIT. This 
shows the awareness of both Contracting Parties that Saudi Arabia has large SWFs, 
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one (SAMA Foreign Holdings) of which is ranked as the 5th largest globally. This made 
it imperative for Saudi Arabia to seek certain protection its GCI’s status,89 whereas 
India lacks such SWFs. Another example of such inclusion is the Kuwait-Mauritius 
BIT, wherein the term “investor” includes “the Government of each party itself”, and 
“any legal person constituted or incorporated […] whether privately or governmentally 
owned or controlled.”90 The inclusion would be for the same reason as Saudi Arabia, 
as Kuwait Investment Authority ranked the 4th largest SWF the world over.91 This 
illustrates that contracting parties would opt for a different meaning and scope for 
certain terms such as investors, depending on SWF ownership.  
Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global provides another example of a large scale 
SWFs. Norway’s petroleum income produces the surplus for the Government Pension 
Fund Global.92 However, Norway’s investment agreements in force do not make a 
particular reference to GCIs. This phenomenon may stem from Norway’s partnership 
with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).93 BITs concluded as a member 
state of the EFTA does not represent the individual interest of Norway. Chapter 5 of 
“Investment of EFTA-Costa Rica-Panama FTA” defines an investor as “any legal 
entity duly constituted […] whether privately-owned or governmentally-owned, 
including any corporation, trust, partnership, joint venture, sole proprietorship or 
association”.94 Contrariwise, the definition of investors in the Norwegian Model BIT 
2015 explicitly includes “a Party.”95 The inclusion of a contracting party, that is, 
Norway, in the Model BIT, confirms Norway’s attempt to accord its GCIs the status 
of investor.  
Conversely, Australia, Costa Rica, Iceland, Israel, Mexico, Spain and Turkey have 
special restrictions on inward investment by GCIs. Australia, Iceland and Spain apply 
certain measures to all investment controlled by government. For example, Iceland 
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explicitly prohibits “investment by foreign states or state-owned enterprises, unless an 
authorisation is granted.”96 In contrast, countries such as Costa Rica, Israel, Mexico 
and Turkey impose sector-specific regulations on foreign GCIs. Costa Rica has such 
restrictions on mining or exploration of ores; Israel on cable broadcasting licences;97 
Mexico on communications or transport activities; and Turkey on the petroleum 
sector.98 These restrictions pattern by states on certain industries shows states’ concern 
over their critical infrastructure sectors: communications, transports, and distribution 
of petroleum in addition to extractive industries directly relevant to energy security. 
Moreover, implementation of sector-specific regulations implies that countries face 
distinctive socio-economic circumstances and their priority regarding critical 
infrastructures also varies.  
Australia, Canada, Russia and the US have regulations targeting investments by 
foreign GCIs, requiring such investments to undergo thorough regulatory scrutiny. 
This type of regulations is different from the aforementioned restrictions in that the 
regulations are not deterring GCIs’ investment or providing less favourable treatment 
– the cases of Australia, Canada and the US will be futher discussed in the next section.  
Regarding GCIs, countries have different attitudes towards foreign investments owned 
or controlled by government. Most IIAs are ownership-neutral without foreign 
investment policies aimed at foreign GCIs’ investment.99 Thus, it remains debatable if 
investor status is only granted to foreign GCIs where the relevant BIT provides so, or 
GCIs are generally qualified as investors unless the BIT excludes them. Countries with 
large SWFs generally seek to pave the way for their SWFs to be accorded legitimate 
protection. Nonetheless, some countries have shown their concerns regarding GCIs by 
either restricting or prohibiting foreign GCIs from investing in certain critical 
industries through regulations.  
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4. National Security in Domestic Investment Law and Critical 
Infrastructure 
This section explores the foreign investment policies that states implement when 
dealing with national security issues. It will also review the roles of critical 
infrastructures in the national policies of European and North American countries. 
As mentioned in the previous section, national security and critical infrastructures are 
closely related. States have constantly shown concern over critical industries, and have 
expressed willingness to protect those industries by sometimes taking drastic 
measures. The ambition to protect critical industries has been more seriously ignited 
by foreign investors’ bids to acquire national champion companies or industries which 
have public social concerns. Therefore, this section analyses each country’s 
understanding of critical infrastructure and the implication of national security in 
investment policy, including an exception to restrict foreign investment or thorough 
appraisal of foreign investment. 
4.1. European Countries 
In general, the EU Member States tend to have a foreign investment-friendly policy. 
This section discusses the approaches in the United Kingdom, Germany and France, 
as representative examples of European Countries. 
The United Kingdom 
The UK implements an open economic policy to foreign investment and generally 
provides foreign investors with no less favourable treatment than domestic investors. 
Although there is no legislation for imposing restrictions only targeting foreign 
investments, there are some exceptions related to national security.100 Specifically, the 
UK government retains the right to prevent particular mergers and acquisitions under 
a certain legal framework if the transactions are determined to be contrary to the 
national interests of the UK. 
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First of all, as a member state of the EU, the UK is subject to EU law. The EC Merger 
Regulation which grants a government the authority to intervene in mergers and 
acquisitions provides in Article 21(4) that:  
Member States may take appropriate measures to protect legitimate 
interests other than those taken into consideration by this Regulation and 
compatible with the general principles and other provisions of Community 
law.  
Public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules101 shall be 
regarded as legitimate interests within the meaning of the first 
subparagraph.102  
As illustrated in the previous section, the scope of public security in the EU’s security 
strategy reports is not sufficiently broad in order to include an economic concern as 
one of public security issues. This is particularly so since the recent report explicitly 
prioritises security concerns pertaining to terrorism and cybercrime given the 
contemporary global circumstance.103 Nevertheless, the meaning of public security is 
not confined, as security concerns are likely to evolve depending on the period. In 
addition to the evolutionary feature of security, the scope of security can be adjusted 
because the authority to interpret security belongs to each Member State as long as the 
concept is compatible with EC law.  
Powers similar to those in EC law can be found in the UK Enterprise Act 2002. The 
Enterprise Act enables the UK government to intervene in a merger or acquisition of 
British companies by foreign entities if the transaction is deemed to be against the 
public interest of the UK. 104 The Secretary of State for the Department of Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (DBERR) has the authority to determine if a 
transaction is contrary to the UK public interests. Essentially, the Enterprise Act 2002 
significantly reformed UK mergers and acquisitions regulations. Before the Enterprise 
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Act, a competition test was considered primary because intervention by the Secretary 
of State for the DBERR was initially intended to counter anti-competitive mergers, 
which means that domestic investors are also subject to such an intervention. The 
Enterprise Act substituted the Fair Trading Act 1973 which was criticised for its vague 
scope of public interest test.105 For example, the considerations of public interest test 
specified in section 84 of the Fair Trading Act 1973 include effective competition 
between service providers, interests of consumers and balanced distribution which are 
ambiguous. The term public interests suggested in the section did not explain what 
types of public interests would be considered. Instead, it noted promoting competition 
rules and provided an insufficient explanation of public interests.  
On the contrary, section 58 of the Enterprise Act specifies the scope of transactions 
subject to a public interest test as an investment which has considerations of national 
security and financial stability.106 The section further specifies that there may be an 
intervention in a merger or acquisition of investment in relation to plurality of the 
media, which is consistent with section 319 of the Communication Act 2003. If a 
merger is involved in the fields above, the Secretary of State can assess if the merger 
is contrary to public interests while the competition test is in process. In addition to 
the right to intervene for the specified considerations, the Secretary of State is entitled 
to modify the section such as adding a new proposal or amending any considerations 
specified in the section. As the right to adjust the scope of national security belongs to 
the Secretary of State, there is always room for further development on the 
consideration list. The Enterprise Act further stipulates that the Secretary of State has 
the right to intervene in takeovers if the firm in the acquisition possesses information 
“relating to defence and of a confidential nature” which shows a more traditional 
approach to security.107  
Additionally, section 58 of the Enterprise Act expressly provides that the interests of 
national security include public security which has the same meaning with public 
security in article 21(4) of the EC Merger Regulation. The provision that the interests 
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of national security include public security implies that public security and national 
security do not share the same meaning.108 Rather, the meaning of national security 
takes into consideration the concept of public security by the EU and, in addition to it, 
UK’s specific understanding of national security which has room for further 
development. 
However, within the UK, there has been a constant controversy over the balance of 
tests. Whereas the meaning of public interest is too broad and vague, focusing on a 
competition test can lead to increasing clarity of the merger framework and 
predictability. There will be a reduction in certainty when more factors are taken into 
account in the mergers process.109 Many politicians are sceptical when it comes to a 
wider public interest test because a domestic political pressure can negatively affect 
transparency and predictability in the process of a public interest test, which leads to 
arbitrary decisions rather than fair and justifiable ones. 110  The government has 
however stated that it does not have current plans to amend the Enterprise Act on 
public interest grounds since it is believed that the existing framework covers the scope 
sufficiently to take actions against mergers for the protection of national interests.111 
The former Secretary of State, Peter Lilley, stated that the UK had pursued the optimal 
allocation of resources in the market for the interests of industries and consumers, by 
implementing privatisation and liberalisation of the market.112 However, he noted that 
government-controlled companies should be treated differently since they are less 
likely to compete fairly with private companies and their decision may be made for 
non-commercial purposes giving rise to market-distorting impacts. Therefore, he 
argued that the Monopolies & Mergers Commission (MMC) must be given the right 
to review mergers involving such companies. Yet, referring a case to the MMC does 
not necessarily mean that it is expected to be against public interest.113 In response to 
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Mr Lilley’s concern, the Trade and Industry Committee contemplated certain 
restrictions of foreign government-controlled bidders, referred to as state-controlled 
bidders.114  
Increased monitoring of state-controlled bidders might be justified since GCIs may be 
capable of dominating the market irrespective of their commercial performance due to 
an unclear financing source and may involve political considerations on decision-
making. Yet, simultaneously, it is important not to presume that state control of the 
acquirer would be contrary to competition and the public interest. Therefore, the 
Secretary of State should not intervene if the degree of state control, size of the entity, 
the share of the market, the likelihood of exercising market influence, and evidence of 
anticompetitive action are insignificant.115  
The government desire to intervene in the market at a minimum can be grasped in 
relation to the Industry Act 1975. The Industry Act 1975 empowers the government to 
intervene in foreign takeovers of important manufacturing sectors when such a change 
of control of the sector is contrary to UK interests. However, this clause has never been 
invoked by the government. The reason may be that manufacturing sectors are 
generally regarded as non-critical infrastructure considering their level of importance 
in society although it can become one of the targeted industries if a state plans to 
enhance the profitability of the industry. Thus, the importance of manufacturing 
sectors in society has decreased compared to research and development or high 
technology sectors. Although the UK applies golden shares in certain strategic areas 
including BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce116 on national security grounds,117 the fact 
that the UK government did not invoke the Industry Act118  shows its attempt to 
minimise the room for governmental manoeuvre in foreign takeovers.119 
Unlike the US’s case with Dubai Ports World, despite the risk to national security, the 
UK decided not to intervene in the takeover of the ports and shipping group, P&O by 
Dubai Ports World which is a GCI. Hence, all of the UK’s ports are owned by Dubai 
                                                     
114 UK, ‘First Report: Takeovers and Mergers’, HC 90 1991-92, November 27, 1991, pp. liv-lv. 
115 Ibid para 238. 
116 Foreign ownership of voting stocks in BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce is limited to 15 percent. 
117 Calvaresi-Barr, 2008, supra note 100, p. 101. 
118 The ECJ ruled that application of gold shares is only acceptable under specific circumstances and 
strict conditions. 
119 Calvaresi-Barr, 2008, supra note 100, p. 102. 
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Ports World. However, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, foreign ownership of 
energy sectors120 – and by extension foreign ownership pf other critical infrastructures 
– has drawn keen attention. Moreover, in relation to national security and interests, the 
definition of critical infrastructure plays an important role in predicting amendment in 
the scope of section 58 of the Enterprise Act. The UK defines critical infrastructures 
as “certain critical elements of infrastructure, the loss or compromise of which would 
have a major, detrimental impact on the availability or integrity of essential services, 
leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life”,121 including 
energy supply pipelines, transport, water supplies, most of which are run by private 
enterprises in the UK. This signifies that the UK is aware of the potential catastrophic 
impact where critical infrastructures are not fully functioning.  
The UK’s crucial interest in its critical infrastructure can also be noticed in the 
document ‘Foreign involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI): the 
Implications for National Security’ submitted by the UK Intelligence and Security 
Committee. 122  The document mainly discusses the potential impact of foreign 
involvement – Huawei, the Chinese GCI – in the telecommunication industry. The 
document doubts if there is any ties between the company and the Chinese 
government, which will be a security risk. While the Committee contemplates the risks 
in the telecommunication infrastructure, it noted that the same concern is applicable to 
other CNIs. Since many shareholders of companies are located abroad, this directly 
raises concern over national security issues.123 It also highlighted that the risk to CNIs 
inevitably exists, due to the global supply chains. Notwithstanding, the government is 
urged to manage CNIs by enhancing an examining process, developing strategies for 
managing risks, calculating the potential impact on CNIs, assessing risks, and 
clarifying the authority for responsibility and accountability.124  In response to the 
Committee’s document, the UK government decided to adopt a risk-based approach 
as more appropriate, stating that a risk on CNIs is not a corollary of foreign ownership 
                                                     
120 The UK Prime Minister expressed his concern over the UK’s energy dependency. See further 
Chapter 3.2.2. European Countries.  
121 Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, ‘Critical National Infrastructure’, 
www.cpni.gov.uk/about/cni (accessed January 22, 2013). 
122 UK Intelligence and Security Committee, ‘Foreign Involvement in the Critical National 
Infrastructure: The Implications for National Security’, June 2013. 
123 Ibid p. 19. 
124 Ibid.  
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and foreign investment in CNI. Hence, the government concluded to deal with the 
issue on a case-by-case basis.125  
The UK example of dealing with foreign investment involving critical industries 
demonstrates the government’s awareness the risks involved in foreign investment in 
such industries. Simultaneously, the discussion highlights that there should not be 
unnecessary restrictions which prevent attraction of foreign investments into the UK. 
Accordingly, the UK has to pursue a more balanced approach, which is evidenced by 
the non-blockage of foreign investment in the relevant industries. Furthermore, despite 
controversy regarding expanding the scope of public interest and national security, the 
current situation shows that the UK is not willing to impose any restrictions on foreign 
investment, in order to remain an open investment market. However, if the UK 
government is concerned about the impacts of foreign ownership on the energy sector, 
there might be further restrictions or perhaps broadening of the Enterprise Act as 
possible policy options designed to enhance the security of the country. 
Germany 
Similarly, Germany is also one of the least restrictive countries regarding foreign 
investment. Germany did not enact any particular restrictions or prohibit foreign 
investment apart from general restrictions under competition law and certain 
requirements for investing in finance sectors, which are equally applied to domestic 
and EU investors.126 Germany, however, enacted new legislation in 2004 that foreign 
investors have to notify the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 
of a business acquisition involved with manufacturing armaments or cryptosystems. 
This legislation empowers the German government to restrict or prohibit acquisition 
of certain industries if the acquisition is deemed to affect security interests of Germany 
significantly.  
In 2008, the OECD published a document regarding SWFs which recognises the 
necessity of implementing investment measures in order to address national security 
                                                     
125 UK, ‘Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Report of Session 2013-
14: Foreign Involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure, July 2013, pp. 5-6. 
126 Norton Rose Fulbright, ‘Restrictions on M&A Transactions under German Foreign Investment 
Law - A Brief Guide’, October 26, 2011, 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/news/57747/restrictions-on-ma-transactions-under-german-
foreign-investment-law-a-brief-guide (accessed January 22, 2013). 
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concerns.127 In response to increasing concerns regarding the relationship between 
national security and foreign investment, the German government amended the 
German Foreign Investment Act in 2009, to restrict or prohibit acquisitions by foreign 
investors from outside the EU and the EFTA (Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland) if the acquisition is considered to jeopardise “the public order or security” 
and to pose “an actual and sufficiently serious threat that affects a fundamental interest 
of the society”. The new 2009 legislation does not confine sectors to armaments or 
cryptosystem industries like the 2004 legislation. This granted the government the 
right to examine a wide range of acquisitions regardless of the types of sectors and the 
prerogative to adapt the list of the sectors to changes. For example, new types of 
industries could be regarded as essential depending on the economic situation of the 
country. With the approval of the Federal government, the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Affairs and Energy may prohibit or restrict the acquisition for public order 
or security reasons if it involves acquiring at least a 25% stake of a German company 
by a non-EU/EFTA company, while foreign investors who own minor shares are not 
subject to such legislation. This standard shows that the concern lies with operational 
control rather than ownership. Foreign investors may apply for a clearance certificate 
which is a binding statement by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy that the 
transaction is not deemed as a threat to public order or security by providing 
information on the planned transaction. Thus, if it is concluded that there are no 
concerns over public order or security, the ministry must give the clearance certificate. 
128 
Till date, the German government has not invoked the clause to impose any restrictions 
or prohibit acquisitions. Yet, as far as foreign ownership of certain industries is 
concerned, the government’s attitude can be evolving contingent on domestic and 
global situations. Although the new legislation specifies that the restriction is applied 
regardless of types of sectors, as shown in the policy suggestion in the previous 
section,129 Germany has a keen interest in its critical infrastructures such as energy, 
                                                     
127 The OECD document on Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Country Policies discusses the 
procedures for applying the concept of national security in policy related to SWFs and raises questions 
as to necessity of new rules governing SWFs. 
128 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, ‘Foreign Investment Germany – Extended Client Briefing’, July 
24, 2017, http://knowledge.freshfields.com/en/Global/r/3558/foreign_investment_germany_-
_extended_client_briefing (accessed May 3, 2018).  
129 See Chapter 3.2.2. European Countries. 
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financial markets and transport. Remarkably, Germany has pursued a liberal policy to 
foreign investment regarding critical infrastructures. In Germany, critical 
infrastructures are defined as “organisations and facilities of major importance to the 
community whose failure or impairment would cause a sustained shortage of supplies, 
significant disruptions to public order or other dramatic consequences.” 130  This 
definition seems to incorporate the meaning of public order within the scope of critical 
infrastructures. As discussed in Chapter 2, public order in Germany is commonly used 
with public security, and it is found that there is a certain overlap between essential 
security interests and public order to the extent that they aim at the protection of 
national interests in society.131 In relation to public security and public order, Germany 
acts more pre-emptively and effectively as discussed in the policy suggestion. 132 
Therefore, German foreign investment policy concerning critical infrastructures can 
be more stringent than other sectors in the future although after introducing the new 
German Foreign Investment Act 2009, it was noted that such legislation is only 
applicable in the exceptional cases and the government remains very open with foreign 
investments.133 
France 
The French government introduced a new decree 2014-479 which entered into force 
as of 14 May 2014 to expand the list of strategic sectors i.e. critical industries, which 
requires foreign investors to receive authorisation from the French Minister of the 
Economy before investing in France, complying with article L.151-3 of the French 
Monetary and Financial Code. The prior authorisation is required only if foreign 
investment is involved in “activities relating to equipment, products or services 
including those relating to the safety and the proper functioning of facilities and 
equipment, essential to guarantee the French national interests regarding public policy, 
public security or national defence”.134 In other words, to be granted the authorisation, 
                                                     
130 Germany, ‘Public-Private Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Protection’, UP KRITIS, February 
2014, p. 4.  
131 See further Chapter 2.2.2. Public Order.  
132 Germany, ‘A Security Strategy for Germany, Resolution of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group’ 
May 6, 2008 (Presented at the CDU/CSU Security Conference Berlin, May 7, 2008), p. 2.  
133 Pöllath + Partners, ‘Foreign Investments in Germany: Legal and Tax Aspects of M&A and Real 
Estate Transactions’, 2013, pp. 58-59. 
134 Latham and Watkins, ‘New French Regulations Tighten Control on Foreign Investments’, Client 
Alert Commentary, no. 1688, May 16, 2014, p. 1. 
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foreign investors should ensure that the transaction will not affect order public (public 
policy or public order), public safety or national. The new sectors included in the list 
are telecommunications, energy, transport, public health and water 135  as well as 
facility or structure of vital importance pursuant to articles L.1332-1 and L.1332-2 of 
the Defence Code, while the previous sectors subject to the authorisation, such as 
national defence and information technology, remain valid.136   
Although expanding the scope of foreign investment restrictions can cause an 
opposition from the EU insofar as it creates a “restriction of capital movements 
between Member States and between Member States and other countries” as specified 
in Article 56 of the EC Treaty, the exceptions, specified in Article 58 of the EC Treaty, 
may permit such restrictions for “reasons of public interest or public safety” if they are 
in conformity with proportionality. Thus, by inserting the phrase “for the protection of 
the public order or public safety” in the decree, the French government seems to hope 
to achieve the coherence between the national decree and the EC law. This could be 
because the ECJ case law requires Member States to take measures which restrict the 
free movement of capital within the EU only for the sake of public order or public 
safety.137 Therefore, France seeks to strike a fair balance between expanding the scope 
of the restrictions applying to foreign investors for national interests and complying 
with EU legislation, as an EU member state.  
There are three types of foreign investment which are subject to prior authorisation in 
France. These types are as follows:  
A transaction as a result of which a non-EU investor (i) acquires the control 
(within the meaning of art. L. 233-3 of the commercial code) or (ii) acquires 
all or part of a business (branche d’activité) or, (iii) crosses the threshold of 
33.33 percent of the share capital, of a company whose registered office is 
located in France.  
                                                     
135 Ibid. 
136 Article L.1332-1 states that “[…] public or private operators which exploit some installations or 
use installations or facilities whose unavailability would seriously compromise the warfare or 
economic capabilities, the security or survivability of the nation, have to cooperate at their own 
expense […] in order to protect these installations, structures or facilities against any threat, 
particularly terrorism. These installations, structures or facilities are designated by the administrative 
authority.” 
137 Case C-54/99, Eglise de Scientologie v. France [2000] ECR I-01335.  
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A transaction as a result of which an EU investor (i) acquires the control (within 
the meaning of art. L. 233-3 of the commercial code) or (ii) acquires all or part 
of a business of a company whose registered office is located in France. 
A transaction as a result of which a French investor under foreign control 
acquires all or part of a business of a company whose registered office is 
located in France. 
From the above, the scope of foreign investment, which is required for prior 
authorisation, was broadened by including EU investors and French investors under 
foreign control in the investment list. The increasing interest in foreign control of 
domestic industries can explain the broadened scope of foreign investment subject to 
prior authorisation.  
Furthermore, the scope of industries subject to review varies depending on the 
nationalities of investors, more particularly, EU/EFTA investors, French investors and 
non-EU investors. The definition of strategic business sectors is narrower and more 
stringent for EU investors and French investors than for non-EU investors. Mostly, the 
definition is restricted to military and national security considerations. For example, a 
transaction by EU investors and French investors will be restricted when the business 
“provides private security services to public or private-sector entities in critical 
facilities or infrastructures, the unavailability of which could materially jeopardize 
France’s military or economic potential, 138  provides airport and harbour security 
services,139 or involves classified information.140” For non-EU investors, a transaction 
will be restricted if it provides any private security services.141 Nevertheless, when it 
comes to the extra sensitive sectors, the French government applies the same sector 
definition to both EU and non-EU investors. The extra sensitive sectors are industries 
involved in cryptology,142 classified information,143 research and development and 
sale of any explosive substances which can be used by the military during a war.144 
                                                     
138 Article L. 1332-1 of the Defence Code.  
139 Article L. 282-8 of the Civil Aviation Code and Article L. 324-5 of Maritime Ports Code.  
140 Article L. 1332-1 of the Defence Code.  
141 Article R. 153-1 of the Regulatory part of the RCMF.  
142 Paragraphs III and IV of Article 30 and paragraph I of Article 31 of Law No 2004-575 of June 21, 
2004 for confidence in the digital economy, JORF of June 22, 2004.  
143 Within the meaning of Decree No. 98-608 of July 17, 1998 relating to the protection of classified 
information.  
144 Within the meaning of Titles III and IV of Book III of the second part of the Defence Code. 
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Therefore, on the one hand, the strict restriction is imposed on the sectors closely 
linked to military security, which is the traditional concept of national security. On the 
other, sectors which have newly emerging security considerations, such as critical 
facilities or infrastructures, loss of which will have a serious impact on society, could 
be open to foreign investors, depending on their nationality. 
The new legislation broadened the scope of national security in foreign investment 
policy, including industries which have appeared as critical infrastructures in many 
security strategy reports. Interestingly, France has not provided any legal framework 
or policy which defines critical infrastructure specifically or protects critical 
infrastructure.145  
In addition to blocking ENEL’s takeover of Suez, an energy sector, as shown earlier, 
the broadening of security is also evidenced in the French government’s intervention 
in General Electric (GE)’s takeover bid for Alstom’s power generation and 
transmission assets,146 due to concern regarding risks posed by a foreign takeover of 
domestic critical company.147 Despite this, GE was given the approval to acquire 
Alstom’s energy assets on the condition that Alstom’s heavy duty gas turbines business 
be divested to Ansaldo of Italy since GE and Alstom were both main players in the 
heavy-duty gas turbine market. Hence, without the divestment, it would have resulted 
in higher price and less innovation.148 This shows that such intervention takes into 
account the similar concern as the UK government contemplates, which is the balance 
between fair competition in the market and national security considerations. Thus, the 
broadening has achieved to some extent coherence between the interventions of 
takeover bids and investment policy in terms of critical infrastructures.  
On a final note, traditionally, all the EU Member States restrict foreign investment in 
certain industries related to war or cryptosystems. Regarding restriction of foreign 
investments on the basis of national security, the UK has a more liberalised policy, 
                                                     
145 BSA, ‘EU Cybersecurity Dashboard: A Path to a Secure European Cyberspace’, Country Report: 
France’, 2015, http://cybersecurity.bsa.org/index.html (accessed May 3, 2018). 
146 The concern regarding foreign takeovers of domestic companies increased after a U.S. drug maker 
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while France has taken a relatively restrictive approach by requiring prior authorisation 
for investments in critical infrastructures. The UK is also more lenient on foreign 
takeovers of industries which have security considerations, like Dubai Ports World’s 
takeover of ports business in the UK. France is rather more concerned about such 
industries given its prohibition of an Italian company’s takeover of a gas company in 
France. This difference implies that a country’s attitude to economic policy – whether 
more liberalised or restrictive – can affect the gravity of national security in its foreign 
investment policy in relation to critical infrastructures. 
4.2. North America 
Canada 
Canada, as mentioned in the previous section, has a review system on foreign 
investments. The main legislation governing foreign investment is Investment Canada 
Act (ICA), part of which stipulates the mechanism of reviewing process of takeovers 
of Canadian firms and establishment of a new business in Canada by foreign investors. 
The ICA was enacted in June 1985, replacing the Foreign Investment Review Act 
(FIRA) which came into force in 1973. The introduction of the ICA implicitly aimed 
at promoting more foreign investment because before the ICA, any foreign takeover 
of a Canadian firm was subject to review – governmental approval – regardless of the 
size of the firm and the amount of assets. Also, to acquire a business in Canada, foreign 
investors had to show that the investment would bring about “significant” benefit to 
Canada, the meaning and the scope of which were not clear.149 Section 2 of the ICA 
clarified and amended “the benefit to Canada” test, as follows: 
To provide for the review of significant investments in Canada by non-
Canadians in a manner that encourages investment, economic growth and 
employments opportunities in Canada and to provide for the review of 
investments […] could be injurious to national security.   
Thus, a foreign investment which is reviewable under the ICA is only approved if the 
Minister of Industry concludes that the investment is likely to be of “net benefit” to 
                                                     
149 M. Frigon, ‘Background Paper: The Foreign Investment Review Process in Canada’, Publication 
No.2011-42E, July 12, 2011 (revised July 21, 2014), p. 5.  
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Canada. This does not mean every foreign investment is subject to such a review. 
Rather, depending on the monetary thresholds, there are two types of foreign 
investment; one subject to a notification, the other subject to review by providing 
information.  
On 24 April 2015, Canada adopted new regulations which affect foreign investors 
regardless of the sectors as an amendment of the ICA. Canada began to implement 
policy which favours foreign investment by adjusting the policy in review. 150  A 
foreign investment which is reviewable includes SOEs and non-SOEs with at least 
CA$600 million and foreign investment which the Canadian government considers to 
be possibly injurious to national security. Regarding applicable thresholds for review, 
the 2015 amendment introduced a new asset threshold for reviews, CA$600 million 
(in enterprise value), which is expected to result in fewer foreign investment subject 
to reviews.151 However, the change does not apply to foreign SOEs which continue to 
be subject to the existing standard.152 Under the ICA, SOEs include entities owned by 
a foreign state and entities directly or indirectly owned, controlled or influenced by a 
foreign government. The factors taken into consideration during the process are if 
SOEs will have a net benefit to Canada and if the companies will have a purely 
commercial function.  
The ICA also has national security provisions. Part IV.1 of the ICA grants the 
Canadian government the authority to review foreign investment which could be 
injurious to Canada’s national security. Thus, it empowers the Federal Cabinet to 
impose any restrictions or measures if considered necessary or advisable to protect 
national security. If the Minister believes that investment by a non-Canadian could be 
injurious to national security, the Minister can send a notice to the foreign investor for 
the review of the investment.153 Then the Minister requires the foreign investor to 
provide prescribed information which is considered necessary by the Minister in order 
                                                     
150 C. Pawluch and K. Wright, ‘Canada Adopts Significant Changes to Foreign Investment Review 
Framework’, DLA Piper, September 23, 2015, p. 1.  
151 The net benefit review threshold changed from the book value which focuses on assets of the 
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153 Part IV.1 Article 25.2(1) of the ICA. 
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to determine if there are any reasonable grounds for the Minister to believe that foreign 
investment could be injurious to national security. The ICA prescribes the procedures 
of the review process and time periods, but it does not define national security, which 
leads to increasing uncertainty in the review process nor specify what kind of sectors 
will be subject to national security reviews. This means that all sectors can be subject 
to review. The ICA has been criticised for giving too much discretion to the Minister, 
thereby increasing unpredictability in the Canadian investment market.154  Also, there 
are no monetary thresholds for national security reviews, in other words, even if the 
asset of the company is less than CA$600 million which is only subject to a 
notification, it may be subjected to a national security review. In addition, if the 
government has reasonable grounds to believe that a foreign investment could be 
injurious to national security, the government may prohibit the investment, impose 
undertakings and conditions for the investment, or require its divestment, where the 
investment has been made. This makes uncertain the period of national security 
review, which is the strongest policy option for the government towards foreign 
investment.  
The Accelero Capital Holdings’ case demonstrated the Canadian government’s power 
to prohibit foreign investment on the national security grounds. Accelero Capital 
Holdings, the Egyptian telecom magnate’s investment firm, announced its bid to 
acquire Allstream division of Manitoba Telecom Services (MTS) Inc. for a transaction 
value of $520 million. The Canadian government restrained the acquisition for national 
security reason under the ICA in October 2013, which was the first time that 
acquisition was rejected for national security under the ICA. 155 After the national 
security review, James Moore, the former Minister of Industry, said in a statement, 
“MTS Allstream operates a national fibre optic network that provides critical 
telecommunications services to businesses and governments, including the 
Government of Canada.”156  Although there is no reference to special regulations 
treating critical infrastructure in the ICA, by his statement, it seems that Canada 
acknowledges the necessity of paying close attention to critical infrastructures, which 
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Financial Post, October 7, 2013, http://business.financialpost.com/technology/ottawa-rejects-
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raise security considerations. Critical infrastructures in Canada refer to “processes, 
systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets and services essential to the health, 
safety, security or economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of 
government….Disruptions of critical infrastructure could result in catastrophic loss of 
life, adverse economic effects, and significant harm to public confidence.”157 The 
inclusion of security in the definition shows that Canada recognises the connection 
between critical infrastructures and national security. Conversely, the list of hazards 
and threats focuses on natural hazards, intentional threats, and technical hazards, while 
it does not address any economic concerns such as an economic crisis or SOEs.158 
Ordinarily, SOEs per se should not be treated as threats, but they may contain a 
possibility of risk to national security, which needs a national security review. 
Additionally, it is illustrated that the list is not exhaustive and it is expected to 
evolve.159 The 2009 amendment to the ICA eliminated sector-specific restrictions 
imposed on investment in critical industries, such as transportation, financial services 
and uranium sectors. This led to lessening the restrictions and making the market more 
foreign investment-friendly. However, it is argued that a national security review can 
be used as a policy option for the Minister to review investment in a uranium 
business.160 This means that, although Canada’s investment legislation has no specific 
provisions aimed at protecting critical infrastructures, the significance of critical 
infrastructures is still high. Accordingly, acquisition and establishment of such 
industries can be easily under tight scrutiny by the Canadian government on the ground 
of national security.  
United States 
In the US, critical infrastructures are defined as systems and assets, whether physical 
or virtual, so vital to the US that “the incapacity or destruction of such systems and 
assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”161 The critical 
                                                     
157 Canada, ‘National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure’, November 10, 2011, p. 2. 
158 Public Safety Canada, ‘Risk Management Guide for Critical Infrastructure Sectors’, Annex B: List 
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sectors include telecommunications, energy, financial services, water, 
transportation, 162  and “cyber and physical infrastructure services critical to 
maintaining the national defence, continuity of government, economic prosperity, and 
quality of life in the United States.”163 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 included 
the term “key resources” within the scope of critical infrastructures. Key resources are 
“publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the 
economy and government.”164 The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, submitted by former President Bush in 2003, 
lists 11 sectors of critical infrastructure: agriculture and food, water, public health, 
emergency services, defence industrial bases, telecommunications, energy, 
transportation, banking and finance, chemical industry and hazardous materials, postal 
services and shipping,165 which has a wide coverage.  
However, Foreign Investment and National Security Act 2007 which provides policy 
pertinent to foreign investment defines critical infrastructure as: those systems and 
assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the US that the incapacity or destruction 
of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact “on national security.”166 
The difference of the definitions of critical infrastructures between the critical 
infrastructure plan and the investment policy is the absence of “national economic 
security, national public health or safety or any combination of those matters”. This 
alludes to the attitude of the US towards foreign investment. With such exclusion, the 
country may attempt to demonstrate its objective to be less restrictive with regard to 
foreign investment and to pursue an open economic system. Nevertheless, the horizon 
of national security is not confined, which is not atypical. This retains a possibility for 
national security to embrace national economic security concerns depending on the 
national circumstances.  
US Congress passed the Exon-Florio provision of the Defense Production Act in 1988, 
which grants the President the authority to obstruct foreign mergers, acquisitions or 
                                                     
162 42 U.S.C. §5195c(b)(2). 
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165 US Department of Homeland Security, ‘The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of 
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takeovers on the ground of national security if the President has “credible evidence” 
that the foreign investment will impair national security and if the President concluded 
that other US laws are inadequate to protect the national security.167 Under the Exon-
Florio, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) was established to 
monitor the impact of foreign investment in the US and to consider policy proposals 
on foreign investment.168 The initial Exon-Florio received the criticism that the scope 
of foreign investment is broad, which decreases economic efficiency.  
Therefore, in 1992, the Exon-Florio provision was amended, known as the Byrd 
amendment, which requires CFIUS to examine proposed takeovers only if:  
(1) the acquirer is controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government; 
(2) the acquisition results in control of a person engaged in interstate commerce in 
the United States that could affect the national security of the United States.169  
The first requirement was fulfilled in the Dubai Ports World case, while the second 
was not met given that the CFIUS concluded, during the investigation, that the 
acquisition “did not affect the national security.”170 Foreign Investment and National 
Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) was adopted after the Dubai Ports World event. FINSA 
broadened the meaning of national security by including critical infrastructure in it, as 
specified in the 2001 USA Patriot Act. 
FINSA could require CFIUS to investigate all foreign investment deals if the entity is 
owned or controlled by a foreign entity. This resulted in imposing a burden of proof 
on foreign firms that their location of investment does not cause any security risk. 
A similar approach was taken by Australia. Under the Foreign Acquisitions and 
Takeovers Act 1975, the Australian government can determine if the application of 
foreign investment is contrary to national interests of Australia. Foreign governments 
must be granted prior approval or permission before locating direct investment 
regardless of size of investment. However, private foreign investors generally do not 
need to obtain approval unless the size of their investment exceeds certain thresholds. 
                                                     
167 P.L. 100-418, Title V, Section 5021, August 23, 1988; 50 USC Appendix Section 2170. 
168 J. K. Jackson, ‘The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)’, 
Congressional Research Service, March 13, 2018, p. 2.  
169 P.L. 102-484, October 23, 1992. 
170 US, ‘Briefing on the Dubai Ports World Deal before the Senate Armed Services Committee’, 
Senate Hearing 109-782, February 23, 2006. 
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The meaning of “contrary to national interests” can be very wide and cannot be defined 
by a hard and fast rule. Hence, it will be decided on a case-by-case basis,171 by taking 
into consideration national security or impact on national economy or society.172 The 
rules can also vary depending on the size of the target enterprise, the technological 
assets, or the sensitivity of the sector.173 To decrease arbitrary actions against GCIs 
and increase transparency, the government produced the Guidelines for Foreign 
Government Investment Proposals.174 Further examinations will be necessary to grant 
approval to foreign GCIs since the investors may have strategic purposes such as using 
the influence as political leverage more than making profits.175 
The same concern arose in the US when Huawei Technologies, the Chinese-owned 
company, attempted to purchase a US technology firm, although Huawei later 
withdrew its plan. Moreover, even in a report on ‘the Counterintelligence and Security 
Threat Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Doing Business in the 
United States' by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the concern 
on potential economic threats and risks to national security interests of the US was 
highlighted, as follows: 
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) must 
block acquisitions, takeovers, or mergers involving Huawei and ZTE given 
the threat to U.S. national security interests. […] 
Committees of jurisdiction in the U.S. Congress should consider potential 
legislation to better address the risk posed by telecommunications 
companies with nation-state ties or otherwise not clearly trusted to build 
critical infrastructure. Such legislation could include increasing 
                                                     
171 Treasurer of Australia, ‘Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy’, 2017, p. 1. 
172 The Australian government prohibited Shell’s takeover bid over Woodside Petroleum Ltd., the 
Australian Energy company. Shell’s proposal was considered against the national interest. See further 
P. Costello, Treasurer, ‘Foreign Investment Proposal – Shell Australia Investments Limited’s (Shell) 
Acquisition of Woodside Petroleum Limited (Woodside)’, Treasury Portfolio Ministers, Media 
release, no. 25, April 23, 2001. 
173 Treasurer of Australia, 2017, supra note 171, pp. 5, 7. 
174Australia, ‘Guidelines for Foreign Government Investment Proposals’, February 17, 2008, 
http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2008/009.htm&pageID=003&m
in=wms&Year=&DocType (accessed May 3, 2018). 
175 Treasurer of Australia, 2017, supra note 171, p. 10. 
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information sharing among private sector entities, and an expanded role 
for the CFIUS process to include purchasing agreements.176  
Such an attitude may partly stem from the US’s concern about foreign ownership of 
critical industries; in this case, a telecommunication industry, and from the political 
dynamic between China and the US. Whereas generally GCIs are deemed as a potential 
risk to national security given the idea that the investment can be based on strategic 
objective rather than market-based one, the attempt for a government to reject foreign 
investment controlled or owned by a foreign state can involve political considerations 
in addition to economic ones. The US has criticised the Chinese corporations for 
causing economic distortions and unfair competition since the state-supported system 
allowed subsidies. Also, the risk is not confined to military risk such as terrorist attacks 
but expanding to economic risks in critical infrastructure. 
The coverage of the CFIUS’ review on foreign investment transactions is to determine 
whether a transaction threatens (to impair) the national security, or the foreign 
company is controlled or owned by a foreign government. Or it would result in control 
over any critical infrastructure which could threaten or impair the national security.177 
However, during the Bush Administration in 2006, an administrative change in the 
CFIUS review of foreign investment transactions took place. An acquisition 
transaction of Lucent Technologies Inc. by Alcatel SA, a French company, was 
approved under one condition that the company was obliged to concede a Special 
Security Arrangement (SSA), which inhibits the company’s access to the previous 
work done by Lucent’s research regarding the communications infrastructure in the 
US. Further, if the US deemed that a company does not comply with the arrangement, 
it can invalidate the approval, which causes huge uncertainty in business and fear for 
arbitrary actions by the CFIUS from the foreign investors’ point of view.178 The US 
District Court confirmed the CFIUS’s authority in one case179  between a foreign 
                                                     
176 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, ‘Investigative Report on the U.S. National 
Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE: A Report by 
Chairman Mike Rogers and Ranking Member C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence’, U.S. House of Representatives, October 8, 2012. 
177 P.L. 110-49, Section 2, July 26, 2007. 
178 J. Pelofsky, ‘Businesses Object to US Move on Foreign Investment’, Reuters News, December 5, 
2006, https://uk.reuters.com/article/usa-investment/update-1-businesses-object-to-us-move-on-
foreign-investment-idUKN0534982920061206 (accessed May 3, 2018). 
179 Ralls Corporation v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, et al., Civil Action 
Number 12-1513, United States District Court for the District of Columbia.   
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investor and the CFIUS. The court dismissed the forieng investor’s suit, stating that it 
lacked jurisdiction because the President’s decisions are a finality provision, which is 
not subjected to judicial review. The court also found that the President and the CFIUS 
do not have an obligation to disclose evidence for review’s decision since the CFIUS’ 
investigation is based on classified information.180  
Generally, the US president is less likely to block foreign investment since mergers 
and acquisitions bids are withdrawn when the CFIUS’s investigation is initiated. This 
is because foreign investors do not like the negative reputation in case their investment 
in a host country is rejected on national security grounds. However, a recent case 
presented a seminal example of the president prohibiting a deal181 after more than two 
decades.182 Chinese-owned Ralls Corporation planned to invest in Oregon’s Wind 
Farms in 2012. Ralls purchased sites near where the US Navy airspace tests drones 
without notifying the CFIUS. President Obama ordered the company to divest, by 
referring to national security concerns.183  
The CFIUS’s authority has been broadened by the concern that foreign investments, 
especially by foreign GCIs, in critical infrastructures will result in a high vulnerability 
in the US society. Most economists claim that there is no economic evidence that 
foreign ownership has a measurable impact on the national economy while some argue 
that it poses a potential threat or risk to national security. Also, there is little evidence 
about the differential economic impact between foreign private ownership and 
investment controlled or owned by a foreign government.184  
When foreign GCIs locate their investment, especially by a take-over, policymakers 
should observe risks of the foreign investment to their nations. Dealing with foreign 
investments by GCIs is complicated from an investment recipient country’s 
perspective. Usually, a host country would have liberalised its domestic investment 
                                                     
180 Ibid. 
181 J. Masters and J. McBride, ‘Foreign Investment and U.S. National Security, Council on Foreign 
Relations’, September 27, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/foreign-direct-investment/foreign-investment-us-
national-security/p31477 (accessed May 3, 2018). 
182 The last time foreign investment was blocked on the national security grounds was when President 
George H.W. Bush prohibited a Chinese aero-technology firm’s bid over a US manufacturing 
company in 1990.   
183T. J. Keeler, ‘President Obama Orders Divestiture of Chinese Investment in US Wind Farms; 
Investor Mounts Unprecedented Legal Challenge’, Mayer Brown, October 5, 2012, pp. 1-3. 
184 Jackson, 2018, p. 40. 
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market in order to attract more foreign direct investment. Simultaneously, it has to 
consider the effect of the foreign investment in the country. Regarding privately owned 
enterprises, governments may impose more lenient regulations because the purpose of 
private investors is in general profit maximisation. On the contrary, concerning foreign 
investment controlled by a GCI, a state has to contemplate additional restrictions or 
thorough reviews which such foreign investment is subject to since the objective of 
the investment may not be business-based. Therefore, as a recipient country, a state 
has to strike a balance between market liberalisation and restrictions on certain 
investors’ investment in critical industries which have a direct impact on societal and 
economic well-being. As the restrictions may decrease the efficiency of the economy, 
states are placed in a situation where they have to determine to what extent foreign 
companies are allowed in critical infrastructures. 
4. Conclusion 
By examining the foreign investment policy of the EU Member States, the EU, and 
North American countries, the discussion in this chapter identified different 
approaches to national security in foreign investment policies, though the countries 
have liberal investment policies. Furthermore, the countries acknowledge the close 
relationship between national security and critical industries.185 Although the countries’ 
approach to defining critical infrastructures differ, contextually speaking, the 
differences are not significant. The definitions are more likely to be general than 
sector-specific.186 Each definition provides the lists of critical infrastructure sectors 
such as energy and water supply and telecommunications, but those lists are only 
illustrative, not exhaustive. The tendency of general definition implies that the 
meaning and scope of ‘critical’ can hinge on economic and societal circumstances. 
Where countries tend not to delineate the scope of critical infrastructure, the concept 
of national security plays a determinant role in understanding critical infrastructure. 
Even among the EU Member States, the scope and meaning of national security 
restrictions in investment policy also vary. The British investment policy is more 
liberal while the French one is more restrictive, having recently added more industries 
in strategic sectors which require authorisation for investment. Thus, within the EU 
                                                     
185 OECD, 2008, supra note 166, p. 2. 
186 Although in some cases some policies provide some examples of critical infrastructure sectors, 
they are illustrative rather than exhaustive.  
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economic and security framework, the Member States still retain certain rights to 
interpret their own security and public order to some extent.  
In foreign investment policies, security has two main features; one for the traditional 
understanding of security – the Realist School – to protect any industries related to war 
and defence such as cryptosystems. The other feature hinges on critical infrastructure, 
which is closely related to energy security and social security. The evolution of 
including critical infrastructure within the ambit of national security directly pertains 
to the examples of governmental interventions in some GCIs’ mergers or acquisitions 
bids in critical infrastructure. Prohibition or restriction of such bids stems from a 
suspicion that there are non-commercial purposes for the investment. This discourse 
is not confined only to GCIs; it can be applied to private foreign investors attempting 
to invest in such industries such as Canada’s prohibition on acquisition of MTS, a 
telecom company by a foreign investor.  
Countries’ attitudes towards GCIs can be contingent on whether they have GCIs. 
While home states of GCIs make efforts to protect the rights of GCIs as investors under 
the IIAs, host states strive to ensure certain policy space in order to prevent GCIs from 
investing in their country on the grounds of national security.  
Regarding national security exceptions, countries formulate more policies and laws to 
govern new emerging security concerns in the investment arena. It stands to reason 
how the concept of national security will be formalised where a government wishes to 
apply it to direct or indirect expropriation. The countries, examined in this chapter, 
have security clauses in their foreign investment policies, but they only focus on 
mergers and acquisitions by foreign investors and on the establishment of investment 
in certain sectors.   
Effectively, countries recognise the necessity of protecting certain industries, such as 
the supply of water and energy, and telecommunications, from investments or 
acquisitions by foreign investors, especially, where a foreign government is involved 
in such a transaction. This is because an operational failure in such industries can cause 
a severe socio-economic impact in society. In addition, GCIs have drawn keen 
attention for their potential risk since a foreign state’s political decision can be 
implemented in the operation of the GCI. While some countries do not impose any 
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regulations particularly applying to GCIs, others have implemented restrictions and 
regulations targeting GCIs, whether sector-specific or general. It is evident that when 
GCIs attempt to take over domestic industries in critical infrastructures, they are 
subject to more stringent rules, given their potential to have more catastrophic 
ramification. However, it is still controversial if the ownership should be the reason 
for stricter rules since home states tend to claim that they are not involved in the 
operation of the investment. While this chapter mainly examined the level of 
restrictions and regulations imposed on GCIs, the next chapter discusses private 
individual foreign investors. 
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CHAPTER 4  
The Role of the Concept of National Security in Individual 
Foreign Investment  
1. Introduction 
The discussion in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 elaborated on how the concept of national 
security can play a role in the context of foreign corporate investment and foreign 
investment controlled by government. It examined the controversy over preventing 
foreign investment on the grounds of national security and public interest. It was 
concluded that GCIs are inevitably subject to more stringent rules because investment 
by GCIs has more risks than private investment in that their operation may be driven 
by political decisions rather than commercial profits. Interestingly, the idea that GCIs 
have more risks than corporate investors should not be taken for granted. Instead, 
investment should be investigated on a case-by-case basis in order to support the 
optimal allocation of capital. While Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 demonstrated how the 
concept of national security is applied to regulating investment by foreign company 
and investment by foreign government, respectively, this chapter will shift the focus 
from collective action to individual action. In particular, it will examine if there is any 
relation between national security and individual foreign investors who become 
citizens or hold a certain residence permit under a special immigration programme.  
Special immigration programmes have been devised and implemented in order to 
attract foreign capital into a country. To attract foreign investments, host states have 
introduced a myriad of incentives such as tax-free zones or tax incentives. They have 
also pledged themselves to provide foreign investors with fair and equitable treatment 
and to secure liberal foreign investment market such as guaranteeing transfer of 
capital. Notwithstanding, host states, especially developing countries, have not 
attracted foreign investment as much as they expected, despite giving up part of their 
policy space. As part of new initiatives, several countries have granted a foreign 
investor citizenship, or a residency permit on condition of certain requirements so that 
foreign investors can enjoy incentives conducive to their investment and even gain the 
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rights of citizens of host states.1 Compared to citizenship-by-investment programmes 
which are implemented by a few countries, permanent residence permits or golden 
visas for foreign investors have been more widely introduced.2 As part of measures to 
become an attractive investment destination, enhance economic growth and foster 
jobs, host states issued permanent residence permits to foreign investors. However, the 
economic benefits arising from the permanent residence permits were evaluated 
questionable, as will be discussed below. Also, countries – such as Malta and Cyprus, 
which were severely affected by the financial crisis, and Caribbean islands3 which are 
in need of government revenue and foreign capital for renovation of industry and 
infrastructure development – began to contemplate citizenship schemes by investment 
or donation.4 The programmes promise to provide quality of life, preferential tax rates, 
access to education, residence and the benefits of visa-free travel to a number of 
countries. Moreover, those benefits become augmented if the country providing such 
a type of scheme is an EU Member State. In other words, where an applicant is granted 
nationality of an EU Member State, such as Malta and Cyprus, by extension, the 
applicant can hold EU citizenship. In a few European countries, an investor citizenship 
scheme has been implemented to provide more favourable investment market.  
In general, to be naturalised, a foreign investor, who applies for the scheme, (i) must 
have resided for a certain period of time; and (ii) must have invested a certain amount 
of capital in the country in question. Granting citizenship to a foreigner is not new, but 
the basic requirement, either by registration or by declaration, is legal recognition 
conferred by a public authority. By being bestowed citizenship, a foreign investor 
becomes a naturalised citizen.   
However, to attract foreign capital, the economic crisis in Europe led a few EU 
Member States to propose an investment-based citizenship scheme which does not 
require residence history. Particularly, the Maltese government in October 2013 
drafted an initiative which accords Maltese and European citizenship to individual 
                                                     
1 M. Sumption and K. Hooper, ‘Selling Visas and Citizenship: Policy Questions from the Global 
Boom in Investor Immigration’, Migration Policy Institute, October 2014, p. 2. 
2 See further Best citizenships, http://best-citizenships.com/ (accessed May 4, 2018); and J. Džankić, 
‘Investment-based Citizenship and Residence Programmes in the EU’, EUI RSCAS, no. 2015/08, 
2015, pp. 15-18. 
3 Saint Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, and St. Kitts and Nevis.  
4 Sumption and Hooper, 2014, supra note 1, p. 1. 
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foreign investors who can make an economic contribution of at least €650,000. The 
proposal generated a heated debate on the legitimacy of citizenship granted under the 
scheme inside and outside the country.5 Especially, the European Parliament and the 
European Commission officially demonstrated their opposition to the scheme. 6 
Thereafter, the Maltese government made several amendments by requiring an 
applicant to reside for 12 months before issuance of passport7 and to invest in approved 
financial instruments. Additionally, an applicant must retain a residence in the country. 
The residence condition requires an applicant to own or lease a property, thereby 
increasing the amount of capital necessary for gaining citizenship from €650,000 to 
€1,150,000 in total – €650,000 donation to National Development and Social Fund, 
€150,000 investment in financial instruments and €350,000 minimum property price.8  
Unlike corporate investors and GCIs, private investors under citizenship-by-
investment schemes are subject to different security considerations. To explain 
distinctive features of this type of investors, this chapter will discuss the controversies 
surrounding such schemes and will shed light on questions about their legitimacy. It 
will thereafter consider citizenship-by-investment schemes by country: Caribbean 
countries of St. Kitts and Nevis, and Antigua and Barbuda, and European countries 
including Malta, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania and Ireland. It will then discuss 
immigrant residence permit programmes. The chapter will also analyse the 
implications of both types of programmes in the context of national security. More 
specifically, it will probe into whether those programmes can pose a risk to national 
security as well as in what cases individual foreign investors’ citizenship can be 
revoked on the grounds of national security.  
                                                     
5 See further, A. Shachar and R. Bauböck (eds), Should Citizenship be for Sale?, EUI RSCAS, no. 
2014/01, 2014. 
6 M. Dalli, ‘IIP, Brussels Contemplating Infringement Proceedings against Malta’, Malta Today, 
January 18, 2014, http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/33227/iip-european-commission-
contemplating-infringement-proceedings-against-malta-20140118#.V1RjbvkrLIW (accessed May 4, 
2018). 
7 The Maltese programme includes the processing time, which is 4 months, in the residence 
requirement of 12 months. Hence, applicants need not apply for citizenship after residing for 12 
months. Rather, they can apply for citizenship if the issuance of passport will take place after 12 
months from date of initial residency.  
8 A. Shachar, ‘Dangerous Liaisons: Money and Citizenship’, in A. Shachar and R. Bauböck (eds.), 
Should Citizenship be for Sale?, EUI RSCAS, no. 2014/01, 2014. 
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2. Controversies over Investment Citizenship Schemes  
It is a general notion that a sovereign state has the exclusive authority to regulate its 
nationality by law or policy. However, the citizenship-by-investment schemes 
generated controversies and criticisms, not only within the implementing countries, 
but also in other countries, international institutions and academia. Although all the 
citizenship-by-investment schemes have general implications, including the concern 
of negatively influencing established values and meaning of citizenship, criticisms 
against the scheme varied based on whether there was particular emphasis on the 
financial requirement or the host state is an EU Member State. For example, the 
Maltese government’s recent proposal on citizenship for foreign investors generated 
the most heated debate within and outside Malta. Outside Malta, the main objections 
against citizenship-by-investment schemes were centred on the assumptions that (a) 
the scheme reduced the value of citizenship and (b) placed the entire citizenship of the 
EU at stake.9 Otherwise, the EU institutions could not have intervened in Malta’s draft 
on citizenship scheme since a state exclusively retains the regulatory space over 
nationality. The grouse of the European institutions against the Maltese scheme was it 
lacked a ‘genuine link’ between an individual and a Member State of the EU to acquire 
citizenship.10 Notwithstanding, this argument raises the question regarding what a 
genuine link is in the realm of citizenship. The then Vice President of the European 
Commission, Viviane Reding, remarked that “in compliance with criteria under public 
international law, Member States should only award citizenship where there is a 
genuine link or connection to the State in question” while taking into consideration the 
potential impact of national policy on citizenship onto the other Member States and 
the EU. 11  It has been claimed that there should be a certain connection such as 
physical, emotional or genetic between the state in question and the individual in order 
to gain citizenship of the state.12  
                                                     
9 European Parliament, ‘Citizenship by Investment (CBI) and Residency by Investment (RBI) 
schemes in the EU’, European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 627.128, October 2018, p. 5. 
10 Ibid. 
11 V. Reding, ‘Citizenship Must not be up for Sale’, European Commission, Speech/14/16, January 15, 
2014, para. 7.  
12 J. Balzan, ‘Citizenship is Priceless-Simon Busuttil’, Malta Today, October 30, 2013, 
https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/31099/citizenship-is-priceless-simon-busuttil-says-
20131030#.WuxflqTt7cs (accessed May 4, 2018).  
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However, whilst the Maltese citizenship-by-investment scheme is the first case where 
the EU officially expressed concern over a Member State’s regulation on nationality, 
it is not the first citizenship scheme in the EU. For instance, Cyprus offered foreign 
investors citizenship without requiring prior residence to compensate their loss in bank 
deposits during the financial crisis.13 Furthermore, Malta claimed that Austria14 also 
has a similar scheme – but investors who were naturalised by the Austrian scheme 
remain unreported since the process is deemed as an official secret, leading to a lack 
of transparency and corruption.15 
This section discusses the controversy over the citizenship-by-investment schemes on 
the basis of the notion of a genuine link. The next discussion will examine the idea of 
citizenship as a marketable commodity and ramifications thereof, such as deteriorating 
democracy. This is important because foreign investors who naturalise under a 
citizenship-by-investment programme are exempt from certain conditions that apply 
to a normal naturalisation application, such as the level of integration. Also, the lower 
thresholds applied under this programme in exchange for money and investment raise 
security concerns about this type of investors. Given that the implementation of such 
a scheme by an EU Member State can confer EU citizenship on a foreign investor, this 
thesis will undertake a discourse on the scheme at the EU level.  
2.1. A Genuine Link and Solidarity 
As former Vice-President Reding underlined, a Member State should grant citizenship 
on the basis that there is a link or connection between an individual and a state, such 
as the individual’s political or societal participation in the polity and attachment to the 
country. Furthermore, the importance of prior attachment and a certain connection in 
the context of nationality has been highlighted by the ICJ, especially in Nottebohm.16 
Nottebohm who had resided in Guatemala from 1905 to 1943 gave up his German 
                                                     
13 Džankić, 2015, supra note 2, p. 8. 
14 P. Cooke, ‘Austria Denies Having Citizenship by investment programme’, Times of Malta, 2014. 
15 According to Austria, Art.10 (6) of the Austrian Citizenship Act (BGBl. No. 329/1985) has not been 
invoked for granting citizenship for years. 
Article 10 (6) states prior residence will not be acquired “if the Federal Government confirms that the 
granting of nationality is in the particular interests of the Republic by reason of the alien’s actual or 
expected outstanding achievements.” 
16 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala); Second Phase, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
April 6, 1955, p. 22.  
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nationality, and applied for Liechtenstein (which he visited a few times) citizenship in 
1939, in order to avoid a sanction as a German citizen since Guatemala and Germany 
had a hostile relation due to the Second World War. He did so notwithstanding that he 
had a chance to become a citizen of Guatemala, but never applied for Guatemala 
citizenship. After being granted Liechtenstein citizenship, he visited Guatemala. 
However, he was denied entry and had his possessions confiscated because the 
authority determined that the naturalisation process was not legitimate, thereby 
considering Nottebohm a German. The Liechtenstein government provided diplomatic 
protection to Nottebohm since the confiscation was regarded as unjust treatment by 
submitting a claim to the ICJ. In response to the claim, the Guatemala government 
insisted that Nottebohm’s naturalisation did not occur in accordance with international 
principles on nationality. While the ICJ in its judgement recognised the prerogative for 
every state to implement its own legislation on nationality, the court agreed with 
Guatemala that the naturalisation process must comply with international principles.17  
While this notion has been widely accepted and confirmed in international tribunals as 
well as in the literature of citizenship and been operationalised in legal frameworks of 
most countries, the determination of the effectiveness of nationality based on the 
genuine link test has room for criticisms. The dissenting opinions of Judges Klaestad, 
Read and Guggenheim of Nottebohm questioned the validity of the link theory/the test 
of effective connection. In particular, Judge Read criticised the notion of genuine link 
for its vagueness and subjectivity, which could allow states to have more discretionary 
power in the process of naturalisation, advocating objective tests for naturalisation for 
increased certainty.18 Judge Guggenheim also noted that international law does not 
contain any rule on “the effectiveness of nationality depending on a bond between the 
naturalising state and the naturalised individual.”19 He further pointed out that the 
permanent residence could create more rights and duties of an individual to the state 
of his permanent residence than those to the state of which he is a national,20 which 
attests to a close link between the state and the individual. This dimension of 
                                                     
17 Even in the Nottebohm case, despite that the diplomatic protection claimed by Lichtenstein was not 
upheld, the nationality of Lichtenstein was recognised since it is the state’s prerogative to determine 
who can obtain its citizenship.  
18 Nottebohm Case, supra note 14, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Read p. 46.   
19 Ibid, Dissenting Opinion of M. Guggenheim, Judge “Ad hoc”, p. 57. 
20 Ibid. 
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citizenship thus leads to questioning the applicability of the genuine link test in the 
process of naturalisation.  
Frequently, citizenship-by-investment schemes are compared to fast-track citizenship 
opportunities for talented people, such as Olympians, given that they do not require 
prior residence. Conversely, it is also argued that citizenship-by-investment schemes 
are fundamentally different from the conferral of citizenship on sports players. There 
is an expectation that sports players granted expedited citizenship should be loyal to 
the conferring state since the main reason for conferring the citizenship was to earn the 
state a global reputation. According to Jelena Džankić,21 the naturalised citizen having 
a sports talent can quickly win the state a collective pride flying its national flag. 
Hence, a bond with other citizens which replaces a prior residence requirement for 
solidarity. On the contrary, the contribution of an investor does not trigger solidarity 
or a social bond in the same manner. Thus, lack of solidarity, where naturalised 
investors face difficulty in operating their business and generating profits in the 
country, can result in disavowal, instead of continued, citizenship, their citizenship. It 
could be argued that requiring an investor to invest €150,000 in stocks or bonds, in the 
Maltese case may cause a future connection in a longer term. Yet, the connection is 
only based on economic profits, devoid of the ability to display allegiance and continue 
the connection. Therefore, the citizenship-by-investment scheme is highly 
controversial regarding the connection between an applicant and the county in 
question. Since the essential purpose of the citizenship-by-investment scheme is 
attracting economic resources into the country, whereby the investors who apply for 
citizenship are expected to make an economic contribution in the country by donation 
or investment at present and in the future, the type of allegiance or connection expected 
for the investors differs from other naturalised citizens or citizens by birth.  
Despite the difference between the two fast-track citizenship schemes, both types of 
citizenship schemes have some commonality in that both lack a prior attachment. The 
reason why a sports player chooses another nationality is not that the player is attached 
to the particular country; but because the player can benefit from citizenship rights 
such as economic incentives or a better sports environment. Moreover, even if sports 
                                                     
21 J. Džankić, ‘Citizenship with a Price Tag: The Law and Ethics of Investor Citizenship 
Programmes’, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, vol. 65, no. 4, 2014, p. 394.  
 122 
 
players may have renounced their previous citizenship, it does not mean that the 
“genuine” connection with the state whose citizenship is given up has been eliminated. 
Accordingly, where the legitimacy of citizenship-by-investment schemes is 
questioned, for lack of prior attachment or the difficulty to create a bond in society, it 
is inevitable to question the legitimacy of fast-track citizenship programmes for sports 
players.  
By the same token, if the legitimacy of citizenship should be solely determined on the 
existence of a genuine link, it is inevitable to challenge citizenship of those who 
emigrated after being born in a country, whilst retaining their citizenship that country, 
since a country of origin does not effectively prove a genuine link. Notwithstanding, 
the idea that physical presence can bring about a particular link with the country to 
some extent cannot be questioned. Džankić highlighted that the duration of residency 
in the state transforms the “stockholder citizen” into a true stakeholder in the polity.22 
Many scholars of citizenship have also emphasised the importance of physical 
existence.23 This is because the interaction during the presence in the polity enables an 
individual to act as a political equal, irrespective of economic class. However, given 
that a certain period of residence in a polity makes an individual a true stakeholder, 
when the person leaves the country and stays in another polity for a similar duration, 
the status of true stakeholder will be downgraded to a stockholder citizen again even 
if the person has not lost the “link” or connection with the country of origin. That is 
why, in a globalised world, the concern remains regarding how meaningful the history 
of physical presence can be. Although social assimilation of individuals into society is 
imperative and a prior attachment can help such assimilation; however, a prior 
attachment alone should not necessarily be determinative because a prior attachment 
can stem from various reasons such as parents or spouse, rather than participation in 
the society. In that sense, the notion of a prior attachment should not be used to oppose 
citizenship-by-investment schemes since every person creates a bond with particular 
society in a different way. 
                                                     
22 Ibid; the paper referred to Bauböck’s ‘stakeholder principle’ from R. Bauböck, ‘Stakeholder 
Citizenship and Transnational Political Participation: A Normative Evaluation of External Voting’, 
Fordham Law Review, vol. 75, 2006.  
23 P. Ochoa, ‘What Money Can’t Buy: Face-Face Cooperation and Local Democratic Life’, in A. 
Shachar and R. Bauböck (eds.), Should Citizenship be for Sale? EUI RSCAS, no. 2014/01, 2014, p. 
24. 
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Besides, depending on the country, the level of allegiance and attachment required for 
citizenship varies. For example, some countries permit dual or plural citizenship 
whereas other countries illegalise dual citizenship, i.e. a more exclusive approach to 
nationality. In granting citizenship, each country requires a different period of 
residence in the polity for regular applications although the prior residence 
requirement can be alleviated or even waived through expedited programmes or 
citizenship-by-investment programmes. This signifies that the understanding of a 
sufficient link between an individual and a state for the sake of citizenship varies by 
country. Further, the main reason why the meaning of a genuine link should be 
questioned is that scholars might have taken for granted the traditional understanding 
of a genuine link that is subject to adaptation and evolution as borders between 
countries have been blurred. By the time the concepts of dual citizenship, 
cosmopolitanism and transnationalism are recognised,24 the meaning of commitment 
or allegiance does not exclusively indicate the traditional notion of loyalty which is 
isolated and exclusive from other countries.   
Stephen Hall suggests that conferral of nationality on a person without a genuine link 
to the state is not consistent with international rules on citizenship since the person’s 
interest could be ‘ephemeral or abusive’, 25  which eventually violates the rules 
enunciated in Nottebohm. While Hall highlights the importance of a genuine link in 
case of granting citizenship, according to Elspeth Guild, the notion of genuine link can 
be misused in order for a state to exclude certain groups of people from its citizens, 
i.e. violating non-discrimination rules, by applying standards such as social ties or 
assimilation tests based on culturally driven factors.26 Thus, emphasising the genuine 
link can lead to nationalism which again leads to a discriminatory approach in 
implementing naturalisation regulations. 
                                                     
24 P. Spiro, ‘Dual Citizenship as Human Rights’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 8, 
no. 1, 2010. 
25 S. Hall, Nationality, Migration Rights and Citizenship of the Union, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1995.  
26 E. Guild, The Legal Elements of European Identity: EU Citizenship and Migration Law, The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004, pp. 68-81.   
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Magni Berton argues that those who invest in the future of the state are entitled to 
citizenship 27  since an investment-based interest is sufficiently significant. Rainer 
Bauböck criticises this idea because it can amount to arguing that a global investor is 
entitled to any types of citizenship since he/she invests the world over. He also argues 
that the idea undermines the value of citizenship by highlighting “the equal status of 
all members of a polity.” 28  Bauböck noted that self-interested and impersonal 
motivations, with a lack of solidarity and humanitarian commitment which can be 
created, during the period of residency, in every likelihood, will give rise to 
fragmentation within society. The residence in the country does not only indicate the 
physical presence in the society but also implies that an individual develops its “sense 
of belonging to community” “with inclusion in society and politics.”29 However, that 
argument precludes the possibility that an investor granted citizenship under the 
scheme will not belong to the community societally and emotionally in the future. 
Individuals applying for such a programme can look for a place which can provide a 
better quality of life with advanced infrastructure and education for their family. Such 
applicants are willing to be assimilated into society. This emphasises prior residency, 
but “a genuine link” could lead to excluding the possibility of building a future 
connection and solidarity in society. Due to the possibility of social fragmentation 
caused by a group of people who have difficulty in settling in a country and, of other 
illicit financial activities, such programmes constantly call for governmental scrutiny 
on applicant’s background and for a device for new settlers to be able to establish 
solidarity between them and the country concerned. 
2.2. Commodification of Citizenship and Democracy 
While the meaning of such a link is highlighted in the context of citizenship-by-
investment schemes without requiring reasonable prior residence, critiques argued that 
these schemes have commodified citizenship. Bauböck claims that a citizenship-by-
                                                     
27 Magni-Berton, R., ‘Citizenship for those who Invest into the Future of the State is not Wrong, the 
Price is the Problem’, in A. Shachar and R. Bauböck (eds.), Should Citizenship be for Sale?, EUI 
RSCAS, no. 2014/01, 2014, p. 11.  
28 R. Bauböck, ‘What is Wrong with Selling Citizenship? It Corrupts Democracy!’ in A. Shachar and 
R. Bauböck (eds), 2014, Should Citizenship be for Sale?, EUI RSCAS, no. 2014/01, 2014, p. 20. 
29 D. Kostakopoulou, ‘Thick, Thin and Thinner Patriotisms: Is this all there is?’, Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, vol. 26, no. 1, 2014, p. 73.  
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investment scheme places citizenship within the category of a “marketable 
commodity”, thereby using the rule of money to increase the possibility of corruption 
in democracies. 30  He refers to the case of Frank Stronach who lost his Austrian 
nationality when he took up Canadian citizenship, having established a significantly 
profitable business in Canada. He reacquired Austrian citizenship under a special 
provision which does not require prior residence or renunciation of another 
citizenship31 when he set up the European headquarters of his business in Austria.32 
After being granted Austrian citizenship, Stronach got involved in Austrian politics, 
by leveraging on his wealth. Bauböck criticises the way Stronach regained his 
citizenship through his investment, arguing that such conferral of citizenship could 
lead to political corruption. Bauböck raised an unchallengeable point in that money 
should not taint the spheres of politics and citizenship.  
However, realpolitik has already allowed many people to leverage their wealthy 
background to gain political influence. This statement does not uphold or attempt to 
justify such a way of political influence. Instead, given the possibility of unfair 
political involvement, granting citizenship to investors in local industries requiring 
innovation and development, and those who can make large monetary donation to a 
country, should not be banned. Additionally, if a governmental authority grants 
citizenship under a certain citizenship legislation other than a citizenship-by-
investment programme – which waives the prior residence requirement in exchange 
for monetary contributions – or discretionally due to current or future contributions in 
the country, it becomes even more difficult to achieve transparency given the lack of 
due diligence. Moreover, the lack of procedural and substantive transparency becomes 
poignant where the exact number of investment or contributions made are not state. 
Importantly, the foregoing discussion does not necessarily mean that providing a legal 
framework to the citizenship-by-investment schemes can engender transparency. The 
programmes can achieve transparency as long as the authority undertakes a proper due 
                                                     
30 Bauböck, 2014, supra note 28, p. 20. 
31 Art.10 (6) of the Austrian Citizenship Act states prior residence will not be acquired “if the Federal 
Government confirms that the granting of nationality is in the particular interests of the Republic by 
reason of the alien’s actual or expected outstanding achievements.” This article has been invoked to 
naturalise famous artists and sportsmen.   
32 Bauböck, 2014, supra note 28, p. 20.  
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diligence process and reveals specific information about applicants in order to prevent 
arbitrary decisions.  
Džankić also points out that if citizenship becomes a commodity, there will be “a race 
to bottom”.33  This suggests the possibility of host states decreasing the required 
amount of donation or investment to outdo one another. However, the concept of a 
race to bottom can be more adequately applicable in the situation where the 
relationship between countries and foreign investors becomes asymmetrical since a 
race to bottom is based on the premise that providing incentives to foreign investors 
can significantly confine regulatory space. Therefore, the citizenship-by-investment 
schemes may not be understood as a race to bottom in that a government has the 
discretion on granting or denying, including revoking, citizenship.  
Meanwhile, Kochenov argues that the traditional concept of citizenship has been 
weakened by underlining the importance of advocating human rights or other universal 
values in conjunction with globalisation.34 Globalisation has resulted in transforming 
nation-states and multiple actors which are not identified as a state at different levels. 
Also, globalisation and the emergence of cosmopolitanism have contributed to 
establishing the concept of post-national citizenship. Thus, the significance of national 
identities and institutions has been weakened compared to global institutions.35 The 
EU has also shown similar trend in that the Member States accepted “de-ethnicised” 
models for citizenship. 36  There are a variety of reasons for this phenomenon. 
Contemporarily, liberal states do not expect all the citizens to have a homogenous 
cultural background or ethnicity, and to behave in a certain way.37  
Similarly, Peter Spiro points out that globalisation has altered the conventional 
meaning of citizenship, and the commodification of citizenship may have inevitably 
                                                     
33 Džankić, 2015, supra note 2, p. 20. 
34 D. Kochenov, ‘Rounding up the Circle: The Mutation of Member States’ Nationalities under 
Pressure from EU Citizenship’, EUI RSCAS, no. 2010/23, 2010. 
35 S. Sassen, ‘Towards Post-National and Denationalized Citizenship’, in E. Isin and B. Turner (eds.), 
Handbook of Citizenship Studies, London: Sage, 2002, pp. 277-281.  
36 D. Kostakopoulou and A. Scharuwen, ‘Olympic Citizenship and the (Un)Specialness of the 
National Vest: Rethinking the Link between Sport and Citizenship Law’, International Journal of 
Law in Context, vol. 10, no. 2, 2014, p. 152. 
37 Kochenov, 2010, supra note 29, p. 4. 
 127 
 
taken place by virtue of globalisation. 38  Accordingly, Spiro argues that 
commercialisation of citizenship is one of the ramifications of globalisation, not a 
cause. Hence, citizenship law cannot prevent the evolution of citizenship. 
Globalisation has provided the theoretical ground for selling citizenship to foreign 
investors. It is pregnable to claim that the citizenship programme is a corollary of the 
globalisation because many countries still do not implement such programmes and 
some of them expressly ban dual citizenship.  
Another political aspect of the citizenship programme regarding democracy is right to 
vote and diplomatic protection. Opponents of citizenship-by-investment programmes 
would claim that bestowing citizenship on a wealthy investor is contrary to democratic 
values, such as fairness and non-discrimination. This is because a wealthy investor has 
the right to participate in more than one polity by gaining another citizenship, thereby 
questioning the notion of dual citizenship. In response, Spiro explains that the advent 
of human rights as an international norm – the protection of an individual against 
arbitrary actions imposed by government – has devalued the advantage of dual 
citizenship.39 Bauböck also notes that dual citizenship per se does not violate complex 
equality to the extent that citizenship of one state will not benefit an individual in the 
state of the person’s additional citizenship,40 so long as the principle of one vote for 
one person is not violated. 
Given the introduction of the citizenship-by-investment schemes, citizenship has lost 
its traditional meaning. However, on a close scrutiny, the practical meaning of such 
programmes is to rescue a country’s economy from deep recession. Some countries 
which underwent economic recession had implemented other methods to attract 
foreign investment, but failed. Some of the governments required immediate funding 
develop infrastructure or particular industries or to recover current account deficits. 
Thus, they encouraged foreigners to make investment in government bonds.  
                                                     
38 P. Spiro, ‘Cash-for-passports and the End of Citizenship’, in A. Shachar and R. Baübock (eds.), 
Should Citizenship be for Sale?, EUI RSCAS, no. 2014/01, 2014. 
39 Spiro, 2010, supra note 24, p. 125. 
40 R. Bauböck, ‘Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism’, International Migration 
Review, vol. 37, no. 3, 2003, p. 717. 
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2.3. Controversy at EU Level 
As aforementioned, when Malta proposed a citizenship-by-investment scheme, the EU 
institutions officially expressed their negative opinions against the proposal by 
underlining that the scheme could put the whole EU citizenship at stake. In line with 
the discussion on the commodification of citizenship, some commentators argued that 
such schemes inevitably place entire EU citizenship into the category of commodity. 
Sergio Carrera argues that selling citizenship through investor citizenship schemes is 
‘commercialisation of EU citizenship’, thereby allowing free-riding insofar as Malta 
or Cyprus can benefit from what other EU Member States have paid for and 
jeopardising the substantial meaning and values of the EU such as sincere 
cooperation.41  
Džankić42  analyses the EU Member States’ exceptional citizenship schemes. The 
analysis showes that most of the EU Member States have special provisions which 
allow a state to loosen the conditions for conferring citizenship by reason of special or 
national interest. 43  Džankić highlights the paradoxical connotation of the EU 
citizenship given that one Member State’s nationality policy can lead to distorting the 
citizenship regimes of other countries.44 She refers to this dynamic as a paradoxical 
iterative relationship between national and EU citizenships. This is because the EU 
Member States were concerned about the possibility of whether EU regulations on 
nationality and citizenship may limit their regulatory space on nationality. A model for 
such a concern can be the Danish opt-out regarding citizenship on the process of 
European integration in the Maastricht Treaty. Such a concern was taken into account 
by countries other than Denmark. Those countries including the current EU Member 
States had the question whether the concept of EU citizenship would prevent the EU 
Member States from implementing their own rules. However, the recent cases of the 
Maltese and the Cypriot citizenship schemes showed that, contrary to such a concern, 
                                                     
41 S. Carrera, ‘How Much does EU Citizenship Cost? The Maltese Citizenship-for-sale Affair: A 
Breakthrough for Sincere Cooperation in Citizenship of the Union?’, CEPS Paper in Liberty and 
Security in Europe, no. 64, 2014, p. 28 
42 Džankić, 2015, supra note 2, pp. 6-8.  
43 Some countries use the term “special interest”; some use “public interest” while others use “the 
interest of the country”. Among them, some provisions have stipulated the list of specific interests 
such as science, commerce, culture, or sports whereas some have not illustrated those interests, but 
rather stated public, national or special interest. 
44 Džankić, 2015, supra note 2, p. 1.  
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an EU Member State could take advantage of the status as an EU Member State in the 
realm of citizenship. Džankić criticises such an approach to EU citizenship to the 
extent that if a Member State sees EU citizenship as an opportunity, it can negatively 
affect other EU Member States’ naturalisation processes.   
The EU institutions’ intervention in the Maltese citizenship-by-investment scheme 
highlighted the extent of the Member States’ discretion and the extent of the EU 
Commission and Parliament’s intervention and restriction on the Member States’ 
authority in citizenship matters. Especially, if a Member State of the EU implements 
such a citizenship-by-investment scheme, the scope stretches from a domestic 
(internal) issue to other Member States’ issues, and by extension the whole of EU. This 
is because, as alluded to earlier, citizenship conferred by an EU Member State entails 
one passport for the country and one EU passport. Therefore, it has been discussed if 
such a scheme complies with the EU principles and legislation on nationality regarding 
EU citizenship.  
As referenced above, the introduction of EU citizenship raised concerns regarding 
states’ regulatory space in the field of citizenship. Accordingly, the realm of nationality 
was protected from other EU institutions’ intervention in order to respect the Member 
States’ autonomy in the field. The non-intervention approach from another Member 
State can be found in the Micheletti decision45 in which the ECJ found that once a 
Member State confers citizenship on someone, other Member States shall not question 
the decision, for instance alleging lack of a genuine link for the sake of legitimising 
prohibition to the rights of EU citizenship.  Conversely, in the Micheletti case, the ECJ 
held that despite the autonomy of Member States in the field, nationality laws and 
policies should have ‘due regard to EU law’ considering the impact of conferral of EU 
citizenship.46  
EU citizenship involves the general right to non-discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality, including the right to move and reside freely within the EU. Despite the 
deference to the sovereignty of Member States, Member States’ exclusive competence 
over nationality can be limited because a citizenship regulation of a Member State can 
                                                     
45 Case C-369/90, Mario Vicente Micheletti and others v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria 
(Micheletti case) [1992] ECR I-04239, para 14. 
46 Ibid. 
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affect the rest of the EU Member States. Thus, this necessitates the ground that the 
Member States must have due regard to EU law when exercising their competency in 
the field of citizenship and nationality. In line with Micheletti, the limitation of a 
Member State’s competence in this field can also be found in Rottmann v Freistaat of 
Bayern: “Member States must exercise their powers in the sphere of nationality having 
due regard to EU law; hence competent Member States should take into account the 
importance of conferring citizenship of the EU while their discretion is exercised.”47 
Accordingly, Advocate General Maduro opined that such exercise is subject to the 
obligation to conform to the EU rules, which accentuated the obligation of Member 
States in the realm of citizenship.48  
Although the Member States should have due regard to EU law, there is no specific 
explanation on the extent of due regard. AG Maduro of Rottmaan case suggested that 
Article 4.3 of Treaty on European Union (TEU) on the principle of sincere cooperation 
should be applied in the exercise of competency in the realm of nationality. 49 
Simultaneously, the Member States shall refrain from taking any measures which 
could jeopardise the attainment of the EU’s objective. Moreover, this implies that the 
ECJ can interpret those measures using the article in a teleological way. 
The initial Maltese scheme without a residency requirement was also criticised for its 
free-ride at EU level. As other EU Member States have their own citizenship-by-
investment scheme, the Maltese scheme which had only a financial condition could let 
other investors have a freeride in other EU countries, and could distort other Member 
States’ nationality regulations.  
The EU passed the 2003/109 Directive to harmonise residence right for an extended 
period of time at EU level. The Directive provides for rules regarding residency – 
legally and continuous for 5 years in a Member State – and economic stability. The 
Directive also gives certain discretion to the Member States to implement their own 
rules, if necessary. The Directive allows the Member States to issue residence permits, 
whether permanent or unlimited, which can be more favourable than ones provided 
                                                     
47 Case C-135/08, Janko Rottman .v Freistaat Bayern (Rottmann case) [2010] ECR I-1449. 
48 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Poiares Maduro on Rottamann case (Case C-135/08), September 
30, 2009, para 26. 
49 Ibid para 30.  
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under the Directive. Recital 17 of the Directive states that it does not restrain the 
Member States from applying more favourable national rules, but for the sake of the 
Directive, permits granted on more favourable conditions do not give the right to reside 
in other EU Member States. The EU does not ban the Member States from having their 
own rules, but if the Member States provide more favourable legislation regarding 
residence permits which can affect the rest of the EU, the EU can deny the rights of 
EU residency permits such as the right to reside and move freely within the EU. The 
legality exists only if the conditions of the Directive are fulfilled, including residency 
for five years in a Member State. However, this is limited to residence permits without 
including citizenship.  
There are two views regarding if EU Member States need to have a consultation with 
EU institutions or other EU Member states. Contrary to AG Maduro’s opinion in the 
Rottmann case, D’ Oliveira argues that the lack of consultation regarding nationality 
regulations, does not necessarily mean a violation of the EU principle including 
solidarity and sincere cooperation.50 According to  D’ Oliveira, this is because any 
players including the Member States and any EU institutions did not request any 
revision before regarding such principles to the Member States since 1957. Hence, the 
lack of solidarity between the EU and the Member States, caused by no consultation, 
seems not an issue.  
The Maltese citizenship scheme case gave rise to a strong reaction from the EU 
institutions including the Commission and the Parliament. Both institutions 
highlighted that the programme failed to pursue loyalty and sincere cooperation as an 
EU Member State. However, one author suggested that ‘duty of loyalty’, that is, 
specific obligations, hinges on the facet51 of the EU’s interest.52 In other words, the 
meaning of the duty of loyalty, including cooperating or consulting with the EU 
Commission, as an EU Member State can vary depending on the facet of the EU 
interest which is specified in Article 4.3 of TEU. This implies that even as regards the 
                                                     
50 H. U. J. D’ Oliveira, ‘Nationality and the European Union after Amsterdam’ in D. Okeeffe and P. 
Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty, Hart Publishing, 1999, p. 405.  
51 Neframi illustrates the EU’s interests as effective implementation of common rules, the preservation 
of effet utile – the principle that the interpretation which best serves the practical effect of EU law will 
prevail, facilitation of the exercise of the EU competence, unity of external representation for the EU 
and the Member States. See further, E. Neframi, ‘The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its Scope through 
its Application in the Field of EU External Relations’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 47, 2010.  
52 Ibid p. 325.  
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same issue, depending on the facet of the EU’s interest, the EU institutions can react 
in a different manner. Thus, in this case, the interest of the EU can be the meaning of 
EU citizenship and potential impacts on the other Member States. Furthermore, this 
may imply the EU can react to a similar citizenship-by-investment scheme differently. 
The underlying meaning of the citizenship-by-investment scheme will be 
commercialising EU citizenship. Carrera points out that the most contestable factor of 
the citizenship-by-investment scheme is placing a private-sector agent as the 
intermediary between the state and non-EU Member nationals who wish for EU 
citizenship.53 By appointing a private sector to filter foreigners, the primary criterion 
lies on a commercial aspect. Carrera further explains that when the commercial point 
is focused, then the value of Maltese citizenship per se will be less of interest than the 
value of EU citizenship.54 In other words, people who are willing to reside and move 
within the EU will pay money to Malta in order to have the right to live in the other 
EU Member States, not Malta. This means Malta becomes a free rider by taking 
advantage of its “margin of manoeuvre” as an EU Member State.  
Therefore, from the perspective of the European Commission and the Parliament, 
commercialising citizenship is to “jeopardise the substance of citizenship of the Union 
and its common nature to nationals of EU countries”. The scheme is also 
discriminatory because richer foreigners can be awarded citizenship through a fast-
track scheme, which is not consistent with Article 3.3 of the TEU that Member 
states“shall combat social exclusion and discrimination…” Thus, under Article 3.3 of 
the TEU, selling citizenship to those who want to have free movement within the EU 
is against the ethos of the EU market. The Commission stated that there should be “an 
effective residence status in the country” prior to the acquisition of Maltese nationality 
for a genuine link or genuine connection. However, as aforementioned, the notion of 
a genuine link is contestable, and the sole emphasis on the role of this link in 
citizenship can lead to arbitrary decisions. This approach is supported by Kristine 
                                                     
53 Carrera, 2014, supra note 41, pp. 25-28.  
54 Ibid. 
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Kruma who argues that there has been little consensus on the definition and scope of 
the genuine and effective link among scholars and international or Community laws.55  
Regarding this issue, Carrera argues that criticising the Maltese citizenship-by-
investment scheme based on the genuine link argument is inappropriate. 56  As 
mentioned in the previous section, the argument of the genuine link may cause 
nationalism in the field of citizenship, thereby breaching the fundamental objectives 
of the EU – the pursuit of non-discrimination, social justice and fundamental rights. 
Therefore, he calls for more precise guidelines at the EU level involving restrictions 
which the EU Member States should take into consideration where the Member States 
bestow citizenship in complying with sincere cooperation under EU law. Although EU 
institutions should not intervene with nationality law per se, if Member States’ rules 
are granting citizenship to those who seek EU citizenship in order to gain the right to 
reside and move freely in the other Member States, the rules will be in the EU’s 
interests, subject to reviews as to whether the rules are reasonably designed.  
Spiro suggests the expected impacts of the programme on a global level, an EU level 
and a national level. 57   The Maltese programme has a cap of 1800 successful 
applications, thereby accepting 1800 citizens with few quantitative implications.58 
Moreover, the limited number of recipients diminishes the potential impact on other 
countries where a prospective applicant can travel without a visa. For instance, EU 
citizens can travel to the US without a visa. Spiro adds that at the EU level, those who 
are granted citizenship under such a programme will be dispersed within the EU such 
as Germany, France or the UK. In other words, the effect of the programme will be 
more significant in the EU than in those countries which have visa-free-travel 
agreements with the EU. Since each EU Member State has the competence to 
determine nationality regulations, the EU has accepted those programmes without a 
legal opposition, as shown above. Moreover, so long as the number of recipients is 
well managed by imposing a sufficiently high price to control the number, the impact 
on a national level is also limited since the buyers’ residency is likely to be in other 
                                                     
55 K. Kruma, ‘An Ongoing Challenge: EU Citizenship, Migrant Status and Nationality (Focus on 
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56 Carrera, 2014, supra note 41, p. 31. 
57 Spiro, 2014, supra note 38, p. 9.  
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countries than Malta or Cyprus. Spiro further suggests that while the buyers’ interest 
would be limited to the protection of their rights, the diplomatic protection for them 
will remain questionable given the unclear scope of the bargain.59   
2.4. Practical Aspects  
Guild rightly underlines the paradox regarding the notion of a genuine link in the 
context of nationality.60 The concept of a genuine link may help determine who can be 
loyal to a state which would bestow citizenship, and who can become a societal and 
economic participant in the polity, rather than switch allegiance to another society and 
state. Conversely, the sole deference to a state’s competence and emphasis on a 
genuine link in citizenship regulations can lead the government to misuse this 
competence in order to exclude certain groups of people, which will raise a 
discrimination issue. Therefore, among the criticisms against such a type of citizenship 
schemes, the argument of a genuine link is pregnable given the room for abuse. 
Therefore, in addition to examining the schemes with theoretical approaches, it may 
need to divert the angle to justifying citizenship-by-investment schemes on economic 
grounds. This is because the introduction of the schemes is motivated by the need of 
foreign capital due to the chronic lack of domestic resources. This signifies that 
practical necessity underlies the citizenship-by-investment schemes. Although 
globalisation has contributed to bringing about a paradigm shift in the realm of 
citizenship and nationality with the idea that citizenship can be in the category of 
commodity,61 the emergence of citizenship-by-investment schemes does not solely 
stem from such a shift. Instead, citizenship-by-investment schemes originated from a 
pragmatic approach. Despite restructuring of economic policies such as privatisation 
and conclusion of trade and investment agreements with other countries, many 
countries failed to attract sufficient economic resources so as to innovate their strategic 
industries, diversify industries and foster economic development. 62  This tendency 
becomes more evident in the case of developing countries which are heavily reliant on 
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60 Guild, 2004, supra note 26, pp. 68-81.  
61 Džankić, 2015, supra note 2, p. 20. 
62 S. Lall and R. Narula, ‘Foreign Direct Investment and its Role in Economic Development: Do we 
Need a New Agenda?’, The European Journal of Development Research, vol. 16, no. 3, 2004, p. 447. 
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one main industry, especially an agricultural sector. Moreover, the financial crisis left 
many countries with deteriorated financial system, which has not fully recovered. 
Among countries severely damaged by the financial crisis, the ones heavily reliant on 
foreign investment and specific volatile industries found it more difficult to recover 
from the crisis.  
Most of the citizenship-by-investment schemes have the tendency of requiring foreign 
investors to make a contribution to national fund foundations. Those funds are used to 
protect public interest and develop infrastructure, including enhancement of education, 
research and development, innovation, employment plans, the environment and public 
health.63 In addition to the national funds, some citizenship-by-investment initiatives 
require applicants to make an investment in government stocks, bonds and debentures 
with aiming at financial recovery. Although the types of investment or government 
bonds/funds will differ depending on the country, the funds for the sake of public 
interest and infrastructure and investment in government bonds are imperative for 
economic development and recovery from the economic and financial crisis. 
Therefore, the approach which only focuses on the theoretical legitimacy underlining 
a genuine link will lead to overlooking the practical benefits of foreign capital to host 
states.  
However, one of the leading practical reasons why this type of schemes is criticised is 
due to national security concerns. There has always been security concern regarding 
granting citizenship to foreigners. Particularly, citizenship-by-investment schemes 
create not only domestic national security concerns, but also potential national security 
risks to other countries. While national security issues exist in this context, the 
programmes may have been built on the premise that a wealthy foreign investor who 
undergoes a due diligence process is less likely to be a threat to national security. Yet, 
even after a due diligence process, the possibility of a naturalised person becoming a 
threat to national security still remains. Once applicants become naturalised, they shall 
be treated in the same way as other citizens. Such equal treatment is important to 
provide security and assurance for the status of citizenship given under such a 
programme and to prevent any room for arbitrary measures. However, citizens 
                                                     
63 Article 13 of L.N. 47 of 2014, Maltese Citizenship Act (CAP.188), Individual Investor Programme 
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naturalised under the programmes are subjected to more scrutiny on account of a 
potential shift in diplomatic relations and the possibility of illicit financial activities 
depending on future circumstance. Moreover, countries, especially the US and 
Canada, are concerned about the visa-free travelling agreement which allows nationals 
to travel to other contracting countries without a visa. This security concern is 
augmented in the case of EU Member States. To understand a potential security 
concern which can be caused by a citizenship-by-investment scheme, the following 
section will examine national security in citizenship-by-investment schemes.  
3. Immigration Schemes for Individual Foreign Investors and 
National Security 
Many countries have denounced citizenship-by-investment schemes on the basis that 
the schemes can adversely affect not only domestic national security but also national 
security of other states. Moreover, where a host state is an EU Member State, the 
potential risk can increase dramatically in parallel to the benefits which a naturalised 
citizen under the scheme can enjoy. This section firstly undertakes an examination of 
citizenship-by-investment schemes on a country-by-country basis. It will discuss the 
following countries: Caribbean Islands, including St. Kitts and Nevis and Antigua and 
Barbuda, and the European countries of Malta, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania and Ireland. 
The next section discusses the Canadian and the US permanent residence schemes and 
compares them with citizenship-by-investment schemes; the Canadian permanent 
residence scheme for foreign investors was abolished in 2014.  
3.1. Caribbean Islands 
3.1.1. St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Kitts and Nevis, a dual-island state in the Caribbean Sea, is the first country to 
implement a citizenship-by-investment scheme without requiring a history of previous 
residence as of 1984.64 The scheme requires a clean criminal record, comprehensive 
CV, business background and either donation for the Sugar Industry Diversification 
Foundation (SIDF) or investment in the real estate industry development designated 
                                                     
64 Part II, Section 3 (5) of the Citizenship Act, 1984.  
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by the government of St. Kitts and Nevis.65 To apply for citizenship by contributions 
to the SIDF, a single applicant shall donate US $250,000. 66  Applicants for the 
investment option shall invest at least US$ 400,000 in the real estate industry which 
shall not be sold for 5 years after the purchase, in addition to government fees of US$ 
50,000 for a single applicant.67 
Regarding deprivation, the Citizenship Act of St. Kitts and Nevis stipulates that if an 
applicant is found to have provided false information or concealed material facts, the 
applicant may be deprived of citizenship under Part III, Section 8(a) of the Citizenship 
Act. The only appearance of national security can be found in the ineligibility 
qualifications, which states that an applicant shall not be approved for citizenship 
under the programme if the applicant is a potential national security risk to St. Kitts 
and Nevis or to any other country. Yet, the scheme does not provide more information 
to help interpret the scope and the meaning of “a potential national security threat”. 
This is on the list of due diligence checks for an applicant’s background for which an 
applicant shall not be approved for citizenship-by-investment. 68  This is why a 
thorough, objective and transparent due diligence background check is imperative in 
order to gain the reputation that passport holders of St. Kitts and Nevis are not potential 
national security threats to other countries. Simultaneously, with the aim of mitigating 
the possibility of arbitrary manoeuvre, it may be necessary to grasp the meaning of 
potential national security to St. Kitts and Nevis and any other country in this context.  
Osmond Petty, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of National Security, stated that 
the national security policy of St. Kitts and Nevis focused on implementation against 
                                                     
65 AMF Global, ‘St. Kitts and Nevis, Citizenship by Investments’, 2012, http://amf-global.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/AMF-BROCHURE-EML.pdf (accessed May 4, 2018), pp. 5-7.  
66 An applicant with up to three dependants (one spouse and two children below the age of 18) shall 
pay US$300,000; an applicant with up to 5 dependants pays US$350,000; an applicant up to 7 
dependants pays US$ 450,000. For additional contribution for each unmarried dependant from 18 to 
25 years old - due diligence authority fees are not included. 
67 US$ 25,000 for each additional dependant such as a spouse of the main applicant and a child below 
the age of 18; a dependent apart from spouse whose age is over 18 shall pay US$ 50,000 for 
government fees - due diligence authority fees are not included. 
68 Article 7(2) Due Diligence Checks provides that “an applicant who (a) has provided false 
information on his/her application form; (b) has a criminal record; (c) is the subject of a criminal 
investigation; (d) is a potential national security risk to St. Kitts and Nevis or to any other country; (e) 
is involved in any activity likely to cause disrepute to the Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis; or (f) has 
been denied an entry visa by a country with whom citizens of St. Kitts and Nevis have visa free entry 
shall not be approved for Citizenship by Investment”. This type of eligibility list can be found in other 
countries’ citizenship schemes for foreign investors.  
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crime at domestic level and international level. 69  Given that the eradication of 
domestic crimes is regarded as a priority to deal with as threats to national security, 
other aspects of security such as economic security and political security are 
overlooked in this case. Although Prime Minister Timothy Harris underlined that his 
administration took a comprehensive approach to national security,70 the scope of 
national security does not seem sufficiently broad to include other security issues in 
the Citizenship Act. Furthermore, given that Prime Minister Harris noted “at this time 
[that] the issue of crime fighting is of paramount importance to our Unity government”, 
it can be understood that his understanding is based on the premise that security issues 
arise mainly from criminal threats.  
Although the scope of national security at the domestic level is narrow, the range of 
potential threats to national security of other countries tends to be contingent on 
international order and diplomatic relations with other countries. Even though the 
government of St. Kitts and Nevis announced in July 2013 that nationals from Iran and 
Afghanistan were no longer eligible to participate in the programme,71 it was claimed, 
by Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), US Department of the 
Treasury, that Iranian applicants still receive citizenship through the programme.72 
The advisory report issued by the FinCEN underlines that certain foreigners had 
acquired citizenship of St. Kitts and Nevis through the programme in order to evade 
international economic sanctions against them or to get involved in illicit financial 
activities.73 The report further criticises the programme on account of its slack controls 
and alerted financial institutions to undertake risk-based due diligence by highlighting 
the risk which can stem from the weak controls.  
                                                     
69 ‘St. Kitts-Nevis Government Strengthens National Security’, Caribbean News Now, June 5, 2015, 
http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/topstory-St-Kitts-Nevis-government-strengthens-national-
security-26407.html (accessed May 4, 2018).  
70 Ibid.  
71 St. Kitts & Nevis Citizenship by Investment, ‘Are There any Restrictions on Who Can Apply?’, 
http://stkitts-citizenship.com/faqs/ (accessed May 4, 2018). 
72 US Department of Treasury, ‘Advisory Report on Abuse of the Citizenship-by-Investment Program 
Sponsored by the Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FIN-
2014-A004, May 20, 2014. 
73 Ibid.  
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According to Prime Minister Harris, at the end of 2015, 10,777 applicants, most of 
whom are Chinese, Russians and Middle Easterners,74 were given citizenship under 
the citizenship-by-investment scheme.75  Also, the number of passports issued has 
demonstrated an increasing trend.76 Although it is claimed that through the attempts to 
restructure the citizenship-by-investment programme, the transparency has been 
enhanced, the importance of control on the number of passports issued under the 
programme should not be overlooked since the government is not recommended to 
accept applicants more than they can control, especially where the programme is 
criticised for its lax controls. 
3.1.2. Antigua and Barbuda77 
Given the success of St. Kitts and Nevis regarding attracting foreign capital, Antigua 
and Barbuda introduced the ‘Citizenship by Investment Programme’ in 2013. The 
Antigua and Barbuda programme offers three options78 on condition that an applicant 
has a clean criminal record and undergoes background checks. The options consist of 
a non-refundable contribution of at least US$ 250,000 to the National Development 
Fund (NDF), an investment of a minimum of US$ 400,000 in the approved real estate 
projects which shall be held for 5 years at a minimum or an investment of US$ 
1,500,000 directly to a business as a sole investor or a joint investment of a minimum 
of US$ 5,000,000 engaging at least 2 individuals in an eligible business.79  
Similar to the St. Kitts and Nevis scheme, an applicant who provides false information, 
has a criminal record,80 or has been denied a visa to a country with which Antigua and 
Barbuda has a visa-free travel agreement and not subsequently obtained a visa to the 
country concerned will be ineligible for the scheme.81 In addition, an application will 
                                                     
74 J. Clenfield, ‘This Swiss Lawyer is Helping Governments Get Rich off Selling Passports’, 
Bloomberg, March 11, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-11/passport-king-
christian-kalin-helps-nations-sell-citizenship (accessed May 4, 2018).  
75 ‘High-end Property Buyers Rush in to Saint Kitts and Nevis’, Global Property Guide, March 20, 
2016, http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Caribbean/St-Kitts-and-Nevis/Price-History (accessed 
May 4, 2018).  
76 In 2005, 6 passports were issued under the citizenship programme ; in 2006, 19 passports were 
issued; in 2007, 75 were issued; 202, 292, 664, 1092, 1758, 2044, 2329 and 2296 passports were 
issued in the year of 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively.  
77 Antigua and Barbuda Citizenship by Investment Act, 2013, No.2 of 2013; Antigua and Barbuda 
Citizenship by Investment, http://www.antiguabarbuda-citizenship.com/ (accessed May 4, 2018).  
78 All three options are subject to government and due diligence authority fees.  
79 Each of the individuals involved in the joint investment shall invest US$ 400,000 at a minimum.  
80 Even an applicant subject to criminal investigation will be denied. 
81 See further, Džankić, 2015, supra note 2, pp. 6-8. 
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be denied if an applicant is a potential risk to national security to Antigua and Barbuda 
or any other country. The programme does not accept any application from some 
countries including Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Somalia and Yemen.82 When 
it comes to the ineligible nationality list, in comparison to St. Kitts and Nevis, the 
Antigua and Barbuda Citizenship Act is more restrictive. 
Citizenship given under the Citizenship Act can be withdrawn if a naturalised citizen 
does not spend at least 35 days in Antigua and Barbuda for 5 years after obtaining 
citizenship with no repayment of any investment or contribution. Moreover, according 
to section 8 of the Citizenship Act regarding citizenship by registration, it is possible 
to deprive a person of citizenship after conferring it 83  on the grounds that the 
citizenship was obtained based on false information or wilful concealment of material 
facts or the person has been convicted of an act of treason or sedition against Antigua 
and Barbuda.84 
Compared to the St. Kitts and Nevis programme, Antigua and Barbuda has not 
received direct criticisms in relation to its programme nor come under scrutiny by the 
US. Whereas St. Kitts and Nevis provides two options for donation or investment, 
Antigua and Barbuda permits application for the direct investment option in addition 
to real estate investment. Regarding nationals of the countries which are ineligible, 
Antigua and Barbuda provides a longer list than St. Kitts and Nevis. This suggests that 
Antigua and Barbuda takes international sanctions into consideration for its citizenship 
scheme in order to prevent international criticisms on national security grounds. 
Notwithstanding, there is no public report on cases of revocation on the grounds of 
national security. 
3.2 European Countries 
One of the implications of an EU Member State granting citizenship to a foreigner is 
that the foreigner will be, by extension, entitled to EU citizenship, consequently 
affecting the rest of the EU Member States. Before Malta’s initial draft of its 
                                                     
82 If a national of one of those countries has obtained permanent residence permits from Canada, the 
United States and Western Europe, applications will be considered. 
83 Section 4. Deprivation of Citizenship by Investment of Antigua and Barbuda Citizenship by 
Investment Act, 2013. 
84 The person shall have a right of appeal to the High Court.  
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citizenship-by-investment scheme, there was no such strong opposition within the EU 
regarding the nationality laws of EU Member States. Opposition to the draft scheme 
from the EU institutions and the other EU Member States migh have arisen from a 
variety of reasons: firstly, no requirement for prior residence in Malt; secondly, the 
financial requirement for the application was lower than other countries’ for similar 
schemes.85 
3.2.1. Malta  
At first, the Maltese Individual Investor Programme (IIP) was proposed to provide 
citizenship to those who make a financial contribution to the government and 
investment, without requiring prior residency in the country. In other words, the crucial 
requirement for gaining citizenship was the economic status of an individual. The 
proposal was amended after the European Commission suggested Malta add a 
condition of residence for at least 12 months in the citizenship scheme.86 Hence, in 
addition to an adjustment on the financial requirement, Malta added the residency 
requirement of a minimum of 12 months87 in the IIP. Therefore, from the Maltese point 
of view, the EU membership can be both opportunities for and constraints to the 
investor scheme. 
The amended L.N. 47 of 2014, Maltese Citizenship Act (CAP.188) and the Individual 
Investor Programme of the Republic of Malta Regulations 2014 state that for an 
applicant to be bestowed citizenship under the programme, he/she shall make a 
minimum contribution of €650,000 to the National Development and Social Fund88 in 
addition to payment of due diligence fees of €7,500 for main applicant.89 The applicant 
shall retain a residence for at least 5 years, either by purchasing a property of which 
value exceeds €350,000 or by leasing a property of which annual rent exceeds €16,000. 
                                                     
85 For instance, Cyprus requires €2.5 million at a minimum in the case of Major Collective 
Investment, while the total financial contribution for Maltese citizenship is approx. €1 million, 
including donation, government bonds and real estate 
86 The EU Commission’s intervention per se could be subject to interesting analysis. If such 
intervention is considered permissible, the dynamic between Member States and the EU institutions 
regarding regulations in nationality can be subject to modification or challenge since in the past, the 
autonomy of Member States on the field was deemed exclusive.  
87 Yet, the residence condition requires an applicant to reside for 12 months before his/her passport is 
issued. Thus, technically applicants need not reside for 12 months in order to apply for citizenship.  
88 The amount of a contribution for spouse and children under the age of 18 is €25,000 each; the 
amount for dependent children from 18 to 26 years or dependent parents above 55 years is €50,000.  
89 The amount of due diligence fees for spouses and adult dependants (children and parents) is €5,000; 
the amount for children 13 to 18 years is €3,000 each.   
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The main applicant also shall invest €150,000 at a minimum in financial instruments 
approved by the government, such as stocks, bonds, debentures and must retain the 
investment for at least 5 years.  
The Citizenship Act specifies qualifications, general requirements and eligibility 
criteria. Article 5 stipulates eligibility criteria regarding legal background. Among the 
eligibility criteria, Article 5(e) states that “the applicant and, or any of his dependants 
is not, or may not be a potential threat to national security, public policy or public 
health.” While other eligibility criteria are clear in that they explicitly referred to 
criminal records in terrorism, money laundering, or other sexual assaults, the criterion 
as regards national security, public policy or public health is not sufficiently 
illustrative. Two other provisions: Article 6 (ineligible applicants) and Article 10 
(deprivation of citizenship refer to national security. Article 6 provides the types of 
applicants who shall not be approved for citizenship unless the authority in charge – 
Identity Malta – issues approval for their special circumstances. One of the ineligibility 
criteria is the case in which an applicant is “a potential national security threat to 
Malta”. Analogous to Article 5, the other sections of Article 6 are self-evident while 
the meaning of a potential national security threat is obscure. Although it is not 
specified in the Citizenship Act, Identity Malta lists nationalities which are ineligible 
for citizenship under the programme: the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) or 
non-nationals who reside, do business, or have significant connections to these 
countries.90 This list shows that Malta attempts to mitigate security risks posed by the 
programme by explicitly excluding countries subject to international sanctions.  
Article 10 specifies the discretion for the Minister to deprive a person of her/his 
Maltese citizenship given under the IIP in the case where an applicant breaches any 
requirement to retain an immovable property in Malta or to keep investment in Malta 
for at least 5 years, or where an applicant has become a threat to national security or 
became involved in activities which negatively affects the vital interests of Malta. In 
the case of revocation, the Minister shall observe the grounds explicitly stated by law 
and shall not apply an arbitrary decision for revocation such as en masse targeting 
                                                     
90 Malta Individual Investor Programme, ‘Eligibility’, http://iip.gov.mt/faqs/ (accessed May 4, 2018). 
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citizens under the IIP since once a person is given Maltese citizenship, he/she will be 
treated as any other Maltese national.91 Although the scope of national security hereto 
is not delineated, as an EU Member State, the understanding of security, public policy 
and public health should be read in conjunction with EU policy.92 
At the domestic level, Chetcuti Cauchi Advocates restated the grounds for revocation 
of Malta IIP. It stated, if citizenship was acquired by providing false material or if the 
citizen has demonstrated “disloyal speech or act towards the Government and the 
President of Malta” or the citizen was involved or associated in an enemy or with any 
business which is intended to assist an enemy.93 The explanation on deprivation of 
citizenship based on national security by Chetcuti Cauchi Advocates mainly focuses 
on military and diplomatic security disregarding other types of security. The grounds 
of deprivation were classified by Legal Malta into two main categories: the first 
category is the ground which a person was not entitled to the acquisition of nationality 
from the beginning whereas the second category is the grounds of a person’s conduct 
after the acquisition of the citizenship since the conduct is not in compliance with 
public interest and national security, thereby disqualifying the citizenship.94   
As a result, 578 applications were made from more than 40 countries95 in 2015 under 
the IIP, and 476 out of 578 applicants had submitted all the necessary documents for 
application. However, only 54 applicants have been granted citizenship by March 
201696 out of the cap of 1800 approved applications. Compared to the number of 
applications, the approved applications are few. The regulatory cap, the criticisms and 
concerns raised by the EU institutions may explain why Malta applied a stringent rule 
during the due diligence process. 
                                                     
91 Legal Malta, ‘Revocation of Maltese Citizenship under Maltese Law’, December 14, 2014, 
http://www.legal-malta.com/articles/revocation-of-maltese-citizenship-under-maltese-la (accessed 
May 4, 2018) 
92 As mentioned in the previous chapter, currently the EU understands the concept of public security 
focusing on military security and border security against illegal immigrants. 
93 Chetcuti Cauchi, ‘Malta Citizenship by Investment’, Feb 27, 2016, 
http://www.ccmalta.com/publications/malta-citizenship-investment (accessed May 4, 2018). 
94 Legal Malta, supra note 94. 
95  Chetcuti Cauchi, 2016, supra note 85.   
96 ‘578 Applied for Citizenship by Investment Last Year - 54 Already Awarded Citizenship’, Times of 
Malta, March 8, 2016, http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20160308/local/578-applied-for-
citizenship-by-investment-last-year-54-already-awarded.605048 (accessed December 12, 2017). 
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3.2.2. Cyprus 
To mitigate the effects arising out of its economic crisis, the Council of Ministers of 
Cyprus, on 19 March 2014, revised the “Scheme for Naturalisation of non-Cypriot 
investors by exception.”97 This amendment specified a new financial criteria. The 
options are:  
(i) investment in government bonds (€5 million);  
(ii) investment in financial assets of Cypriot companies or Cypriot 
organisations such as bonds, securities, debentures issues in Cyprus (€5 
million);  
(iii) a bank deposit (€5 million deposited for 3-year fixed-term in a bank in 
Cyprus);  
(iv) direct investment (€5 million of purchases or construction of real estate, 
acquisition of a local business, 98  purchase of shares of companies or 
financial assets, and/or participation in a company undertaking a public 
project);  
(v) combined investments of aforementioned criteria (€5 million);  
(vi) special class of those whose bank deposits in the Bank of Cyprus and the 
Popular Bank Public Company were damaged by the Cypriot government 
Decree of 15.3.2013 and whose impairments are tantamount to at least €3 
million; or  
(vii) major collective investment which reduces the amount of investment to 
€2.5 million where the total value of the collective investment is at least 
€12.5 million.  
An applicant must retain the investment for no less than a period of 3 years after 
citizenship is granted. In addition to the investment, an applicant must purchase an 
immovable property for the residence of which value exceeds €500,000.  
In contrast with the Maltese scheme, the Cypriot scheme does not specify the case of 
deprivation, nor national security concerns in the decree, nor specific nationality 
                                                     
97 Council of Ministers Decision on ‘Scheme for Naturalisation of Investors in Cyprus by Exception 
on the basis of subsection (2) of section 111A of the Civil Registry Laws of 2002-2013 (hereinafter 
Council of Ministers Decision), September 13, 2016.  
98 The businesses or companies should employ at least 5 Cypriot citizens.  
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restrictions. Instead, the Chapeau of the Cypriot scheme states that “in the case where, 
following a periodic inspection, it has been ascertained that any condition is being 
circumvented, the Naturalisation may be revoked”.99  In other words, the scheme 
enables the Cypriot Authority to undertake periodic checks, in order to determine if 
applicants are fulfilling the conditions and to deprive them of citizenship where they 
breach the conditions.100  
Apart from applicants breaching the conditions, Cypriot citizenship has been revoked 
on the grounds of international sanctions. The wealthy investor, Rami Makhlouf, a 
relative of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad received Cypriot citizenship on 4 
January 2011. Four months later, the EU imposed sanctions on Makhlouf for his 
involvement in the Syrian political authoritarian regime, whereby his Cypriot 
citizenship was revoked.101 This showed Cyprus’s discretion to deprive a naturalised 
person of citizenship based on international pressure beyond national security within 
the border. However, despite the discretion of the authority to withdraw citizenship 
based on B.3 Terms and Conditions of the scheme, the insufficient procedural and 
substantive explanation on the deprivation of citizenship under the programme can 
create room for arbitrary decisions by the authority. 
Like other schemes, the Cypriot programme requires a clean criminal record, a 
residence in Cyprus, and relevant documents of investment. Unlike the Maltese 
scheme, the Cypriot scheme does not require prior residency but has managed to avoid 
official intervention by the EU institutions. Therefore, from the perspective of a 
foreign investor, the Cypriot scheme can be more attractive although the total required 
investment for the Cypriot scheme is higher than the Maltese. 
The programme had drawn €2.5 billion in revenues between 2013 and 2015. 102 
Nevertheless, the Interior Minister Socratis Hasikos has refused to reveal the number 
                                                     
99 Council of Ministers Decision, supra note 89.  
100 Džankić, 2015, supra note 2, p. 9. 
101 S. Farolfi, D. Pegg and S. Orphanides, ‘Cyprus ‘Selling’ EU Citizenship to Super Rich of Russia 
and Ukraine’, The Guardian, September 17, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/17/cyprus-selling-eu-citizenship-to-super-rich-of-
russia-and-ukraine (accessed December 12, 2017). 
102 A. Anastasiou, ‘Citizenship-by-investment Raises €2.5bn for Cyprus’, Cyprus Mail, November 6, 
2015, http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/11/06/citizenship-by-investment-raises-e2-5bn-for-cyprus/ 
(accessed December 12, 2017). 
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of foreign investors who were granted citizenship under the programme.103 Though the 
EU has weighed significant pressure on Cyprus to make an amendment to the 
eligibility conditions in the citizenship scheme.104 Cyprus countered the pressure by 
positing that the programme was a temporary measure to soothe its devastating 
economic situation arising from the financial crisis. However, the programme has 
continued in effect.105 This may provide the possible explanation why Cyprus has 
avoided public intervention by the EU institutions. While the EU passport is at stake, 
the Cypriot government has resisted including a requirement of prior residence. From 
the EU’s point of view, the scheme should be implemented as a temporary emergency 
measure because it includes those whose deposits were impaired by the Cypriot 
government measures in 2013 caused by the financial crisis. However, since the phase 
of drafting a proposal passed, the EU institutions cannot easily intervene in the current 
existential legislation on nationality after it began implementing. 
3.2.3. Bulgaria and Romania 
Unlike Malta and Cyprus, the citizenship-by-investment programmes in Bulgaria and 
Romania require applicants to have an efficient residence history. Džankić suggests a 
comparison citizenship schemes of Romania and Bulgaria.106 She explains that they 
are “hybrid” insofar as they require applicants to have permanent residence rights 
before proceeding to application. To apply for citizenship-by-investment, it is a 
prerequisite to hold a permanent residence permit. 
Regarding Bulgaria, Part 6 of Article 25107 of the Law for Foreigners (LF) in the 
Republic of Bulgaria108 provides that a foreign investor can gain a permanent residence 
permit if the investor has invested 1 million Bulgarian lev/BGN (approx.. €0.52 
million) in Bulgarian trade companies with tradable shares,109 state bonds, ownership 
of more than 50% of a Bulgarian business, intellectual property and trademark, or 
rights to concession in Bulgaria. As an alternative, according to Article 25c of the LF, 
a foreign investor can apply for permanent residency if the investor has invested in a 
                                                     
103 Ibid.  
104 Ibid. 
105 And the Scheme does not contain a sunset clause.   
106 Džankić, 2015, supra note 2, p. 12. 
107 Previous Article 25, SG. No. 36/2009. 
108 Law for Foreigners in the Republic of Bulgaria (Official Gazette 29/6 April 2007). 
109 Article 25 (para 1, part 8) stipulates that if the shares are not tradable in the market, the amount of 
investment should be at least 6 million Bulgarian leva (€3.12 million). 
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class A project which includes projects in the field with high unemployment or in the 
high technology sector (with approx. the amount of €8.18 million investment), high 
technology projects in service sectors (€5.6 million) or regular projects (€16.3 million) 
in conjunction with the Investment Promotion Act. Once foreign investors have held 
permanent residency under Article 25 or Article 25c of the LF, for five years, they 
become entitled to apply for Bulgarian citizenship according to Article 12 of the 
Bulgarian Citizenship Act which specifies that individuals with a residence permit can 
apply for naturalisation.110 The other criteria required for the application are that an 
applicant should be at least 18 years and should not have been convicted of a wilful 
crime by a Bulgarian court. 
In addition to this option, Bulgaria introduced a new fast-track option to citizenship in 
2013,111 which requires doubling investment. Thus, making two investments which is 
tantamount to 2 million BGN in total. In exchange, the minimum duration for which 
an applicant must hold a permanent residence permit decreases to one year. In other 
words, applicants to the fast-track citizenship are required to have at least one year of 
permanent residence status in exchange of double the investment whereas applicants 
for the regular Bulgarian Citizenship Act are required to have a permanent residence 
permit at least for 5 years. This shows that even if a foreign investor increases the 
amount of investment, Bulgaria still underlines the importance of prior connection and 
past commitment by foreign investors. In this sense, the citizenship-by-investment 
scheme of Bulgaria differs from the Cypriot and Maltese ones. 
The LF provides rationales for revocation of residence rights for a foreigner on the 
grounds of national security and public interest,112 but there are no revocation clauses 
for a naturalised individual on the basis of national security. Instead, in case that a 
naturalised person is sentenced for committing a serious crime, the person can be 
                                                     
110 Section III. Acquisition of Bulgarian Citizenship through Naturalisation, Article 12 of the 
Bulgarian Citizenship Act. 
111 Article 14a of the Bulgarian Citizenship Act.  
112 Article 33h. (4) (New - SG, No 23/2013, in force as of 01.05.2013) of the LF. A foreigner, 
possessing a residence permit of a long-term resident in the European Union in the first Member State 
on the basis of an international protection granted by this Member State, which has not been taken 
away, may be expelled from the country prior receiving his or her long-term residence in the Republic 
of Bulgaria permit, if there are grounds for considering that he or she poses a serious threat to the 
national security, or who, as a convict with a serious crime sentence entered into effect, poses a threat 
to the public order. 
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deprived of the citizenship. Section III (Deprivation of Bulgarian citizenship) of LF 
states that:  
A person who has acquired Bulgarian citizenship by way of naturalisation 
can be deprived of it, if he is convicted by enacted sentence for a severe 
crime113 against the republic, on condition that he is abroad and does not 
remain without citizenship.114 
The Romanian scheme is different from the Bulgarian one. Article 8 of the Romanian 
Citizenship Act decreases the length of the ordinary residence requirement from 8 to 
4 years with the proviso that an applicant must have invested €1 million in Romania.115 
In addition to the residence and investment conditions, the Romanian Act requires the 
applicant to fulfil other criteria including age, the ability for a decent living, a non-
criminal conviction in any countries, language and culture, allegiance to Romania, and 
knowledge of the Romanian Constitution and national anthem.116  
There is no particular clause for revocation under this special scheme, but the general 
clause applies to all naturalised citizen irrespective of the type of scheme. Article 25 
of the Romanian Act stipulates  
The Romanian citizenship may be withdrawn from the person who: 
a) found abroad, commits very serious offences which injure the interests 
of the Romanian state or its authoritativeness; 
b) found abroad, enlists in the armed forces of a state with which Romania 
has broken the diplomatic relations or with which is in state of war;  
c) has obtained the Romanian citizenship by fraudulent means; or 
                                                     
113 It does not illustrate the types of severe crimes. 
114 Chapter 3 Losing Bulgarian Citizenship, Section III Deprivation of Bulgarian citizenship of LF. 
See further G. Georgieva, ‘Acquiring Bulgarian Citizenship by a Foreign National’, March 13, 2015, 
http://www.ruskov-law.eu/bulgaria/article/bulgarian-citizenship-foreign-national.html (accessed 
December 14, 2017).   
115 Article 8, para 2 stipulates that “the time-limits laid down in paragraph 1 (a) may be reduced until 
half in the following situations: […] (d) the applicant has invested in Romania amounts exceeding 
1,000,000 Euro.” 
116 Article 8, para 1 of Romanian Citizenship Act. 
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d) is known as having connections with terrorist groups or has supported, 
under any form, or has committed other actions which endanger the 
national security.117  
However, a Romanian citizen who has acquired citizenship by birth will not be 
deprived of citizenship even if the person commits very serious offence injuring the 
interests of Romania. This implies that a naturalised citizen is subject to less 
benevolent standards for revocation of citizenship than a citizen who has gained 
citizenship by birth. 
The comparative analysis of the schemes of European countries in force shows that 
countries have different expectations regarding “a genuine link” and level of loyalty 
from foreign investors who wish to be naturalised although all of the schemes aim to 
provide more favourable conditions for foreign investors who invest a significant 
amount of money.  
3.2.4. Ireland 
Ireland has abolished its citizenship-by-investment scheme. However, the 
restructuring of the programme and the reason why the programme came to an end are 
noteworthy for the future development of other citizenship-by-investment schemes.  
Ireland implemented a citizenship-by-investment programme from 1989 to 1998. The 
Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 was amended to incorporate the 
programme, by waiving the provision of section 15(c)118  of the Irish Act so that 
foreigners who establish particular businesses, particularly in the manufacturing 
sector, could be exempt from the normal residence requirement. Section 16 of the Irish 
Act stipulates that although the conditions for naturalisation specified in section 15 are 
not fulfilled, the Minister, in his absolute discretion, can approve an application for 
citizenship where the applicant is Irish associations.119 According to the Statement of 
                                                     
117 Chapter 5. Losing the Romanian Citizenship of the Law no.21 of March 1, 1991.  
118 Section 15(c) of the Act provides that the Minister may grant the application, if satisfied that the 
applicant has had a period of one year's continuous residence in the State immediately before the date 
of the application and, during the eight years immediately preceding that period, has had a total 
residence in the State amounting to four years. 
119 Section 16 comprises seven subsections: in cases that the applicant is (a) of Irish decent or Irish 
associations; (b) a parent or guardian on behalf of a minor of Irish decent or Irish associations; (c) a 
naturalised Irish citizen acting on behalf of a minor child of the applicant; (d) married to a naturalised 
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Intent, the Minister would regard the following type of applications as meeting the 
conditions of “Irish associations” under section 16(a) of the Irish Nationality and 
Citizenship Act, and waive the residency requirement specified in section 15(c) of the 
Act if:  
(a) the applicant acquired a residence in the state, had been resident for two 
years and spent a reasonable amount of time in the State over the two years;  
(b) the Minister was satisfied […] that the applicant had established a 
manufacturing or international services or other acceptable wealth and job-
creating project here that was viable and involved a substantial investment by 
the applicant.120 
The Statement of Intent also stipulated that the applicant is required to have acquired 
a residence and have spent at least 60 days in Ireland over the past two years. Despite 
the initial intention of attracting investment in the manufacturing industry through the 
scheme, investments in the forestry and shipping industries were also included in the 
list of approved industries. 121  Although no minimum amount of investment was 
provided, investment of £500,000 was considered as the norm. 
The government decided in March 1992 that “Irish associations” should not be 
interpreted to limit the condition to invest in industry, whereby projects pertaining to 
tourism were included. Between 1988 and 1994, 66 investors and 39 spouses and 
children were naturalised through the scheme. It was revealed that some successful 
applications of naturalisation did not satisfy the requirements under the Irish Act or 
evidence was missing from the files. This revelation led to highlighting the necessity 
of a more transparent approach. Hence new guidelines in 1994 which introduced the 
Terms of Reference of an Advisory Group on Investment-linked Naturalisation so that 
the Group could examine each application by making recommendations on criteria 
including property ownership and investment conditions.122 
                                                     
Irish citizen; (e) married to an Irish citizen; (f) has been resident abroad in the public service; (g) a 
refugee.  
120 Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, ‘Report by Review Group on Investment-based 
Naturalisation’, April 2000. Appendix A. Statement of Intent. 
121 Ibid para 2.5.   
122 J. Handoll, ‘Country Report: Ireland’, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, EUI RSCAS, no. 2010/22, 
September 2009, revised June 2010, p. 5. 
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Whereas the pre-1994 scheme required the investor to fulfil the condition of good faith 
to continue to reside in the state following naturalisation, the scheme after 1994 only 
required the investor to reside for 60 days at least in the two years after being granted 
citizenship. In the period from 1994, until the programme was abolished, 40 investors 
and their 24 spouses and children were naturalised. In 1996, the government decided 
not to accept new applications. Consequently, in 1998, the scheme was abolished. In 
total, 169 persons including the investors’ 63 spouses and children were naturalised 
under the programme with a total investment of over £100 million.  
The main reason that the Irish programme came to an end is that despite introducing 
the new guidelines, the issues of transparency and informality still existed and it was 
assessed as lacking extra safeguarding tools. This means that with the aim of efficient 
and sustainable implementation of such a scheme, transparency and due diligence 
should be undertaken by governmental authorities in charge in order to diminish the 
risks of misuse of the scheme.  
Country 
/Enabling 
Law 
Residence 
require-
ment 
Types of investment 
or donation 
Appearance of 
national 
security 
Other 
requirements 
St. Kitts  
and Nevis 
►Part II, 
Section 3 (5) 
of the 
Citizenship 
Act, 1984 
No  Donation for the 
SIDF 
(US $250,000) 
or 
 Investment in the 
real estate 
industry 
development 
(US$400,000) 
Ineligibility 
qualification 
(i.e. if an 
applicant is a 
potential threat 
to national 
security, the 
applicant is 
ineligible to 
apply) 
 Clean 
criminal 
record 
 CV 
 Business 
background 
 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
►Citizenship 
by 
Investment 
Act, 2013, 
No.2 of 2013 
No  Non-refundable 
contribution to 
the NDF 
(US$250,000) 
or 
 Investment in 
approved real 
estate projects 
(US$400,000) 
Ineligibility 
qualification 
 Clean 
criminal 
record 
 Background 
checks 
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or 
 Direct 
Investment 
(US$1,500,000) 
or joint 
investment 
(US$5,000,000) 
in an eligible 
business 
Malta 
► L.N. 47 
of 2014, 
Maltese 
Citizenship 
Act 
(CAP.188), 
Individual 
Investor 
Programme 
of the 
Republic of 
Malta 
Regulations, 
2014 
Yes 
(12months) 
 Contribution to 
National 
Development 
and Social Fund 
(€650,000) 
AND 
 Investment in 
approved 
financial 
instruments 
(€150,000) 
 Eligibility 
criteria 
 Ineligible 
applicants 
 Deprivation 
of 
citizenship 
 Residence 
either by 
purchasing a 
property 
(€350,000) 
or by 
leasing 
(annual rent 
€16,000) 
 Clean 
criminal 
record 
Cyprus 
►Scheme 
for 
Naturalisatio
n of non-
Cypriot 
investors by 
an exception 
on the basis 
of subsection 
(2) of section 
111A of the 
Civil 
Registry 
Laws of 
2002-2013 
No  Investment in 
government 
bonds (€5M) 
or 
 Investment in 
financial assets 
of Cypriot legal 
entities (€5M) 
or 
 Bank deposit 
(€5M) 
or 
 Direct 
investment 
(€5M) 
or 
 The combined 
investment of 
options above 
(€5M) 
Not mentioned 
in the decree. 
 Clean 
criminal 
record 
 Purchase of 
property 
(€500,000) 
 Relevant 
documents 
of 
investment 
 Periodic 
checks after 
bestowing 
citizenship 
under the 
scheme 
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or 
 Special class for 
those whose 
bank deposits in 
the Bank of 
Cyprus and the 
Popular Bank 
Public Company 
were impaired by 
the Decree of 
15.3.2013 and 
whose damage 
amounts to €3M 
or 
 Major collective 
investment (sum 
€12.5M and 
€2.5M per 
person) 
Bulgaria 
►Part 6 of 
Article 25 of 
the Law for 
Foreigners 
(Official 
Gazette 29/6 
April 2007 
and State 
Gazette on 
February 23, 
2013) 
Yes 
(one year 
of 
permanent 
residency 
status for 
fast-track 
option, or 
five years 
in case of a 
regular 
application) 
Investors must hold a 
permanent residency 
for 5 years (a regular 
application) or one 
year (fast-track) in 
order to be entitled to 
apply for Bulgarian 
citizenship. 
The requirements to 
gain permanent 
residency are as 
follows; 
 Investment in 
trade companies 
with tradable 
shares; state 
bonds; 
ownership of at 
least 50 % of a 
Bulgarian 
business; 
intellectual 
property and 
trademark; or 
rights to 
No 
(There is 
revocation of 
residency rights, 
but there is no 
revocation 
clause for a 
naturalised 
person on the 
grounds of 
national 
security.) 
 Must gain a 
permanent 
residence 
permit 
 At least, 18 
years of age 
 Must not be  
sentenced 
by a 
Bulgarian 
court for a 
wilful crime 
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concession 
(BGN 1M, 
approx. 
€512,000) 
or 
 Investment in a 
class A project 
(€8.18M, €5.6M 
or €16.3M 
depending on the 
project) 
 New Fast Track 
Option: double 
the investment 
by investing 
BGN 1M 
(€512,000) twice 
in government 
bonds or in a 
Bulgarian 
enterprise on a 
Priority 
Investment 
Project 
(investment of 
€512,000 and a 
year later another 
investment of 
€512,000) 
Romania 
►Article 8 
of Romanian 
Citizenship 
Act 
(1991) 
Yes 
(4 years) 
 Investment of 
€1M 
(no specific 
industries 
provided) 
No appearance 
of specific 
terms, but the 
revocation of 
naturalised 
citizenship 
utilises the term 
in connection 
with terrorist 
groups or 
national safety 
(Article 24 (d)) 
 18 years of 
age 
 Ability to 
live a decent 
life 
 Clean 
criminal 
record 
 Language 
and culture 
 Allegiance 
to Romania 
 Knowledge 
of the 
Constitution 
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and the 
anthem 
Ireland 
► Section 
16(a) of the 
Irish 
Nationality 
and 
Citizenship 
Act and 
Statement of 
Intent 
(1989-1998) 
(Abolished) 
Yes 
(60 days in 
the past 
two years) 
 Investment in 
manufacturing, 
forestry and 
shipping 
industries until 
March 1992 and 
then the tourism 
industry was 
added to the list. 
(£500,000 - 
despite no 
suggested 
minimum 
amount of 
investment) 
 
No  Before 
1994, good 
faith 
 After 1994, 
the 
residency of 
60 days in 
the two 
years after 
gaining 
citizenship 
Table 3 Citizenship-by-investment programmes by country 
3.3 Residence Schemes123 
Except for St. Kitts and Nevis, which has implemented the citizenship scheme since 
1984, citizenship-by-investment programmes have a relatively recent history in 
comparison to residence permits for foreign investors. Compared to citizenship 
programmes, immigration permanent residency programmes or golden visas have a 
limited scope of effects. However, it is crucial to discuss potential national security 
concerns or economic benefits which can arise from the permanent residency 
programmes.  
Sumption and Hooper evaluate that the permanent residency programme attracted 
economic benefits to the country, such as economic growth, diversification of industry 
and job creation. 124  The document of the US Immigrant Investor Program: New 
                                                     
123 Although this section deals with the cases of Canada and the United States, there are many other 
permanent residence permit or golden visa schemes. In analysing golden residence programmes, 
Džankić notices a market economy by pointing out that countries such as the UK and France require a 
larger amount of pecuniary contribution, i.e. investment, than other countries including Romania and 
Bulgaria since the former are more attractive to foreign investors as investment market. See further, 
Džankić, 2015, supra note 2, pp. 18-20. 
124 Sumption and Hooper, 2014, supra note 1, p. 6. 
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American Investors Making a Difference in the Economy125 underlines the economic 
impacts of the EB-5 (Employment-Based Fifth Preference) Immigrant Investor 
Program of the US. The paper states that the programme is different from other US 
citizenship and immigration services programmes to the extent that it is only a visa 
programme the objective of which is to create jobs and promote economic growth. It 
is claimed that the EB-5 played an essential role as a financing tool during the financial 
crisis when a conventional capital source – credit – was not available especially in 
Vermont and Pennsylvania. It also achieved economic diversification and 
modernisation in Vermont.126 
However, many countries expressed that their immigrant investor programmes have 
made few economic contributions, thereby considering amendments and new 
conditions.127 Moreover, this has been highlighted by the UK Migration Advisory 
Committee, stating that residence rights were given in exchange for investment in a 
government-bond which do not produce economic values. 128  For this reason, Canada 
abolished the programme in 2014 having concluded that it did not generate sufficient 
economic benefits, since those investors were entitled to lower taxes and they tended 
to find integrating in Canada difficult, thereby leaving the country.129 Thus, unlike 
citizenship-by-investment schemes which bring immediate and abundant capital flow 
into host states, the economic values of immigrant investor residency programmes 
remain questionable. 
In addition to questioning some economic effects of the EB-5 programme, the Office 
of the Inspector General for the US Department of Homeland Security also raised a 
security concern.130 Since the centres in charge of approving investment under the 
                                                     
125 M. Kolodziej, ‘The US Immigrant Investor Program: New American Investors Making a 
Difference in the Economy’, American Immigration Council, Special Report, September 2014.  
126 Ibid.  
127 Government of Canada, ‘Building a Fast and Flexible Immigration System: Government to 
Eliminate Backlog-Ridden and Inefficient Investor and Entrepreneur Programs’, February 11, 2014, 
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=814939 (accessed May 4, 2018). 
128 UK Migration Advisory Committee, ‘Call for Evidence: The Economic Impact of the Tier 1 
(Investor) Route’, October 2013, p. 5. The United Kingdom also drafted a proposal on auctioning 
residence, which would grant a golden residence to the highest bidders according to the report issued 
by Migration Advisory Committee 2014. However, due to the criticisms regarding the 
commodification of residence, the proposal was not adopted. 
129 Government of Canada, 2014, supra note 119. 
130 US Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, DHS, ‘United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Employment-Based Fifth Preference (EB-5) Regional Center 
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programme in each state of the US are interested in receiving funds from foreign 
investors, it is claimed that they have not undertaken due diligence for investment at 
the proper level because there were no appropriate regulations which can control over 
harmful or questionable types of economic activities which can lead to impairing 
national security. Hence, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) insisted that the institution be given the necessary authority to prevent 
national security threats which may harm the US given that the current legislation on 
the EB-5 regional centre programme does not allow for administering or managing the 
programme by USCIS. Conversely, it has been claimed that the programme became a 
risk to national security.131 For instance, it was alleged that some fraud cases stemmed 
from the programme and some individuals may have special connections with Chinese 
and Iranian intelligence or who are international fugitives accused of money 
laundering.132 This concern has been expressed by a few US politicians including 
Senator Charles E. Grassley, Republican of Iowa who remarked that the programme 
always had the potential for corruption and a threat/risk to national security.133   
4. Potential Repercussions and National Security Concerns 
Whereas citizenship-by-investment programmes may occasion security concerns to 
the host state and other countries, it is noteworthy that the main prospective clients for 
the programmes are from China, Russia and the Middle East. Interestingly, the Chinese 
government by policy does not recognise dual citizenship, hence a Chinese national 
will lose Chinese citizenship after acquiring another citizenship. Also, under Russian 
policy, Russia requires her citizens to declare dual citizenship. These policies can play 
a role in influencing the efficiency of the schemes in the long run.134 
                                                     
Program’, Memorandum OIG-14-19, December 12, 2013, Appendix B. Management Comments to 
the Draft Report. 
131 M. Mosk and B. Ross, ‘Visa Program for Wealthy Foreigners Has ‘Serious Security Challenges,’ 
Homeland Whistleblower Says’, ABC News, June 11, 2015, http://abcnews.go.com/US/visa-program-
wealthy-foreigners-security-challenges-homeland-whistleblower/story?id=31695681 (accessed May 
4, 2018). 
132 M. Chishti and F. Hipsman, ‘Controversial EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program Faces Possibility of 
Overhaul’, Migration Policy Institute, May 25, 2016, 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/controversial-eb-5-immigrant-investor-program-faces-
possibility-overhaul (accessed May 4, 2018). 
133 R. Nixon, ‘Program That Lets Foreigners Write a Check, and Get a Visa, Draws Scrutiny’, The 
New York Times, March 15, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/us/politics/program-that-lets-
foreigners-write-a-check-and-get-a-visa-draws-scrutiny.html?_r=0 (accessed May 4, 2018). 
134 The Caribbean Council, ‘Caribbean Citizenship by Investment Schemes’, December 3, 2014, p. 3. 
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Without a stringent due diligence check, the schemes may well have the potential to 
damage international reputations of the host states, which can lead other states to 
impose visa restrictions on the nationals from the host states. Similarly, it has been 
noted that the St. Kitts and Nevis’s programme represents an innovated but risky 
attempt to economic diversification through attracting the financial capital necessary 
for development insofar as “by selling sovereignty and the state, the islands can 
effectively pursue economic development by trading security.” 135  Accordingly, 
despite the fact that security concerns exist at the core of the citizenship programme, 
due to the lack of domestic and foreign capital, a clear economic benefit outweighs 
security concerns.  
Scholars have indicated two main potential ramifications from citizenship-by-
investment programmes: money laundering and visa-free travelling. Thus, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, as the first country to implement a citizenship-by-investment scheme, has 
restructured the scheme in order to eliminate or mitigate such repercussions over the 
past decades. For example, the St. Kitts and Nevis programme previously had a bond 
investment option for citizenship. But because of the allegation that applicants utilised 
the option to facilitate money laundering, 136  the St. Kitts and Nevis government 
decided to abolish the bond investment option.137 This aligns with the US’s allegation 
that the passports issued under the St. Kitts and Nevis citizenship-by-investment 
programme have been used for illegal financial transactions. The US had urged 
financial institutions to take a risk-based identity verification138 by applying different 
levels of verification checks according to the risk of committing fraud. Thus, where an 
individual is found to have a higher risk, he/she needs to undergo more stringent 
checks. This is supported by FinCEN which argued that certain foreigners with the 
aim of undertaking illicit financial activities had abused the St. Kitts and 
                                                     
135 H. S. Kassab, Weak States in International Relations Theory: The Cases of Armenia, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, Lebanon and Cambodia, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, Chapter 7. Weak State 
Autonomy: Armenia and St. Kitts and Nevis.  
136 It was alledged that the money for the bond investment originated from illicit activities. 
137 Government of St. Kitts and Nevis, Office of the Prime Minister, ‘Citizenship by Investment 
Programmes Restructured over the Years’, July 17, 2014, www.cuopm.com/?p=7982 (accessed 
December 12, 2017).  
138 A risk-based verification is used to deter the risks of money laundering and financing terrorists by 
identifying the channel between the business activities and those financial frauds. See further, HM 
Revenue & Customs, ‘Anti-money Laundering Guidance for Trust or Company Service Providers’, 
July 2010, p. 24.  
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Neviscitizenship programme;139 especially a few Iranian businessmen on the list of a 
US Treasury Department Sanction-Evaders held St. Kitts and Nevis's passports.140 
This hinders a sanction including denial of benefits from being efficiently imposed on 
a targeted country since an individual from the country with another citizenship may 
well avoid the sanction.  
In connection with the possibility of illicit financial activities, the programme has been 
criticised for its inadequate security, weak controls and inadequate administration. One 
of the US Department of Treasury’s lead agencies has alleged that certain foreign 
individuals have by abuse taken advantage of the St. Kitts and Nevis citizenship-by-
investment programme.141 For example, the son of the President of Equatorial Guinea 
who was charged by the American government for corruption is a dual citizen under 
the St. Kitts & Nevis’s programme and Rustem Tursunbayev, a Russian who was 
accused of embezzlement in Kazakhstan, is also a holder of a St. Kitts and Nevis 
passport. Following the US allegations, St. Kitts and Nevis recalled approximately 
16,000 passports, by requiring that passports be submitted to the foreign ministry in 
St. Kitts and Nevis in exchange for new ones. The old ones were otherwise deactivated 
and cancelled.142 
In addition to avoidance of international sanctions and money laundering, Canada and 
the US claimed that citizenship-by-investment schemes could cause threats to their 
national security especially due to visa-free travelling insofar as the passports under 
such schemes help obscure identities of travellers. 143  Visa-free-travel agreements 
between governments are concluded on the premise that each country’s citizens are 
safe to admit, hence, no threat to their security. However, by naturalising foreigners 
who are not certified as non-threats to the other contracting party, the risk caused by 
                                                     
139 US Department of Treasury, 2014, supra note 65. 
140 ‘Russian Social Network Founder Flees Homeland after Acquiring St. Kitts and Nevis Passport’, 
Times Caribbean, April 27, 2014, http://timescaribbeanonline.com/russian-social-network-founder-
flees-homeland-after-acquiring-st-kitts-nevis-passport/ (accessed May 4, 2018).  
141 ‘St. Kitts-Nevis Economic Citizen Split $22.5 Million Corruption Pay-out’, Caribbean News Now, 
June 10, 2014, http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/topstory-St-Kitts-Nevis-economic-citizen-split-
$22.5-million-corruption-payout-21504.html (accessed May 4, 2018).  
142 E. Dezenski and E. Ottolenghi, ‘A Better Way to Sell Citizenship’, The National Interest, 
December 29, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/better-way-sell-citizenship-14750 (accessed 
May 4, 2018). 
143 ‘Canada Imposes Visa Requirement on St. Kitts and Nevis Citizens’, Caribbean News Now, 
November 24, 2014, http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/topstory-Canada-imposes-visa-requirement-
on-St-Kitts-Nevis-citizens-23753.html (accessed May 4, 2018). 
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the citizenship programme in relation to visa-free travelling increases from the 
perspective of the other contracting party. For example, the Canadian government 
delayed the visa-free-travel agreement with Grenada due to Grenada’s citizenship-by-
investment scheme. It is claimed that the recall ensued from the increased security 
concerns regarding the St. Kitts and Nevis citizenship-by-investment programme 
whereby the Canadian government immediately required St. Kitts and Nevis citizens 
to hold a visa to enter Canada. The increased security concerns were due to the 
unsatisfactory procedures of passports issuance and the identity management practices 
by the authority of St. Kitts and Nevis in charge.  
The Maltese Act shows the iterative reference to national security ranging from 
eligibility through ineligibility to deprivation. This tendency may be caused by the 
security concerns expressed by the US and Canada regarding the St. Kitts and Nevis 
scheme. Notwithstanding the emphasis on national security, the UK Immigration 
Minister David Hanson alluded to national security concerns arising out of the Maltese 
citizenship scheme, stating “this risks being a backdoor route to reside anywhere in 
the EU which is not a tight or appropriate immigration policy.”144 Thus, a citizenship-
by-investment scheme by an EU Member State such as Cyprus, Malta and Bulgaria, 
entails a security risk to the whole EU Member States, which resulted in the 
intervention by the European Parliament and the European Commission in the Maltese 
IIP. Similarly, the programmes of the Caribbean island states, including Antigua and 
Barbuda and St. Kitts and Nevis, have given rise to some security concerns to other 
countries as demonstrated by Canada’s imposition of entry visa on nationals from St. 
Kitts and Nevis and of the US’s advisory document regarding Iranian nationals who 
hold St. Kitts and Nevis’ passports. 
While the risk of organised crime is still high in that people involved in such crime 
can more easily afford the programme given financial support from certain institutions 
they belong to, it is not appropriate to presume a naturalised citizen under a citizenship-
by-investment programme can be a potential threat to the society and other countries. 
Therefore, it is recommended that countries introduce a code of conduct on ethics and 
                                                     
144 H. Warrell and J. Fontanella-Khan, ‘Malta Passport Sale Puts UK under Pressure’, Financial 
Times, December 9, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7de0a9fe-60fe-11e3-b7f1-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz47VMKt9ZL (accessed May 8, 2018).  
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compliance and strengthen due diligence by great cooperation between law 
enforcement institutions and the industry involved, which will help avoid corruption 
and abuse in the future. 
As aforementioned, some schemes have provisions which make reference to national 
security in ineligibility or deprivation considerations. Accordingly, for example, ‘if an 
applicant is a threat to national security of the country or other countries, the 
application will not be admitted’145 or ‘if a naturalised citizen is found to have made 
disloyal speech or act to the country, citizenship will be withdrawn’. 146 
Notwithstanding, few cases have demonstrated that applications were rejected on the 
ground of national security or that citizenship under such a scheme was revoked on 
the same ground. This is mainly because the procedure of examining applications is 
not revealed and withdrawal of citizenship remains unreported with a few exceptions. 
Moreover, the provisions regarding deprivation on the national security grounds have 
not clarified the scope and the meaning of national security in the context of the 
naturalisation scheme, which can increase the discretionary power of authorities.  
In contrast to investment controlled by government, the impact of investment, by an 
investor who became a citizen under a citizenship-by-investment scheme, on socio-
economic security is trivial and economic security issues are less likely to be relevant 
in the context of citizenship-by-investment programmes. This is because the scale of 
investment by a private investor is not sufficiently significant to pose a risk on 
economic security of the host state. For instance, financial requirements for the 
application as such could be (i) donating money to the host state and/or (ii) investing 
in specific sectors. In the first case, as the donation is not refundable, the investor does 
not reap profits and cannot transfer money out of the host state, hence no appearance 
of risks to economic or financial security. And in the second case of obtaining 
citizenship by investing in government bonds or real estate development, putting a 
small scale of investment in infrastructure projects, or participating in local business, 
the investor may have profits which she/he will reap in a few years. However, the 
profit is not significant enough to impact the country’s economy or critical 
infrastructures even if transfer of profits takes place. In other words, the amount of 
                                                     
145 Article 6 of Maltese Citizenship Act, supra note 56. 
146 Article 10 of Maltese Citizenship Act. 
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money invested for certain industries – for example, in the case of St. Kitts and Nevis, 
the sugar industry for innovation, or in general, real estate industry – cannot easily 
destruct the whole industry involving public order and security interests. In Cyprus’s 
case, there is a provision for eligibility which specifies that being partly involved in 
the investment of critical infrastructure such as constructing roads147 is also considered 
as the eligible investment for the citizenship scheme, which may seem to affect the 
critical infrastructure of the country. However, although an individual investor can be 
involved in establishing infrastructures such as bridges and toll roads, the investment 
plan will be divided by many investors as a form of joint investment. Hence, one 
investor can hardly exert a strong influence in operating the infrastructure.   
Therefore, regarding citizenship-by-investment schemes which involve an individual 
foreign investor, the understanding of national security mainly focuses on military or 
diplomatic security pertinent to allegiance such as treason against the country that 
granted the citizenship. This is because the types of security issues which individual 
investors will cause are different from those which enterprises and GCIs can cause 
because the size of investment of individual investors tends to be significantly smaller 
than that of the latter.  
5. Conclusion  
This chapter analysed existing citizenship-by-investment schemes and shed light on 
the controversies surrounding them. The controversies focus mainly on, by reason of 
well-established international principles of citizenship, “a genuine link”, solidarity, 
and the democratic value of citizenship to the extent that citizenship should be granted 
in a non-discriminatory manner. This analysis led to the conclusion that the notion of 
a genuine link helps identify those who can be loyal and willing to contribute to the 
development and prosperity of a country. Simultaneously, the notion can be used to 
discriminate against a particular group. However, considering that the meaning of a 
link in the citizenship arena plays a certain role, it is questionable if a citizenship-by-
investment scheme is expected to generate a connection between a naturalised citizen 
and the country in question. More specifically whether an economic contribution made 
by the naturalised citizen suffices to create the future connection. In addition to the 
                                                     
147 Participation in company that carries out public work. 
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connection between a naturalised citizen and the host country, given the limited 
accessibility of programmes,148  are the issues of fairness and value of citizenship 
which cannot be bought in exchange for money. By putting a price tag on citizenship, 
the citizenship programmes demonstrated the commercialisation of citizenship. Spiro 
argues that the commodification of citizenship is the by-product of the globalisation 
and recognition of dual/plural citizenship. However, the practical rationale for the 
advent of citizenship-by-investment programmes may be the failure of recovering 
from the financial crisis and introducing initiatives targeting foreign investment.  
A citizenship-by-investment programme inevitably poses a question as to the 
legitimacy of granting citizenship to a foreign investor in exchange for money. A 
missing genuine link between the host state and the foreign investor further questions 
the legitimacy. And those challenges to the legitimacy may affect the status of the 
naturalised investors in the host state. Despite the requirements including the minimum 
duration for a certain period after obtaining citizenship and keeping the investment for 
a specified period, the reason for this clarification will be the stability and credibility 
of such type of citizenship. Therefore, neither the legitimacy can merely be gained by 
fulfilling the requirements, nor should the disapproval be given only through applying 
the traditional requirements for citizenship. 
Even though the competence over nationality exclusively belongs to a state, 
considering the repercussions arising out of countries’ nationality policy and 
membership, countries cannot overlook denunciations from the international 
communities including powerful countries, supranational institutions, and credit rating 
agencies. This is because one country’s citizenship-by-investment scheme can be used 
as a tool to avoid economic and trade sanctions imposed globally and the scheme can 
also pose security risks to other countries by taking advantage of a visa-free travelling 
agreement. Furthermore, the programmes can be easily abused for an illicit financial 
activity such as money laundering. Hence for the sake of the credibility of citizenship 
given under the programme, governments and other institutions involved should 
undertake proper due diligence in the process.  
                                                     
148 That is, such a citizenship-by-investment programme is only available to wealthy foreigners. 
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It is also noted that risks will increase unless transparency is pursued in the process 
such as the way funds are spent and an examination as to if the funds collected for 
donations are spent as envisaged for the sake of economic and social benefits of the 
country. Otherwise, governments implementing the schemes will be inundated with a 
denunciation of the policy’s corruption, which leads to challenging the legitimacy of 
the programme. Moreover, this can easily influence the international reputation of the 
country concerned regarding their economic policies and credibility. This possibility 
becomes more evident in the case of the US’s scathing remarks on the St. Kitts and 
Nevis citizenship-by-investment scheme. The previous Irish citizenship-by-
investment programme demonstrated that only significant transparency, by avoiding 
corruption and bribery, can lead to mitigating perceived risks of the programmes.  
Given international diplomacy and potential risk of using the programme for illicit 
financial activities, it is inevitable for citizenship granted under such schemes to be 
more exposed to scrutiny, revocation, or recall on the grounds of national security. 
Conversely, if the measures of revocation and recall become frequent, that will 
negatively influence the reliability of such schemes. That is why, in addition to 
conducting due diligence, control on numbers and transparency should converge. 
When it comes to revocation of citizenship, it is imperative to examine the cases 
thoroughly and apply the appropriate measures, considering the potential impact of 
threats to national security and the reputation of the scheme. Although this chapter 
confirms states’ prerogative to determine citizenship matters, it argues that countries 
cannot escape criticisms for their citizenship policies at the domestic, the regional and 
the international levels. Given a plethora of criticisms on the policies, countries, 
especially St. Kitts and Nevis, have restructured their citizenship-by-investment 
programmes in order to mitigate possibility for abuse and risks to national security of 
the host state and other countries. As the cases above demonstrated, however, it is clear 
that the citizenship programmes are not fool-proof, but very susceptible to corruption 
and national security threats.  
Of the countries which provide foreign investors with more favourable immigration 
incentives, there is a difference in the requirements, including the financial 
commitment and prior residence as well as the approaches to understanding national 
security regarding the naturalising process. While the programmes of some countries 
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insist on higher thresholds than others to ensure connection between an applicant and 
the host country, some countries do not emphasise other conditions such as language 
or a certain level of loyalty. This corroborates countries’ diverse interpretations of the 
meaning of citizenship and national security. 
Although most of the citizenship-by-investment schemes have a few references to 
national security, the schemes tend not to sufficiently provide the precise definition 
and scope of national security in the eligibility and revocation criteria. Instead, the 
schemes either emphasise the discretionary power of state to revoke citizenship,149 or 
do not illustrate what types of national security matters may be added to the list of 
national security or how a government undertakes an examination on whether a 
naturalised citizen has become a threat.  
As already stated above, an individual investor, as a naturalised citizen by investment 
or donation is less likely to pose any significant risk to socio-economic security like 
GCIs, given the scale of investment. Instead, it has been suggested that the scope of 
national security in this field will be merely limited to criminal records – a specific 
connection with national enemies or terrorist groups; and disloyal speeches or acts 
against the country. Inevitably, naturalised citizens under the programme can be more 
susceptible to deprivation of citizenship on the grounds of national security since they 
lack a residence history and they were not obliged to renounce their prior nationality. 
Therefore, the role of national security in the citizenship schemes calls for further 
clarification by policy-makers because the scope of national security can change 
depending on the international relations and concomitant risks in order to curtail 
discretionary or even arbitrary measures. It is also noteworthy how a host state deals 
with a naturalised citizen under a citizenship-by-investment programme when the 
programme does not have a provision regarding revocation on the grounds of national 
security. That is, whether the country will revoke the citizenship discretionally or by 
invoking another provision. 
                                                     
149 For example, by periodic checks, Cyprus can withdraw the citizenship. 
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CHAPTER 5 
National Security Derogations and Exceptions 
 
1. Introduction (Background: Is there a Balance between a 
Foreign Investor and a Host State?) 
As analysed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3, the notion and the role of national security in 
security policies and security studies have evolved in the light of national and 
international events. In particular, events, such as the Second World War, the advent 
of the nuclear age and the oil shock, steadily diversified national security studies and 
adjusted the gravity of military security in the studies. Although military security has 
played a significant role in this process, the emergence of economic security stemming 
from international or regional economic crises, reliance on imported energy and the 
importance of critical infrastructure/strategic industries have shed light on different 
types of security and the way governments have broadened the notion of national 
security.  
The previous chapters have demonstrated how states have used the concept of national 
security to derogate from their domestic and international obligations towards foreign 
investors, be they collective or individual actors. It is true that in a neo-liberalised 
investment system, governmental intervention in the financial or economic market is 
deemed to be an interventionist approach. However, in the IIL arena, governments 
sometimes implement restrictive measures regarding foreign investment and would 
invoke exceptions in IIAs to justify these measures. Nevertheless, the scope of 
exceptions in international investment treaties has was never been clearly demarcated.1 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the current dynamics between host states 
and foreign investors, whether symmetric or asymmetric, and to highlight the role of 
exceptions, especially essential security interests in IIAs, in addressing this dynamics. 
The motivation of this examination is to probe the level (the extent) of regulatory space 
and, where regulatory space is found highly restricted, contemplate a new 
                                                     
1 This is not limited to the essential security interests exception, but rather covers other exceptions 
such as public interest and public order in international investment treaties as well as doctrines of 
international law including the right to regulate and the police powers of state.  
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understanding of security as a solution to this challenge. Thus, the chapter discusses 
the rights of foreign investors and the options for flexibility available to a host state 
and examines how tribunals approach the relationship between the rights of foreign 
investors and the policy-space of host states. This will lead to a discussion on how a 
newly conceptualised concept of security can contribute to adjusting the asymmetric 
dynamics by complementing other escape clauses. This is not solely motivated to 
secure or even widen policy space of host states, which may lead to disproportionately 
favouring host states over foreign investors. Instead, it attempts to find a means of 
striking a balance between the protection of foreign investors’ rights and the policy-
space of host states and to delineate the scope of security derogations more overtly so 
that predictability can be enhanced.  
Therefore, this chapter demonstrates whether regulatory space of a host state has been 
accommodated. This is approached by especially discussing cases in relation to the 
doctrine of police powers under customary international law that host states have used 
to avoid compensatory obligation concerning expropriatory measures taken for public 
interests. After examining those precedents, the chapter analyses the potential changes 
in ex-post and ex-ante government measures which may affect foreign investors and 
foreign investments following the application of the broadened concept of security. 
Lastly, this chapter envisages a new approach to understanding compensation when a 
state exercises its regulatory power and discusses the viability of the suggested scope 
of security exceptions.  
2. Challenges to Regulatory Space 
The regulatory space of host states has been diminished in parallel with the conclusion 
of international agreements and the development of soft law.2 Soft law could exist in 
the form of guidelines and conditionalities which are contractual terms and conditions 
that a recipient country is required to agree in exchange for a loan, aid or debt relief – 
as established by international organisations.3 Moreover, state contracts – including a 
                                                     
2 Soft law is widely defined as “hortatory obligations” rather than legally binding. The concept of soft 
law became popular since countries faced difficulties in concluding or developing further a 
multilateral agreement due to diverse member states ranging from developing countries to developed 
countries which have different socio-economic interests. Yet, in reality, soft law has been evaluated as 
effective as hard law in terms of enforcement in spite of its non-binding characteristic. See further, A. 
T. Guzman and T. L. Meyer, ‘International Soft Law’, Journal of Legal Analysis, vol. 2, no. 1, 2010.  
3 Conditionalities can be imposed by international organisations, mainly the World Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund, or can be drafted by a donor country in case of bilateral loans and aids.  
 168 
 
concession agreement, i.e. a natural resource exploitation contract such as mining, 
made between foreign investors and host states – usually prevent host states from 
introducing new rules which could negatively affect foreign investment. If the BIT 
between a host state and a home state provides for the umbrella clause, foreign 
investors can claim that newly introduced rules impinge on their rights, whereby the 
host state violates its domestic obligations4 and international obligations.5  
The restraint on regulatory space because of IIAs is well illustrated in Santa Elena v. 
Costa Rica6 and Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates.7 The cases alleged the 
violations of indirect expropriation and fair and equitable treatment clauses. In both 
cases, foreign investors filed a claim that measures taken by the host state and changes 
in policy amounted to expropriation. In response, the host states argued that the 
measures were implemented within the scope of the police powers of the state; hence 
there was no obligation to compensate. Notwithstanding, as will be further discussed 
below, even though the states implemented a measure for the public interest, it might 
not avoid the obligation to pay compensation.  
The conclusion of IIAs, thus, has resulted in increased policy costs. For example, it is 
possible for a host state not to take into account the risk that the measure concerned 
can be tantamount to expropriation when a state takes a measure necessary to pursue 
its general public interest. This is because the state could consider the measure for the 
protection of public interest to fall within its regulatory powers. However, a foreign 
investor whose interests are detrimentally affected would logically claim that the host 
                                                     
4 UNCTAD, ‘State Contracts’, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements, 
New York and Geneva, UN, 2004 (UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2004/11). 
5 This is because an umbrella clause in a BIT provides more general protection for foreign investors, 
in addition to treaty protection, related to any other contractual commitments that a host state entered 
into. See further, OECD, International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking 
Innovations, Paris: OECD, 2008, Chapter 2. 
6 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, 
Feb 17, 2000 (hereinafter Santa Elena Award). 
7 Emanuel Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates and USA, December 29, 1989, vol. 23 Iran-
United States CTR 378. See also, Metalclad Corporation v. the United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB (AF)/97/1, August 30, 2000 (hereinafter Metalclad Award); SGS Société Générale de 
Surveillance v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, January 29, 2004 (hereinafter SGS Award); Saluka Investments BV v. The 
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, March 17, 2006 (hereinafter Saluka Award); Siemens 
A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, January 17, 2007 (hereinafter Siemens 
Award); Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, August 27, 
2008 (hereinafter Plama Award); and Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United 
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, May 29, 2003 (hereinafter Tecmed Award). 
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state must pay compensation for the loss in accordance with an IIA between them. The 
amount of compensation can exceed the budget for the policy in question, which could 
decrease the cost-efficiency of the policy. Hence, the host state would rather not adopt 
any measures necessary for its development. Thus, the host state’s regulatory space is 
confined, and, in the end, can dissuade it from ratifying an IIA.  
Moreover, the high thresholds for invoking exceptions aggravate this phenomenon. If 
a host state implements a measure on the grounds of necessity, or essential security 
interests in IIAs, the host state must comply with certain stringent conditions. For 
instance, one of the conditions is that the measure should be the least trade/investment-
restrictive. This condition, however, can lead to a controversy over whether there were 
other policy options which would have had a lesser effect on foreign investors’ 
interests comparatively to the measure actually undertaken.8 This unpredictability also 
becomes a serious impediment on a policy adoption or even deters a host state from 
implementing a measure, where necessary. Therefore, despite the inclusion of escape 
clauses for flexibility in IIAs, the applicability of such clauses and the dynamic 
between foreign investors and host states become questionable. 
Before examining the efficiency of escape clauses and flexibility tools, to gauge the 
protection accorded to foreign investors by a host state, we need to briefly discuss 
some rights of foreign investors: fair and equitable treatment (FET), national treatment 
(NT), most favoured nation (MFN) treatment, and an umbrella clause.  
2.1. The Rights of Foreign Investors  
The controversy over whether or not the relationship between foreign investors and 
host states is balanced has been examined over the decades.9 In order to find out an 
effective method to strike a right balance between the interests of host states and those 
                                                     
8 The Continental tribunal noted that other alternatives did not seem viable or less disruptive than the 
measures taken by the Argentine government. See further, Continental Casualty Company v Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9, September 5, 2008, para 231. 
9 J. W. Salacuse, ‘BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and their Impact on 
Foreign Investment in Developing Countries’, in F. Beveridge (ed.), Globalization and International 
Investment, Routledge, 2017. See further, B. Kingsbury, and S. Schill. ‘Public Law Concepts to 
Balance Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest – the Concept of 
Proportionality’, in S. Schill (ed.), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law, 
Oxford University Press, 2010.  
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of foreign investors, it is imperative to examine the current regime of foreign investors’ 
rights granted under IIAs or BITs as well as host states’ obligation to provide full 
security and protection to foreign investment.  
Contracting parties conclude BITs and IIAs with the intention of promoting 
international investments. This is achieved by promising certain international standard 
protection to foreign investors, which enhances the host state’s attractiveness as a 
foreign investment destination. Despite the benefits, IIAs may restrain the regulatory 
space and discourage host states from formulating new regulations which affect 
foreign investment, if the host state cannot afford compensation where the regulations 
are judged expropriatory. Thus, the fundamental characteristic of agreements is to seek 
to minimise the leeway given to host states to deter arbitrary measures against foreign 
investors.10 Therefore, clauses in BITs and IIAs encompass MFN treatment, NT, FET, 
an umbrella clause, and the right to compensation in case of expropriation based on 
the Hull Rule11.  
Firstly, MFN treatment provides that beneficial treatment granted to a foreign investor 
from one state shall also be granted to a foreign investor from another state. In other 
words, there should be no discrimination between trading partners. NT refers to a 
commitment that a host state shall treat a foreign investor as equally as a domestic 
investor. The essence of NT is that there should be no discrimination between a foreign 
investor and a domestic investor. FET has a more comprehensive feature than MFN 
and NT given that FET requires “an attitude to governance based on an unbiased set 
of rules that should be applied with a view to doing justice to all interested parties that 
maybe affected by a State’s decision in question, […]”.12 Thus, there is no standard to 
determine whether a host state has failed to provide FET to the foreign investor 
concerned, which implies a broad and general protection for foreign investors. 
Furthermore, the right to compensation in the case of expropriation refers to the 
situation where a foreign investor’s investments and assets are expropriated wholly or 
                                                     
10 R. Dolzer, ‘The Impact of International Investment Treaties on Domestic Administrative Law’, New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 37, 2004, p. 953. 
11 The right to compensation will be discussed in the following section. When expropriation takes 
place, the host state has the obligation to pay prompt, adequate and effective compensation. This 
standard was put forth by the statement of the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull in response 
to the confiscation of American citizens’ property by the Mexican government from 1915 and 1940.  
12 UNCTAD, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements II, New York and Geneva, UN, 2012, p. 7. 
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partly following a host state’s measure; the foreign investor thus can claim 
compensation for the loss caused by the measure against the host state.13 
In contrast, an umbrella clause amalgamates contractual commitments outside the IIA 
with the terms specified in the IIA. In other words, the clause binds a host state to 
observe the contractual commitments made with foreign investors, such as state 
contracts and concession agreements as well as provide foreign investors with broad 
protection for their assets, in addition to the minimum standards which foreign 
investors are entitled to, i.e. protection under customary international law. Apart from 
the substantive protection, regarding procedures, BITs often accord a foreign investor 
the right to resort to international dispute settlement. Such dispute settlement measure 
could be to resort to either a tribunal of the ICSID or an ad hoc proceeding,14 rather 
than to the domestic court, where the affected investment is not treated in accordance 
with the relevant BIT. Thus, if an international tribunal regards a BIT as a tool to 
protect the rights of foreign investors and promote foreign investment without 
considering public interests, a host state may face an interpretation which disregards 
the interests of that host state, but favours the interests of foreign investors.  
Contrary to the wider protection for foreign investors, regarding clauses for policy 
space, i.e. exceptions, with stringent requirements for invocation, BITs and IIAs tend 
to have restrictive and negative wordings in order to diminish the possibility of 
invoking such clauses. For example, Article 18: Essential Security of the US Model 
BIT 2012 provides that “[N]othing in this Treaty shall be construed […]”15 and Article 
20: Financial Services of the Model BIT also specifies “a Party shall not be prevented 
from adopting or maintaining measures in relation to financial services for prudential 
reasons […]”.16 The tendency that provisions regarding the right of a host state to 
regulate exist as exceptions in IIAs confirms that IIAs are drafted to protect foreign 
investors and foreign investment rather than host states. Therefore, the rights of foreign 
investors in IIAs are not confined to a specific scope but are somewhat open-ended 
whereas host states’ right to regulate is clearly restricted. This can restrict the scope of 
                                                     
13 This is further discussed in the following section. 
14 Based on the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL). 
15 2012 US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty. 
16 Ibid.  
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legitimate measures or regulations which are implemented in order to protect public 
interests.17 
2.2. Regulatory Space Accommodated by the Right to Expropriate and 
Police Powers 
It is well recognised that where a host state expropriates an investment directly or 
indirectly, the state must comply with the conditions of expropriation. 18  The 
requirements for a lawful expropriation were developed in customary international law 
on expropriation, and they have been recognised by the ICSID and ad hoc tribunals 
and incorporated in provisions on expropriation in many BITs and IIAs. 19  The 
requirements based on the Hull Rule are: the measures which amount to indirect or 
direct expropriation should be taken “(i) for a public purpose related to the internal 
needs of that Party; (ii) on a non-discriminatory basis; (iii) against prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation.”20  
Whereas it is clear whether a direct expropriation, by transferring the owner of the 
business has taken place or not, the decision as to if a governmental measure is an 
indirect expropriation requires further examination. The examination is to determine 
whether the measure concerned falls within the ambit of regulatory space thereby 
resulting in no compensation or amounts to an expropriation. The OECD 2004 report 
on “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment 
Law21 (hereafter the OECD 2004 report) also suggests that a few of the US Free Trade 
Agreements 22  and the US model BIT provided the criteria to establish indirect 
expropriation, despite the necessity of case-by-case examination, which are: 
                                                     
17 Kingsbury and Schill, 2010, supra note 9, p. 76.  
18 C. Schreuer, ‘The Concept of Expropriation under the ETC and Other Investment Protection 
Treaties’, Transnational Dispute Management, vol. 2, no. 3. 
19 A. van Aaken, ‘International Investment Law between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract 
Theory Analysis’, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 12, no. 2, 2009, p. 510. 
20 Tidewater Inc., Tidewater Investment SRL, Tidewater Caribe, C.A., et al. v. The Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, March 2015, para 122. 
21 OECD, ‘“Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law’, 
OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2004/04, OECD, 2004. 
22 The US FTAs with Australia (signed in 2004), Chile (signed in 2003), Central America (i.e. Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua) - Dominican Republic (signed in 2004), 
Morocco (signed in 2004) and Rwanda (signed in 2008). 
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2 the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that 
an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the 
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish 
that an indirect expropriation has occurred; 
3 the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, 
reasonable, investment-backed expectations; and 
4 the character of the government action.23 
Again, to be lawful, an expropriatory measure must meet the requirements referenced 
above. However, whereas payment of compensation for the loss caused by a regulation 
is accepted as a norm, customary international law provides for a police power 
exception which does not necessarily require compensation with the proviso that 
economic injury or the impairment on foreign investment stems from a bona fide non-
discriminatory regulation, policy or measure within the scope of the police power.24 
For the distinction between a legitimate regulatory measure based on the police powers 
of the state and an expropriatory measure (indirect expropriation), the US FTAs and 
the US model BIT provide that;25 
Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a 
Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, do not 
constitute indirect expropriations.26 
This exception can also be found in Canada’s 2004 model Foreign Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA),27 thus signifying that the approach is not 
only taken by the US government. Other countries have adopted the same approach to 
demarcate the scope of (indirect) expropriations, distinct from legitimate regulatory 
measures which do not entail compensatory obligation. Further, the OECD 2004 report 
shows that tribunals tend to rely on certain standards in order to distinguish between 
indirect expropriation and regulatory taking, which is not compensable. These are: (i) 
                                                     
23 2012 US Model BIT, supra note 15, Annex B. Expropriation, p. 41.  
24 OECD, 2004, supra note 21.  
25 For instance, this can be found in Annex B para. 4(b) of the BIT between US and Rwanda as well as 
in the 2012 US Model BIT in Annex B. 
26 2012 US Model BIT, Annex B, supra note 15. 
27 Especially Article 13 and Annex B. 13(1) (c).  
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the extent to which the governmental measure affected a foreign investor’ assets; (ii) 
what the objective the state wanted to achieve by the action was; and (iii) whether the 
measure was reasonable with the legitimate expectations of foreign investors. 28 
Notwithstanding the above criteria, tribunals are required to examine whether there is 
expropriation on a case-by-case basis by interpreting relevant treaty clauses.29 
In addition to the police powers doctrine, under domestic law, the Exon-Florio 
Amendment to the Omnibus Trade Act allows the US President to intervene in the US 
investment market on the ground of national security. This has raised questions 
relating to takings and compensation.30 This presidential authority may well impinge 
on the rights of foreign investors to establish their investment (the Greenfield 
investment), which involve property rights and national treatment. The EU has 
criticised this legislation arguing that compensation is not foreseeable. 31  The US 
would argue that this is within its regulatory power and thus does not lead to 
compensable takings.32 Environmental takings are always subject to compensation in 
Tecmed and Santa Elena where the tribunals held that environmental takings are 
“similar to any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to 
implement its policies.” 33  Sornarajah asserts that any taking which stems from 
economic reasons should be subject to compensation, but where an overriding public 
interest exists, it may not entail an obligation to compensation.34 However, a clear 
distinction has not been made between takings motivated by economic reasons and 
takings for preponderant public interests, i.e. compensable takings and regulatory 
(non-compensable) takings. Rosalyn Higgins has noted that the distinction is not 
simply possible and that states have an obligation to compensation for both cases, 
without providing any criteria for the distinction.35 In contrast, it is also argued that 
                                                     
28 OECD, 2004, supra note 21, p. 22.  
29 2012 US Model BIT, Annex B, supra note 15. 
30 M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 4th edn., Cambridge University Press, 
2017, p. 545. 
31 ‘European Community: Statement on US Policy on Foreign Direct Investment’, International Legal 
Materials, vol. 31, no. 2, p. 467. See also ‘United States: Department of the Treasury Regulations 
Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions and Takeovers by Foreign Persons’, International Legal 
Materials, vol. 31, no. 2, p. 424. 
32 Sornarajah, 2017, supra note 30. 
33 Santa Elena Award, supra note 6, para 72. 
34 Sornarajah, 2017, supra note 30, p. 531. 
35 R. Higgins, ‘The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law’, 
Hague Recueil, vol. 176, 1982, p. 331. 
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the category of regulatory takings should be established distinct from that of indirect 
expropriation, 36  but this seems unviable because security matters are constantly 
changing. 
While environmental security and energy security can fall within the scope of a 
broadened notion of security, it is not reasonable to allow a state to implement an act 
related to the protection of the environment or natural resources. The severity and 
exogenous variables of a security issue can vary depending on the surroundings. 
Accordingly, what is considered a security issue in different countries varies, and the 
issue could be de-securitised in the future. This feature makes it more complicated to 
draft an agreement with a specific list of measures which can be deemed as indirect 
expropriation, not falling within the scope of regulatory takings.  
The role of the police powers doctrine has been discussed in assessing the legality of 
a governmental measure.37  The police power doctrine is designed “to secure and 
promote the public welfare”.38 Specifically, for instance, the Tenth Amendment to the 
US Constitution provides that police power is the authority “to enact measures to 
preserve and protect the safety, health, welfare and morals of the community.”39 This 
definition signifies that a government shall take measures with the aim of protecting 
the public interest. While discussing the role of the doctrine, some commentators 
regard police power as the overriding factor.40 In other words, the doctrine is not 
influenced or balanced by other elements.41 Thus, once a state measure is determined 
to fall within the scope of police powers, the country does not take the obligation to 
compensation. Regarding police powers, Sornarajah confirms that if a non-
discriminatory measure implemented by a host state is pertinent to some issues, such 
as security, environmental preservation, consumer protection, anti-trust or land issues, 
compensation may not be required since the measure in question is essential for the 
                                                     
36 S. H. Nikiema, ‘Compensation for Expropriation’, Best Practices Series, International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, 2013. 
37 OECD, 2004, supra note 21, p. 14. 
38 E. Freund, The Police Power, Public Policy and Constitutional Rights, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1904.  
39 US The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. 
40 B. Mostafa, ‘The Sole Effects Doctrine, Police Powers and Indirect Expropriation under 
International Law’, Australian International Law Journal, vol. 15, 2008, pp. 272-273; A. S. Weiner, 
‘Indirect Expropriation: The Need for a Taxonomy of Legitimate Regulatory Purposes’, International 
Law Forum, vol. 5, no. 3, p. 170. 
41 OECD, 2004, supra note 21, p. 18.  
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protection of national values.42 However, to be exempt from this payment, a host state 
or defendant – where a foreign investor files a claim accusing a host state of 
expropriation – should demonstrate that there exists an overwhelming public interest 
and such a measure or taking was indispensable.  
This is also supported by the Restatement Third of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States which discusses how justifiable governmental regulations within the 
ambit of police powers can be differentiated from indirect expropriation. 43  The 
commentary pointed out that “[A] state is not responsible for loss of property or other 
economic disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture 
for crime, or other action of the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police 
power of the states, if it is not discriminatory…”44 Contrariwise, Sornarajah suggested 
a list of expropriatory takings which are more specific than the criteria to constitute an 
indirect expropriation in the US FTAs and the US model FTA. Among them, the types 
of measures that can be related to indirect expropriations cover: 
(iv) failure to provide protection when there is interference with the 
property of the foreign investor;  
(v) administrative decisions which annul concession licences and 
permits necessary for the business in the jurisdiction;  
(vi) adjustment in taxation - the right to increase taxation or royalties in 
a concession agreement, is accepted not in violation of property 
rights, which means, not a compensable taking as long as taxation 
is not excessive – otherwise, it would bear the possibility of a 
disguised expropriation;45 
(vii) treatment on the contrary to international law; or  
(viii) undertakings of harassment including freezing their assets rather 
than direct and practical nationalisation or expropriation such as 
takeover of management control over the investment.46 
                                                     
42 Sornarajah, 2017, supra note 30, p. 443.  
43 American Law Institute, ‘Restatement of the Law, Third, The Foreign Relations of the United 
States’, American Law Institute Publishers ,Volume 1, 1987, Section 712, Comment g. 
44 Ibid.  
45 A relevant case can be Gudmundsson v. Iceland, ECHR no. 511/59, December 20, 1960. 
46 Sornarajah, 2017, pp. 436-437.  
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Since the types of state actions illustrated in the commentary and the list of indirect 
expropriation have a certain overlap, it is still not clear what types of state actions are 
‘within the police powers of the states.’ This has generated much confusion regarding 
whether a state measure lies within the police power so that the action does not result 
in compensation for loss of foreign investment. Otherwise, the measure in question is 
an expropriation which entails the state obligation to pay full compensation, which is 
evidenced in a couple of cases where a state measure was found to constitute an 
expropriation. The OECD 2004 report suggested that one of the most determinant 
factors to decide whether or not a state measure is expropriatory is the consideration 
of “social purpose” or the “general welfare”47 in the measure.48 Similarly, George 
Christie also argues that “the existence of generally recognised considerations of the 
public health, safety, morals or welfare will normally lead to a conclusion that there 
has been no ‘taking’”.49 However, as discussed in the previous section, some tribunals 
noted that the purpose or objective of the policy concerned might not be taken into 
account in determining the obligation to compensation; instead, the effect arising from 
the policy should play the determinant role. 
On the one hand, it is not certain whether, in case of adopting a measure resulting in 
loss of foreign investment, a government should be obliged to pay compensation 
unquestionably, or should be exempted as a police power exception, stemming from 
the unclear boundary of police power. On the other, Sornarajah also points out the 
difficulty in exempting from the obligation to pay full compensation. 50 This is mainly 
because property rights have been protected as one of the constitutional rights, 
particularly in the US,51 whereby payment of compensation for expropriating property 
has been a norm. The protection of property rights has also been strengthened by neo-
liberal rules which prioritise the protection of individual property rights over that of 
public interests by governmental measures.  
                                                     
47 B. H. Weston, ‘“Constructive Takings” under International Law: A Modest Foray into the Problem 
of “Creeping Expropriation”’, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 16, 1975, p. 112. 
48 OECD, 2004, supra note 21, p. 16. 
49 G. Christie, ‘What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law?’, British Yearbook of 
International Law, vol. 38, 1962, p. 338. 
50 Sornarajah, 2017, supra note 30, p. 454.  
51 Ibid.  
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This trend is evident inter alia in Santa Elena v. Costa Rica52 where the tribunal held: 
Expropriatory environmental measures – no matter how laudable and 
how beneficial to society as a whole – are in this respect, similar to any 
other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to implement 
its policies: where property is expropriated, even for environmental 
purposes, whether domestic or international, the state’s obligation to pay 
compensation remains. 
Likewise, despite many tribunals’ acknowledgement of the police power doctrine, the 
governmental obligation to compensation has been reiterated in several ICSID cases 
including Metalclad v. Mexico.53 There are two main reasons why the ICSID tribunals 
highlighted that states should pay compensation for such a taking or measure which 
amounts to expropriation – indirect expropriation. First, the ICSID or any adjudicative 
body attempts to ensure that governments should not refrain from taking measures 
targeting the protection of the environment. Secondly, with the goal of protecting 
foreign investors’ assets, the ICSID and ad hoc dispute settlement bodies examine 
whether a government attempts to provide unfair and discriminatory treatment towards 
foreign investors by implementing regulations which can negatively influence their 
investment or even overturn their investment practically. While tribunals recognise 
police powers, they are likely to accentuate the importance of paying compensation to 
foreign investors who suffer loss caused by a state measure. 
Yet, Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates presents a case where the ICSID 
recognised the exercise of the police power and thereby excepted the obligation to 
compensation. The tribunal held that:54 
[A] State is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic 
disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation or any other action 
that is commonly accepted as within the police power of States, provided it 
is not discriminatory and is not designed to cause the alien to abandon the 
property to the State or to sell it at a distress price […]. 
                                                     
52 Santa Elena Award, supra note 6, para 72.  
53 Metalclad Award, supra note 7.   
54 Emanuel Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates and USA, supra note 7, para 26. 
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The same rationale was iterated in several cases including Tecmed v. Mexico in 
which the Tribunal remarked on the police power of states, holding that:  
The principle that the State’s exercise of its sovereign power within the 
framework of its police power may cause economic damage to those 
subject to its power as administrator without entitling them to any 
compensation whatsoever is undisputable.55 
While the Tecmed tribunal recognised the sovereign power, it found that such action 
should conform to international law and the agreement in question – here, the 
Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments between Spain 
and Mexico – and held that the host state breached its obligation on fair and equitable 
treatment and expropriation. Furthermore, by referring to the practice of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) which underlined the importance of striking a fair 
balance between public interests and private interests regarding a state measure, i.e. in 
the case of expropriation, the control of use,56 the Tecmed tribunal noted that to decide 
whether an action taken by a host state falls within the realm of expropriation, they 
need to examine “whether such actions or measures are proportional to the public 
interest presumably protected thereby and to the protection legally granted to 
investments.”57 This shows that in spite the tribunals’ recognition on the regulatory 
power, a host state still faces the difficulty in taking a measure necessary in compliance 
with international law as well as domestic law.  
The Methanex v. USA case under NAFTA showed the similar distinction between 
indirect expropriation and non-compensable regulatory taking within the ambit of 
police power. The matter concerned the California ban “on the sale and the use of the 
gasoline additive” for the protection of public health. The tribunal stated that:  
But as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation 
for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, 
                                                     
55 Tecmed Award, supra note 7, para 119. 
56 H. Mountfield, ‘Regulatory Expropriations in Europe: the Approach of the European Court of 
Human Rights’, N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal, vol. 11, no. 1, 2002, pp. 136-147. 
57 Tecmed Award, supra note 7, para 122. 
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which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed 
expropriatory and compensable […]58  
The tribunal found that the measure was implemented for the public interest in a non-
discriminatory manner with compliance to due process. Thus the ban was a legitimate 
policy which did not require compensation by rejecting the Methanex’s claim on 
expropriation.59 Yet, whereas measures, aimed at preserving the environment, have 
been widely understood to entail payment of compensation for the loss, the exemption 
on police power measures, and the right for governments to regulate are still examined 
on a case-by-case basis.  
The investor’s expectations when deciding to locate his/her investment in the host state 
are another factor taken into account in determining whether a foreign investor is 
entitled to compensation for loss. The expectations should not be unreasonably 
subjective. 60  The Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran case discusses the approach to 
determine the reasonable expectation standard. The tribunal noted that:  
Investors in Iran, like investors in all other countries, have to assume a risk 
that the country might experience strikes, lock-outs, disturbances, changes 
of economic and political system and even revolution. That any of these risks 
materialised does not necessarily mean that property rights affected by such 
events can be deemed to have been taken.61  
The Tecmed tribunal held that the measure taken by the Mexican government should 
be reasonable to the policy objective, and the “legitimate expectations” of those whose 
investment and assets were negatively influenced. The tribunal also added that since 
foreign investors may well expect their investments will last sufficiently long so that 
they can reap profits out of their investments prior to the decision to make an 
investment, the tribunal needs to take the legitimate expectations into account in line 
with the agreement concerned and international law.62 By applying this approach and 
                                                     
58 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, August 9, 2005, Part IV, Chapter 
D, para 7.  
59 Ibid paras 15-16.  
60 OECD, 2004, supra note 21, p. 19. 
61 Starrett Housing Corporation, Starrett Systems, Inc., Starrett Housing International, Inc., v. The 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Bank Omran, Bank Mellat, 16 Iran-US C.T.R, Case No. 
24, 1983, pp. 156-157. 
62 Tecmed Award, supra note 7, para 50.  
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the proportionality test, the tribunal found that the state measure amounted to 
expropriation. Notwithstanding, Newcombe underlines the importance of the 
obligation for a host state to pay compensation for expropriation even if an IIA tribunal 
concluded that the measure is necessary for public interest, public order and legitimate 
policy objective, 63 claiming that “if an expropriatory measure is necessary to protect 
“human, animal or plant life or health”, the state may take the measure, but still must 
pay compensation.”64 
Thus, it would be particularly difficult for a host state to prove that its actions do not 
result in its obligation to compensate. This is so particularly where (i) the belief that a 
host state should pay compensation to a foreign investor for a regulatory taking is 
predominant and (ii) the thresholds for a state to derogate from its duty to 
compensation stemming from its policy are high and even are not easy to determine. 
Therefore, despite the deference to the police powers of states, tribunals are likely to 
find that foreign investors are entitled to compensation. Thus, although it is 
acknowledged that in order to fall within the ambit of non-compensable takings as 
discussed above, measures should be non-discriminatory and motivated by public 
purpose, it is necessary to contemplate another option in order to secure certain policy-
space with the aim of striking a balance between the interests of foreign investors and 
those of host states. It is true that awards given by ICSID tribunals or ad hoc 
proceedings based on the UNCITRAL’s rules do not have any binding effects de jure, 
but their approach with respect to exceptions, such as essential security interests, and 
the obligation to pay adequate compensation ensuing from measures can provide 
fruitful insights for further development in interpreting exceptions to pursue a more 
balanced approach in IIAs between the interests of foreign investors and those of host 
states.  
                                                     
63 This argument may lead to more questions: such as the legitimacy of the EU directive on 
environmental policy such as CO2 emission, which does not render any obligation to pay 
compensation; the existence of sustainable development and economic prosperity which exists in line 
with the protection of foreign investors and the promotion of foreign investment in preamble; and 
excessive emphasis on property rights with disregarding non-discriminatory measure for the public 
purpose. 
64 A. Newcombe, ‘Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law’, Journal of World 
Investment Trade, vol. 8, no. 3, 2007. 
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2.3. The Tribunals’ Tendency 
While there is little disagreement on the notion of legal expropriations, tribunals may 
take different approaches regarding which factors/criteria should be applied for the 
assessment of the legitimacy of a measure.  
Some tribunals65 have focused on the effect of a state’s measure in question on foreign 
investors as the “sole criterion” 66  in determining whether the measure is an 
expropriation, while others have to take into consideration other factors, such as the 
intention and the context of the measure.67 Among tribunals, there has also been a 
conflict with respect to examining the applicable criteria. The Tippetts case shows that 
that the effect of state measures on a foreign investor plays a more significant role than 
the objective of the state measure in tribunal determinations. The tribunal held that 
“the intent of the government is less important than the effects of the measures on the 
owner, and the form of the measures of control or interference is less important than 
the reality of their impact.”68 Similarly, the Metalclad case tribunal under the NAFTA 
pointed out that the tribunal “need not decide or consider the motivation, or intent of 
the adoption of the Ecological Decree”69 when examining whether a state measure 
amounted to an expropriation. The tribunal added that: 
[E]xpropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and 
acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal or 
obligatory transfer of title (direct expropriation), but also covert or 
incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of 
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use of 
reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property (indirect 
                                                     
65 For example, this approach is taken by the tribunal of Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. 
TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, 6 Iran-US C.T.R., Case no. 7, 1984 (hereinafter Tippetts 
Award). 
66 Where the sole effects criterion is adopted, a tribunal emphasises the effect of the measures on the 
value of the investment without paying attention “to the nature of the act” in assessing the legality of 
the measure. See, V. Heiskanen, ‘The Contribution of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to the 
Development of the Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation’, Journal of the International Law FORUM, 
vol. 5, no. 3, 2003, p. 177.  
67 R. Dolzer, ‘Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?’,  N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal, 
vol. 11, 2002, p. 79; C. Henckels, ‘Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting 
Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitration’, Journal of 
International Economic Law, vol. 15, no. 1, 2012.  
68 Tippetts Award, supra note 65, pp. 225-226. 
69 Metalclad Award, supra note 7, para 111. 
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expropriation) even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host 
State.70 (Bracket added) 
Although acknowledging a state’s sovereign duty to pursue the protection of essential 
interests, the Phelps Dodge tribunal underlines the obligation for a government to pay 
compensation for the loss caused by a state measure irrespective of the purpose of the 
measure. In response to the actions taken by the Iranian government to protect from 
negative impacts arising out of the Iranian Revolution, the tribunal stated that:  
The Tribunal fully understands the reasons why the respondent felt 
compelled to protect its interests through this transfer of management, 
and the Tribunal understands the financial, economic and social concerns 
that inspired the law pursuant to which it acted, but those reasons and 
concerns cannot relieve the Respondent of the obligation to compensate 
Phelps Dodge for its loss.71 
The approach of the tribunals in the aforementioned cases showed that as far as those 
tribunals are concerned, the intent or the purpose of a governmental measure is less 
important than the impact of the measure in determining whether or not a host state is 
obliged to pay compensation since the impact on foreign investors has taken place and 
the host state has the responsibility for such an impact by implementing the measure 
regardless of the objective of the policy.  
Contrary to an effects-based approach, an analysis on the objective of the policy or 
measure introduced by a government often takes place. In such cases, tribunals 
examine whether the measure is purely driven by public interests or has the 
characteristic of protectionism by treating domestic investors more favourably than 
foreign ones. The concurring opinion of the S.D Myers v. Canada case also pointed 
out that the measure, i.e. the ban on PCB exports, was motivated by protectionism, and 
could not be justified. The determination of whether there is a denial of national 
treatment to investors or investments ‘in like circumstances’ under Article 1102 of 
NAFTA may require an examination of whether a government treated non-nationals 
                                                     
70 Ibid para 103. 
71 Phelps Dodge International Corp. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 6 Iran-US C.T.R. Case No. 99, 
1986, para 22, p. 130.  
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differently for a legitimate policy objective that could not reasonably be accomplished 
by other means that are less restrictive to open trade.72 
Regarding the scope of exceptions, tribunals have reiterated the necessity of a 
restrictive approach. Although it is comprehensive that exceptions in the agreement 
should be read narrowly in order to deter any abusive invocation of the exceptions, the 
Decision on Preliminary Question in the Canfor Corporation v. United States of 
America and Terminal Forest Products Ltd. v. United States of America case under 
NAFTA confirmed this restrictive interpretation, stating that: 
The present Tribunal subscribes to the view expressed by the GATT 
Panel in Canada - Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt: “The 
Panel […] noted, as had previous panels, that exceptions were to be 
interpreted narrowly and considered that this argued against flexible 
interpretation of Article XI:2(c)(i).”73 
Despite the divergences among tribunals in terms of approaches regarding whether to 
focus on the effect/impact of state measures or on the objective/purpose, tribunals have 
shown an increasing tendency of recourse to the approach that unless a state measure 
for the purpose of a public interest, in effect, leads to the cessation of the ownership of 
the investment or the complete loss of the value of the investment, it is less likely for 
the measure to amount to an expropriation, except in extreme situations.74 
In addition to adopting a restrictive approach to exceptions, tribunals tend to rely on 
the title and the preamble of BIT in order to interpret clauses in a BIT which do not 
provide specific conditions for invocation or which have room for more judicial 
interpretation.75  In Siemens v Argentina, the tribunal underscored that the treaty is “to 
protect and to promote” foreign investment and noted that the intention of the parties 
                                                     
72 Separate Concurring Opinion by Dr. Bryan Schwartz of S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, 
UNCITRAL, November 13, 2000, para 129.  
73 Decision on Preliminary Question on Canfor Corporation v. United States of America and Terminal 
Forest Products Ltd. v. United States of America, June 6, 2006, para 187.  
74 Y. Radi, ‘International Investment Law and Development: A History of Two Concepts’, in R. 
Hofmann, S. Schill and C. Tams (eds.), International Investment Law and Development: Bridging the 
Gap, Edward Elgar, 2015, p. 79.  
75 In particular, FET can be an exemplar of the clauses in that FET has a comprehensive scope by 
requiring a host state to have “an attitude to governance based on an unbiased set of rules that should 
be applied with a view to doing justice to all interested parties that maybe affected by a State’s 
decision in question, […]”, see UNCTAD, 2012, supra note 12, p. 7.  
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was to create favourable conditions conducive to investment.76 The same approach 
was adopted in SGS S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines where the tribunal held that 
“[i]t is legitimate to resolve uncertainties in its interpretation so as to favour the 
protection of covered investment” since the treaty was concluded in order to contribute 
to creating favourable conditions for investors and investments by interpreting in 
favour of foreign investors.77 
Other tribunals, such as the Saluka v. Czech Republic tribunal, have observed that the 
purpose of investment treaties is to encourage foreign investment and to develop “the 
parties’ economic relations.”78 In this way, tribunals have adopted a more balanced 
approach rather than only focusing on the protection of the rights of foreign investors: 
“[a]n interpretation which exaggerates the protection to be accorded to foreign 
investments may serve to dissuade host states from admitting foreign investments and 
so undermine the overall aim of extending and intensifying the parties’ mutual 
economic relations.”79 Similarly, the Plama v. Bulgaria tribunal stated that excessive 
emphasis on the aim of a treaty may well spur a teleological interpretation based on 
the preamble, i.e. protecting the rights of foreign investment and promoting foreign 
investment, which can lead to even denying “the relevance of the intentions of the 
parties”, as Sir Ian Sinclair warned. 80 This contrast in the tribunals’ approaches calls 
for a more balanced approach.  
Although the emphasis on either of the approaches in choosing criteria can be 
dependent on the treaty, extreme teleological interpretation based on the preamble or 
the title of BIT can distort the intentions of the parties and disregard the interests of 
host states especially when they have essential public interests, such as health, security 
or public order, to protect. Some tribunals suggested other criteria to determine the 
legitimacy of a measure, such as in Pope & Talbot v. Canada and GAMI v. Mexico. 
The Pope & Talbot tribunal held that a measure would not be a violation of NT if it 
has “a reasonable nexus to rational government policies which (i) do not distinguish 
on their face or de facto, between foreign-owned and domestic companies – in other 
                                                     
76 Siemens Award, supra note 7, para 81. 
77 SGS Award, supra note 7, para 116. 
78 Saluka Award, supra note 7, para. 300. 
79 Ibid.  
80 Plama Award, supra note 7, para 130. 
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words, non-discriminatory –, and (ii) do not otherwise unduly undermine the 
investment liberalising objectives of NAFTA.”81 And the tribunal of GAMI stated that 
“plausibly connected with a legitimate goal of policy […] and […] applied neither in 
a discriminatory manner nor a disguised barrier to equal opportunity” 82  with the 
emphasis of a clear connection between the legitimate policy objective and the policy 
in question. 
3. Need for Flexibility and Security Exceptions 
The above analysis brings the necessity for flexibility in IIAs to the fore. While the 
right of a host state to regulate has existed in IIAs based on the police powers doctrine, 
the use and the scope of the doctrine has been highly limited. This could be due to the 
characteristic of customary international law in that its scope is not conducive to the 
evolution and changes unless any international organisation explicitly delineates the 
scope. While security matters lie within the scope of the police powers doctrine, as the 
doctrine has not efficiently played as a security exception that exempts a host state 
from paying compensation, we need to explore security exceptions in IIAs, distinct 
from the police powers doctrine. For understanding essential security interests in IIAs, 
as discussed in Chapter 2 above, the Argentine cases became a cornerstone. Before the 
Argentine cases, the scope of security exceptions in IIAs remained questionable since, 
traditionally, the concept of national security mainly focused on military security 
between countries – that is, dealing with international military issues.  
To provide grounds for an exceptional measure against an imminent and serious threat, 
necessity under customary international law has common features with security 
exceptions in IIL. The ILC interpreted necessity in Article 25 of Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and acknowledged that 
necessity would embrace various interests more than military interests.83 However, in 
the realm of IIL, before the Argentine cases, there was no ruling or interpretation on 
the scope of essential security interests. Therefore, the Argentine cases were the first 
to acknowledge the weight of other aspects of security interests apart from military 
security interests in line with the ILC’s approach to necessity. Despite the recognition 
                                                     
81 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, April 10, 2001, para 78. 
82 GAMI Investments, Inc. v. The Government of the United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, November 
15, 2004, para 114. 
83 See further Chapter 2.2.4. The Tribunal Awards. 
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of various types of security, the tribunals of the Argentine cases did not provide the 
types of measures that could be legitimised on the grounds of security.  
The legitimate scope and types of measures for essential security interests could vary 
depending on the types of (i) investors, (ii) investments and (iii) the host state’s 
situation. Some measures could be preventive (ex-ante), and others could be aimed at 
addressing a threat or a crisis (ex-post). In the first case, a host state can implement 
different regulations applied to a different type of investor, whether a GCI or a 
corporate investor. The justification of the different treatment would be based on the 
concern that a GCI could use its economic influence in the host state as political 
leverage. In the second case, regulations could differ between Greenfield investment 
(new establishment of investment) and a merger/acquisition. The government of host 
state, in general, would not intervene in Greenfield investment unless the law explicitly 
restricts a particular industry. But regarding a foreign takeover of, inter alia, a strategic 
industry or a critical infrastructure,84 even countries with a free-market system tend to 
adopt a more restrictive approach.85 Measures based on such an approach can be a 
government’s intervention in the takeovers of specific industries, including critical 
infrastructure or national champion industries or implementation of further restrictions 
for the protection of public interests. However, these measures can often be claimed, 
by an investor, to be expropriation if they affect the investor’s interests adversely or 
the violation of NT.  
The last case is regarding the host state’s situation such as societal distress, a military 
attack and an economic crisis. For example, during a financial crisis, a government 
might decide to limit the transfer of funds/capital because, without particular measures, 
the situation can bring about unrecoverable repercussions. Therefore, socio-economic 
and political issues drive the necessity for a government to adopt a new measure so as 
to maintain the society and pursue sustainable development based on stable 
infrastructures and socio-economic system. 
                                                     
84 This encompasses industries like transport, telecommunications, water and electricity supplies and 
health. 
85 This is further illustrated in the US’s intervention in Dubai Ports World’s take-over bid over 
American ports.  
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The effective ways to implement IIAs have been widely examined with the 
consideration of flexibility since too strict, inflexible and unchangeable terms of 
agreements do not lead to achieving the mutual benefits of both parties.86 This is 
because enforcing the initially agreed terms without certain flexibility during a crisis 
including economic and financial exigencies can easily encourage the host state to 
violate its commitments, which automatically impairs the interests of foreign 
investors. By concluding and ratifying an IIA, on the one hand, a host state expects an 
increasing or continuous influx of foreign direct investment. On the other, the state 
faces a decreased regulatory space given its commitments under an IIA. Excessive 
constraints on the host state’s sovereignty may backfire in that they may lead the host 
state to nullify the treaty, if it reaches the conclusion that keeping the commitments by 
no means benefits its interests. The tension between abiding by commitments and 
introducing a flexibility mechanism signifies the conflict between the legal and 
political security and stability and preparation for unforeseeable events in the future.  
However, it is not possible to create agreements which take every contingency into 
account. Any attempt to do so will lead to increasing drafting and negotiation costs.87 
Anne van Aaken points out the conflicting interests: between (i) encouraging parties 
concerned to respect contractual commitments with the goal of ensuring mutual 
benefits and (ii) expecting contractual terms still valuable even in case of and after 
uncertainties.88 Drafting a contract/agreement with ‘hard’ language – which has little 
room for further interpretation – can increase certainties for both parties. Yet, 
considering risks and uncertainties in the future, such languages rather are not 
preferable by both parties. To achieve mutual benefits, Aaken argues that tribunals 
should aim to strike the optimal balance between ushering international commitments 
and securing flexibility. Yet, concurrently, tribunals should be deterred from 
interpreting contractual terms too broadly to avoid putting the system per se at stake.89  
                                                     
86 F. Ortino, ‘Substantive Provisions in IIAs and Future Treaty-Making: Addressing Three 
Challenges’, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, June 2015; see also, van 
Aaken, 2009, supra note 19.  
87 Van Aaken, 2009, supra note 19, p. 516.  
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid p. 508. 
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3.1. The Effectiveness of IIAs and Need for Flexibility 
Considering the necessity of flexibility, exceptions in IIAs can play a pivotal role in 
accommodating flexibility, which can help IIAs attain legitimacy in the long term. 
While increased liberalisation in IIAs has taken place in parallel with opting for the 
negative list approach90 and broader coverage, governments feel the necessity to create 
safeguards for them to secure regulatory space in order to pursue their policy 
objectives for public interests, public order or essential security interests, otherwise 
violating the commitments. On the one hand, the IIL system has worked effectively 
due to direct sanctions, i.e. compensation, and indirect sanctions, such as a negative 
impact on the reputation of a host state, which can play a more effective role in 
influencing a host state’s action.91 This is because a host state is wary of gaining a 
reputation for breaching international obligations. 92  On the other, when foreign 
investors expect increased predictability in the host state’s legal framework and 
governance for foreign investment, the predictability should not refer to the status of 
freezing the whole legal framework, thereby causing no changes. Rather, it should 
indicate no instability in the direction of governments’ policy objectives. This is 
because a host state should be entitled to introduce new rules to address social needs. 
When a state decides to conclude an international agreement, it gives up certain policy 
space, and it may also be required to make amendments to domestic policies and make 
significant commitments, as opposed to the socio-economic development goals.  
While a state should make changes in its current policy by entering into an 
international treaty, whether economic or not, thereby having its policy space reduced, 
it still retains its policy objectives for public interest and its economic development. 
Imposing onerous requirements and obligations on host states could dissuade host 
states from generally ratifying an international agreement. For that matter, exceptions 
have played a role in enhancing flexibility in international agreements, given that 
contracting parties need to embrace “flexibility” mechanisms which provide host 
                                                     
90 A negative list in this case connotes that foreign investment is allowed in all sectors unless it is 
explicitly precluded.  
91 A. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, Chapter 3. Reputation. 
92 R. E. Scott and P. B. Stephan, The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory and the Enforcement of 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 68. Scott and Stephan discussed the 
effectiveness of soft law in international law in reference to reputational effects.   
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states with policy space which enables states to reflect on the commitments and the 
agreements. 93  Such policy space is necessary because ambitious international 
agreements tend to require states with onerous modifications, amendments on their 
conduct, or policy directions.94  
The UNCTAD Framework pointed out in ‘Policy Options for International Investment 
Agreements’ that broadening the exception can reduce certainty for foreign investors 
and increase the possibility that such exceptions can be abused.95  However, Pelc 
revealed that there had not been much abuse of escape clauses in the case of the GATT-
WTO.96 This may be due to the existence of the adjudicative body, Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) of the WTO. An analogy can be drawn between the case of WTO and 
that of IIAs, in that a host state will not abuse the clause due to the presence of 
international tribunals such as the ICSID and ad hoc proceedings. As stated above, 
countries are wary of introducing a new rule given that a foreign investor can claim 
that the rule is indirect expropriation and this can result in a substantial financial risk 
for the government in case a tribunal finds in favour of the foreign investor. 
Besides, Helfer argues that where tribunals interpret the rights of foreign investors in 
IIAs broadly by referring to the preamble which often provides the objectives of IIAs, 
i.e. the protection of foreign investors and foreign investment, this leads to 
“overlegalising”.97 And this “overlegalising” can aggravate the asymmetry between 
foreign investors and host state. Helfer also points out that either the case where a 
government is required to make many amendments on its policy or the case where 
tribunals read the agreements expansively, i.e. overlegalising, can rather encourage 
host states to violate their agreement, because the cost for observance becomes too 
                                                     
93 See further L. R. Helfer, ‘Exiting Treaties’, Virginia Law Review, vol. 91, no. 7, 2005, p. 1586. 
94 K. Raustiala, ‘Form and Substance in International Agreements’, American Journal of International 
Law, vol. 99, no. 3, 2005, pp. 613-614. 
95 UNCTAD, ‘Policy Options International Investment Agreements’, Part A. Post-establishment, 5. 
Public Policy Exceptions, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ipfsd/policy-options-iia (accessed 
June 4, 2018).  
96 K. J. Pelc, ‘Seeking Escape: The Use of Escape Clauses in International Trade Agreements’, 
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 53, 2009, p. 353.  
97 L. R. Helfer, ‘Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash against Human Rights Regimes’, Columbia Law Review, vol. 
102, no. 7, 2002, p. 1834. 
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burdensome considering the benefits they can get.98 Although one measure taken by a 
state may be recognised as direct or indirect expropriation, the amount of 
compensation payable is another issue which needs to be agreed on by both parties, 
i.e. a host state and a foreign investor. Tribunals will retain the authority to interpret 
clauses – rights and obligations, widely or narrowly. The controversy as to whether 
IIAs provide sufficiently open regulatory space to host states is still ongoing and sparks 
more discussion about possible means in order to strike a balance. Therefore, it is 
imperative to devise a means to increase the flexibility in regulatory space to some 
extent for host states for justifiable policy objectives, including public order, public 
interest and national security. 
Some commentators claim that tribunals in the IIL system tend to be open to legitimate 
policy objectives whereas general exceptions provided in GATT Article XX are a 
closed list.99 And an illustrative list of exceptions enables tribunals to interpret the 
provision broadly in terms of legitimate government policy. It is argued that a general 
language allows tribunals to take a balanced approach between the interests of 
investors and policy-space of host states for legitimate policy, which is broader than 
general exceptions.100 On the contrary, Andrew Newcombe questions the applicability 
of general exceptions into IIAs during the eighth Annual WTO conference. He notes 
that even if states have added general exceptions with the aim of securing flexibility 
in their regulatory power for public interests, it still remains questionable how tribunals 
will interpret such exceptions.101 Newcombe states that since the appearance of general 
exceptions in IIAs is quite rare, it may increase regulatory space for host state if parties 
propose an expressive intention with an effet utile approach by tribunals.102 He also 
explains the possibility that the inclusion of general exceptions in IIAs can lead to 
rather less regulatory flexibility with the example of the Model International 
Investment Agreement for Sustainable Development drafted by the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), by noting that the IISD intentionally did 
                                                     
98 L. R. Helfer, ‘Flexibility in International Agreements’ in J. L. Dunoff and M. A. Pollack (eds.), 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 176. 
99 N. DiMascio and J. Pauwelyn, ‘Non-discrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart 
or Two Sides of the Same Coin’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 102, no. 1, 2008, p. 77.  
100 Ibid. 
101 A. Newcombe, ‘General Exceptions in International Investment Agreements’, Draft Discussion 
Paper, Prepared for BIICL Eighth Annual WTO Conference, May 13-14, 2008, London, p. 4.  
102 Ibid p. 8. 
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not include general exceptions given the concern that such exceptions in IIAs could be 
interpreted by the tribunals too narrowly, which can bring about even more limitation 
on regulatory power of host states.103 
The OECD 2004 report also demonstrated that the new trend of BIT had taken a broad 
approach, such as a broadened definition of investment and investors including 
investment controlled by one of contracting parties, i.e. government-controlled 
investment.104 The report shows that while foreign investors desire “transparent and 
predictable rules” which are applicable to their investments, 105  governments 
increasingly resort to various exceptions relating to taxation, essential security, the 
protection of human health, the environment and the preservation of natural resources, 
and measures for the financial sectors.106 To achieve legitimate policy goals, states 
have incorporated more public interest safeguards in IIAs, inter alia, the regulatory 
power of government to pursue objectives regarding the environment, health, safety, 
etc. The preambles of the Japan-Korea BIT107 and the Japan-Vietnam BIT108 underline 
that encouraging investment in exchange for undermining the standard of protection 
in the environment or labour law should be deterred. Notwithstanding, the previous 
section illustrated that a host state could not effectively pursue its policy objective due 
to the burden of the compensation especially and the recourse to the exceptions is less 
likely to be determined as legitimate where the protection of property rights are greatly 
emphasised. Moreover, even if a tribunal recognises that the political, societal and 
economic circumstances were sufficiently serious to permit the host state to take a 
measure to tackle the circumstances, the tribunal could question whether the measures 
taken did not exceed the level of what is conisdered “necessary”. More importantly, 
the meaning of necessary can be controversial. 
Escape clauses can play a role as a certain degree of flexibility in case of unpredictable 
events in international agreements by delaying obligations on agreement temporarily 
                                                     
103 See A. Cosbey, ‘The Road to Hell? Investor Protections in NAFTA’s Chapter 11’, in L. Zarsky 
(ed.), International Investment for Sustainable Development: Balancing Rights and Rewards, London: 
Routledge, 2012. 
104 OECD, 2004, supra note 20, p. 145. 
105 Ibid p. 151. 
106 Ibid p. 176. 
107 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of Japan for the 
Liberalisation, Promotion and Protection of Investment (2002). 
108 Agreement between Japan and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for the Liberalization, Promotion 
and Protection of Investment (2003). 
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in order to recover from a certain shock facing a country. Escape clauses allow a 
government to address emergency situations with the proviso that such a measure 
taken on the grounds of escape clause should be temporary and indiscriminate. The 
escape clauses give a host state a leeway to explore for its benefits in case of exigencies 
and simultaneously broadens the scope of lawful actions. Thus when a state utilises an 
escape clause, it violates the agreement de facto, but complies with it de jure. Hence, 
an escape clause exists on the boundary between soft law and hard law.109 Although 
some authors including Koremenos argues that the inclusion of escape clauses in 
international agreements leads to decreasing obligations in the agreements, 110  an 
international agreement with a high threshold or rigid rules can dissuade states from 
concluding such an agreement, and may well leave a state with nothing, but a choice 
to withdraw from the agreement.  
On the contrary, where an agreement is too lax, a state can be more resilient to crisis, 
but it can easily abuse this flexibility, which may damage the credibility of escape 
clauses as exceptions. Scholars have argued that in order to avoid this dilemma and to 
enhance the efficiency of escape clauses, a country which invokes such clauses should 
pay “some kind of a cost.”111 Such cost can play a preventive role as compensation to 
those who are negatively affected as a result of invoking an escape clause. Thus, a state 
can bargain with other states over the amount of compensation and calculate a cost and 
a benefit to determine whether it needs to invoke a clause or not. Countries have an 
incentive to abuse an escape clause for various reasons such as protectionism; hence, 
some kind of cost is essential as a penalty.112 However, Krzysztof J. Pelc criticises this 
view in that it is somewhat too ideal since it was found that governments tend to avoid 
compensation rather than discuss optimal compensation.113 Pelc believes that lowered 
obligation by invoking an escape clause can be counterbalanced by other obligations 
                                                     
109 K. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, International 
Organization, vol. 54, no. 3, 2000.  
110 B. Koremenos, ‘Bringing More Precision to the Three Dimensions of Legalization’ Paper 
presented at the European University Institute, Fiesole, Italy, 2004.  
111 P. Rosendorff and H. Milner, ‘The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty 
and Escape’, International Organization, vol. 55, no. 4, 2001, p. 831. 
112 K. J. Pelc, Making and Bending International Rules: The Design of Exceptions and Escape Clauses 
in Trade Law, Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 38. 
113 K. J. Pelc, ‘Seeking Escape: The Use of Escape Clauses in International Trade Agreements’, 
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 53, 2009, p. 350.  
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not included in the exception list – he called this as a trade-off.114 Kravis, however, 
notes that, to some extent, an inclusion of escape clause is inevitable in international 
agreements for the sake of further liberalising international market.115  
3.2. Current Problems in Exceptions in IIAs and Security Exceptions 
Escape clauses, discussed above, have the conditions that the measure should be rather 
temporary to curtail continuing the impairment on rights of other parties which are 
negatively affected by the measure. However, the strict conditions and the tribunals’ 
approach driven by the preamble of BITs can prevent host states from derogating from 
its obligation, especially the obligation to compensation in the case of expropriation, 
thus decreasing the efficacy of escape clauses. Moreover, current escape clauses may 
not reflect the changing circumstances and newly created issues in society.  
In the Argentine cases where the Argentine government took an emergency measure 
during the economic crisis, such as CMS, Enron and Sempra, the tribunals interpreted 
essential security interests in line with necessity in customary international law by 
applying the same elements for invoking a necessity claim. In CMS, the tribunal held 
that invoking essential security interests should comply with the conditions for 
invoking necessity under customary international law.116 The Enron tribunal also held 
that the term “essential security interests” is not defined, so the tribunal should refer 
to a state of necessity to interpret, and that essential security interests “becomes 
inseparable from the customary law standard when it comes to the conditions.”117 
Although Article 25 of Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts emphasises that a state may invoke necessity in order “to safeguard an 
essential interest from a grave, imminent peril”,118 it does not provide that legislation 
adopted by a state has to be temporary on the grounds of essential security interests. 
                                                     
114 Ibid p. 351. 
115 I. Kravis, ‘The Trade Agreements Escape Clause’, The American Economic Review, vol. 44, no. 3, 
1954. 
116 CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, September 
2005, para 373. 
117 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
May 22, 2007, para 334. It may be necessary to rethink whether necessity and security exceptions 
have the same thresholds for invoking a plea, and whether while the notion of national security 
evolves, the meaning and the scope of necessity also develop.  
118 Article 25 of International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Articles on State Responsibility, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10 and Corr.1, 2001. 
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Even if a measure is taken on the grounds of security including risk, the essence of the 
clause does not change, that is, ‘exceptions’.  
Although the Argentine cases highlighted the type of measures, aimed at tackling an 
emergency situation, where a broadened security is applied in IIAs, there are two 
potential types of measures which can affect foreign investment on the grounds of 
national security: during normal times and during a crisis or emergency period. 
Although the Argentine cases were close to the latter, a potential measure for a security 
purpose during a normal time can be possible. This is because ‘a risk’ which has not 
been materialised can lead to an unrecoverable repercussion without an adequate 
measure. Therefore, it may not be feasible to provide the benchmark as to whether a 
security issue is a risk which has a highly destructive potential or not. Thus, a country 
continually needs to reflect on its security report to specify what type of threat belongs 
to a category of risk, and what type of threat falls within the group of existential 
threats.119 
While the discussion regarding ex-post measures addresses compensation issues – 
whether a foreign investor is entitled to full compensation for loss caused by a state 
measure, ex-ante measures have different characteristics. A specific distinction should 
be made between normal times and emergency situations. Where a threat has not 
materialised (thus, only where risk exists), a government may not be entitled to take a 
regulatory measure which does not result in the obligation to pay compensation. The 
measures during the stage of pre-investment and during a normal time cannot be 
legitimised on the grounds of necessity since there may not exist an imminent threat. 
Yet, host states have intervened in takeover transactions, evidenced in the Dubai Ports 
World case, and have renewed the list which restricts foreign investment in specific 
industries from particular types of investors.  
The role of risk in the realm of security policy should not be overlooked, but it requires 
higher thresholds since a threat is not materialised. This signifies that the interest which 
might worsen once the risk becomes a real threat should be catastrophic. Regulation 
on public health and the environment can be included in this category. 
                                                     
119 O. Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in R. D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security, Columbia 
University Press, 1995.  
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Notwithstanding, it would not be easy for tribunals to discern whether a measure is 
purely driven by the concern to preserve the environment and protect the public health 
or involves the intention to impinge on foreign investment.  
4. Conclusion 
This chapter explored challenges to accommodating regulatory space of host states and 
examined the asymmetric relationship between host states and foreign investors. The 
chapter briefly discussed the rights of foreign investors in order to demonstrate what 
they are entitled to and what types of treatment a host state should provide to foreign 
investors. Some clauses with regards to the rights of foreign investors in IIAs have 
some room for judicial interpretation since such clauses do not demarcate the scope of 
the clauses such as FET.120 The chapter further examined how tribunals interpret these 
rights, based on whether a sole-effect criterion or other factors are taken into account. 
The ongoing controversy whether a tribunal should adopt a sole effect criterion or take 
into account the purpose of the measure has also increased the uncertainty in 
determining the legality of regulatory actions. Given the increasing emphasis on 
property rights as a constitutional right, a host state has been expected to pay 
compensation to foreign investors, where the latter’s rights are impinged on by a host 
state’s regulation. This may imply that the rights of foreign investors could outweigh 
the purpose of measures.  
In the meantime, it is difficult to estimate whether a measure is tantamount to 
expropriation or falls within the ambit of the police powers. Despite this growing 
concern regarding the obligation to pay compensation – or the right to compensation 
from foreign investors’ perspective – host states have sought to facilitate their 
regulatory space by explicitly specifying an exception that “non-discriminatory 
regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public 
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute 
indirect expropriations” as provided in the US 2012 Model BIT and Canada’s FIPA. 
However, it is not clear how the insertion of such a clause can help host states secure 
their regulatory space and further exempt host states from paying compensation. To 
be a legitimate expropriation, the measure concerned should have public interest 
                                                     
120 See supra note 75; UNCTAD, 2012, supra note 12, p. 7. 
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consideration. However, despite the public interests purpose, a host state cannot avoid 
the obligation to pay compensation. In other words, the police powers of state arising 
out of sovereignty have been diminished by the narrow interpretation of tribunals. 
Where the definition of national security is survival, then the right to regulate 
stemming from sovereignty should be one of the requisites to achieve national security. 
Therefore, an overlap exists between police powers and national security to some 
extent.  
Moreover, it is true that stringent rules without a certain level of flexibility may 
encourage a host state to violate its international commitments rather than adhere to 
them. This is because the costs to comply with the commitments are more than the 
benefits gained out of the commitments. Accordingly, this underlines the importance 
of flexibility, i.e. the role of escape clauses, for the legitimacy of international 
agreements. Therefore, it is imperative to examine whether such clauses are in effect 
viable and applicable in spite of the high thresholds for invocation and to deliberate 
the ways to make such clauses remain justifiable, where necessary.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Legal Recommendations and Policy Reforms 
1. Introduction 
Host states have endeavoured to secure their policy space against possible limitations 
imposed by the ratification of international agreements. As shown in the previous 
chapter, the police powers doctrine has been used insufficiently, and current escape 
clauses have not played an effective role as derogations. 1  Additionally, foreign 
investors have sought to find effective ways of protecting their assets and their rights 
in host states, which include broader interpretation of host states’ obligations, 
especially the obligation of fair and equitable treatment. 2  Such interpretation can 
connote imposing obligations on host states, which go beyond their expectations and 
what they are pledged to grant.  
For this reason, the broadening of national security can help balance the interests of 
host states and foreign investors by allowing a host state to take measures to address 
various security matters. In addition to striking a balance between the conflicting 
interests, the broadening can contribute to achieving coherence in understandings of 
national security among host states’ policies as well as between host states and foreign 
investors. For instance, while a foreign investor would claim that the scope of security 
should be limited to military security, host states could extend the scope of security 
much broader. Conversely, approaches to security adopted within one country could 
even vary. For example, although one country’s national security strategy report 
covers diverse security issues, its foreign investment policy might only highlight the 
military aspect of security.3 To be more specific, while a security strategy report 
                                                     
1 See Chapter 5, especially on Chapter 5.2.2. Regulatory Space Accommodated by the Right to 
Expropriate and Police Powers.  
2 See further Chapter 5.2.1. The Rights of Foreign Investors and footnote 75 regarding the definition 
of fair and equitable treatment.  
3 And the opposite case is also viable, i.e. foreign investment policies may cover security interests 
beyond military security whilst security reports mainly discuss military security. It is true that 
essential security interests/national security is often intentionally left undefined, given the difficulty of 
defining the notion and delineating its scope; thus such incoherence may not seem clear. 
Notwithstanding, the analysis in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 demonstrates that such complexity exists. 
For example, the recent US strategy reports mainly emphasised military security and military security-
related matters such as space security while they did not provide concrete policy targets or strategies 
regarding other types of security by simply making remark on the role of critical infrastructure (see 
further Chapter 3.2.1. United States). However, as evidenced in Chapter 3. Security in Foreign 
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addresses a variety of security issues, such as economic prosperity and cyber/space 
security, foreign investment policies may discuss more limited scope of security – for 
instance, an investment act can stipulate that foreign investors are not allowed to 
acquire a company or invest in a sector which is closely related to military security. 
Thus, although the differences are more evident between foreign investors and host 
states, certain discrepancies still exist among different policies at the domestic level. 
The divergences in the conceptual understandings lead to a question as to how various 
approaches within one country can be harmonised in order to achieve more coherence 
in the security-related policies. 
The broadening of security may be seen as an attempt to favour a host state’s 
regulatory power over the interests of groups affected by such broadening, that is, 
foreign investors in this case. However, the broadening can be used to bring about the 
mutual benefits of both host states and foreign investors/home states as long as a 
government attempts to mitigate the possibility of discretion and arbitrary decisions 
towards foreign investors. As discussed in Chapter 1, security scholars have 
highlighted the necessity of broadening, but simultaneously they have avoided the 
securitisation of every issue. Instead, the ultimate goal of securitisation is to de-
securitise a securitised issue, thereby bringing this issue within the area of normal 
politics (Chapter 1.2.2). Furthermore, scholars also argued that the scope of national 
security is no longer limited to military security, but it has been recognised that 
different security matters should be included in this scope (Chapter 1.2.2, 1.2.4). 
Therefore, de-securitisation and securitisation are in progress, and the concept and 
scope of national security are evolving. This means, at some point, policy-makers 
might not recognise terrorism as an issue which needs securitising but could address 
it within the political sphere.   
While recognising that the notion of security is subject to evolution, this thesis also 
argues that, depending on the type of foreign investor, i.e. a corporate investor, a GCI, 
and an individual investor, the role, breadth and influence of military security vary. 
Accordingly, when dealing with individual foreign investors, particularly under a 
                                                     
Investment Policy and Government-controlled Investment, the US intervened in a few takeover 
transactions of companies closely related to critical infrastructure on the grounds of national security. 
For example, the US’s inhibition on the acquisition bid for the US energy firm, Unocal, by the 
Chinese national oil company, CNOOC, due to the risk of technology leakage.   
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citizenship-by-investment programme, it is most likely that only military security 
concerns are taken into account. A myriad of security matters, such as societal security, 
economic security and political security, can be allowed for in the policies to cope with 
corporate investors and government-controlled investors. In addition, a host state may 
well impose more stringent rules on GCIs on the grounds of national security. This is 
especially so where a GCI wishes to invest in certain sectors of the economy which 
are closely related to critical infrastructure. This is because it is believed that GCIs are 
more likely to become a threat to military or societal security given the way GCIs are 
governed, i.e. a home state’s government can be involved in decision-making for a 
strategic purpose other than just for profit-maximisation.  
In addition, it is also true that the concept of national security plays a different role in 
each type of investment and investor. In the case of corporate investors, the main issue 
is whether a security measure is an indirect expropriation entailing compensation or a 
legitimate regulatory measure, which does not result in compensatory obligation. In 
the case of GCIs, – although a GCI can also be subject to a regulatory measure, thereby 
being able to file a claim against a host state, unless the BIT between the host state and 
the home state excludes a GCI as an investor – the protection of strategic industries 
and critical infrastructures is highlighted. In most cases, it is accepted for a government 
to intervene in a take-over transaction where the industry in question has a public 
interest.  
The last case, that is, an individual foreign investor under a citizenship-by-investment 
programme, is very distinctive in that the broadening of national security plays a minor 
role. In other words, the broadened concept of security is not so much applicable in 
this context, and the scope of national security is unlikely to cover economic, political 
and societal security. This can be contrasted with the cases of corporate foreign 
investors and GCIs, which demonstrate that national security has been evolving and 
its scope and meaning have been broadened so that different types of issues are 
incorporated as security matters, such as economic security, societal security, political 
security and so forth. Therefore, each type of investor incorporates (retains) a unique 
notion of security, given the fluid nature of the security, whether multifaceted or 
simple. Thus, this chapter seeks to suggest some policy recommendations and 
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directions a host state may adopt for the purpose of relating with different types of 
investors. 
Regarding the relationship between national security and foreign investment, a host 
state faces a number of critical considerations, irrespective of the type of foreign 
investment. Such critical considerations are as follows: 
(i) While a host state wishes to enjoy the benefits flowing from the influx of 
foreign investment, the state also wishes to secure its regulatory space. However, if 
the host state takes a measure on national security grounds (in a broadened sense), this 
can dissuade foreign investors from locating their investment within the host state due 
to the possibility of being subject to such a measure. 
(ii) Given the importance of critical infrastructures, a host state needs investors 
who can keep innovating and maintaining the industry efficiently, but the host state 
concurrently has the concern that transfer of the ownership of such industries can 
decrease its societal security. However, this does not mean that domestic companies 
will guarantee societal security, either. 
(iii) A government implementing a citizenship-by-investment programme needs 
the inflows of cash and investment in the country; but, in exchange, it does not wish 
to compromise its security. 
It is imperative to acknowledge the broadening of security, which encompasses 
military, economic, political and societal security given that it can help a host state to 
secure its policy space regarding security. Conversely, foreign investors should be 
aware of potential security measures in advance. However, it is also noteworthy that 
demarcating the scope of security is as pivotal so that the regulatory space in this 
regard does not expand in the excessive/arbitrary manner, which can help mitigate the 
dilemmas (i-iii) aforementioned.  
Therefore, to deter excessive/arbitrary measures on the grounds of security, this 
chapter contributes to delimit (partitioning) the scope of security, by distinguishing the 
concept of security from other terms and suggesting the way the notion of security 
should be developed. Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 compared the notion of security with 
necessity and public order, both of which are widely examined along with national 
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security/essential security interests, as evidenced in the Argentine cases.4 Notably, 
Chapter 5 shed light onto the conceptual framework of security, distinct from necessity 
insofar as they exist under the different systems, that is, IIL and customary 
international law, respectively. Therefore, this chapter recommends how the definition 
of security should be undertaken, distinct from public order and necessity in concept 
and application to tribunals and contracting parties for IIAs. 
2. General Recommendations for Host States in relation to 
Theories: from Securitisation to Demarcation 
2.1. Recommendations in relation to Securitisation 
In Chapter 1, I argued that most of the Realist security scholars have criticised the 
broadening of national security. In their opinion, the concept of broadening national 
security would give rise to incoherence. In other words, they claimed that the inclusion 
of many sectors, such as economic security and socio-political security, can lead to 
incompatibility between security issues, i.e. which security should be prioritised if 
there is a conflict.5 Where a policy objective for achieving economic security may 
cause political insecurity, it can be questionable which security issue should take 
precedence. However, by placing emphasis solely on military security, the Realist 
School reinforces the gap between security studies and security demands in reality. 
Moreover, all security issues have multifaceted dimensions; military insecurity can be 
caused by economic tensions; societal insecurity can also stem from long-standing 
local grievances or a failing government which lead to political insecurity. Amid a 
state-centric view to security, the emphasis on societal security, independent of 
national security, can help complement the state-centric understanding of national 
security, as the Copenhagen School argues.6 Thus, national security should encompass 
                                                     
4 See Chapter 2 for the analysis of the Argentine cases. The Argentine government argued that the 
emergency measures taken should be legitimised on the grounds of public order and essential security 
exceptions in the BIT between the US and Argentina, whereby the government could be exempt from 
its obligation to pay compensation to investors affected by the measures. The tribunals drew upon the 
requirements/conditions for invoking necessity under customary international law in order to assess 
the legality of the measures on the grounds of security.  
5 See Chapter 1.2.1. The Realist School; S. Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 2, 1991.  
6 See Chapter 1.2.2. The Copenhagen School and Securitisation to see the argument of the 
Copenhagen School that societal security can play a complemental role to state (national) security.  
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societal security on its term as a constituent of national security. This means that a 
state should be allowed to take a measure against a threat to societal security. 
In this regard, the broadening of national security could enhance a state’s regulatory 
space as the state can take a measure against diverse security threats in addition to a 
traditional threat, i.e. an inter-state military threat. However, despite the increased 
latitude of regulatory measures on the grounds of national security, the legitimacy of 
security measures can be always questioned. Therefore, to gain the legitimacy for 
measures motivated by security interests, host states need to set a specific duration for 
the measures in question. This could be extended further depending on the progress of 
addressing a securitised matter. As pointed out by Ole Wæver, securitised issues need 
to be de-securitised because the aim is not to securitise a politicised matter, but to de-
securitise a securitised issue by placing it in a category where policy-makers can 
redress issues within the normal politics (Chapter 1.2.2).  
The emphasis on the broadening of national security in IIL should not be interpreted 
as an attempt to induce an arbitrary measure against foreign investors or to foster a 
burgeoning trend of unfair treatment or indirect expropriation towards foreign 
investors. Nor should the broadening of national security signify an unlimited 
expansion of the concept. Instead, the scope of national security needs to be 
adjusted, and the process of securitisation should be followed by de-
securitisation. If a host state arbitrarily takes advantage of national security, not only 
will the legitimacy of the measure be absent, but also the credit of the country will be 
tainted as a host country, thereby being disadvantaged in the international investment 
market. Where a state accepts the broadening of national security in its regulatory 
framework, it is recommended that this intention be explicit in documenting security-
related policies in order to prevent the scope of security measures from expanding in 
an excessive and arbitrary manner.  
Moreover, host states also have to pay considerable attention to securitisation because 
the securitised issues may not correspond to the initial plan concerning securitisation 
(Chapter 1.2.3). Therefore, with the goal of refraining from undertaking excessive and 
arbitrary securitisation, a government should examine the securitisation process so as 
to ensure the scope of securitised matters remains within the demarcated boundary.  
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Besides, as highlighted by the Copenhagen School and the Paris School,7 regardless 
of the genuineness of a threat, an enunciator, in general, a policy-maker, announces by 
a speech act that a threat is existing so that he/she can take an appropriate measure 
against such a threat. Although securitisation can provide a rationale to justify 
emergency measures on the grounds of security, securitising issues may well lead to 
increasing insecurity among the audience8 in that a government takes abnormal actions 
whereby citizens sense that their security is under a specific threat. As the 
Constructivist School argued, if knowledge, in this case, security is created for 
someone and for some purpose,9 the intention and the aim of implementing security 
measures per se should be questioned. Therefore, a tribunal should take a closer look 
at the measures and assess if there is any underlying rationale behind the emergency 
measures because, without a policing institution, wrongful securitisation can be 
undertaken.  
2.2. Recommendations in relation to Investment Risk10 
The notion of risk has been incorporated in security and investment policies, but it can 
also threaten the legitimacy of the broadening. While shedding light on the future 
development of security policies, risk studies examined the idea that the concept of 
risk could be efficient in dealing with future events that can be catastrophic.11 However, 
at the same time, due to ‘potential’ catastrophic effects, the notion of risk can lead to 
increasing the possibility of discretionary decisions in drafting security policies based 
on the risk governance, i.e. which risk is more likely to occur and has potential to 
become more catastrophic once it is realised. The reason why it has significant room 
                                                     
7 Both the Copenhagen School and the Paris School discuss securitisation, but their foci are distinctive 
in that the Copenhagen School highlights the role of enunciators in securitisation and de-securitisation 
as an ultimate goal, while the Paris School takes a closer look at the process of securitisation by 
examining whose interests take precedence over others, and how audiences react to securitisation. See 
further Chapter 1.2.2. The Copenhagen School and Securitisation and Chapter 1.2.3. The Paris 
School. 
8 See Chapter 1.2.3. regarding the Paris School’s argument on in-securitisation. 
9 R. W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 10, no. 2, 1981. See further Chapter 1.2.4. The 
Constructivist School.  
10 This section mainly discusses the implications of risk in the context of corporate foreign investors 
and GCIs. This is because, as will be shown in the following section 4.3, the notion of risk is 
applicable in the context of individual investors under a CIP in a very limited manner compared to the 
other two types of investors. 
11 See Chapter 1.3. Risk on how the notion of risk has been suggested as a more efficient way of 
achieving security by contemplating future events based on scientific knowledge and calculation.  
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for discretion is due to the difficulty to calculate risk and devise an appropriate measure 
to prevent the risk from becoming a real threat, because risk arises from uncertainty, 
and absolute certainty cannot be achieved. Moreover, as Ulrich Beck points out, risks 
emerge, only when they are defined or articulated by institutions which retain the 
authority of disseminating knowledge.12 Therefore, although risk governance is based 
on scientific research and previous experiences, governments announce a priority list 
of security values, based on the way risk is perceived by them and the institutions 
which define as such and introduce measures according to the priority list, which 
denotes serious subjectivity. Thus, it remains questionable how far a host state can 
take a measure on the grounds of risk. 
Furthermore, the notion of “unimaginable implications” justifies exaggerating the 
possibility of risk by policy elites rather than underestimating risks,13 in order to avoid 
the responsibility of undoing. For example, if the risk became a real threat, and no 
actions were taken prior to the occurrence of threat, those policy elite would be accused 
of taking no actions against the risk. In response to the possibility of overestimating 
risks, the primary lesson in the risk analysis should be how to deal with consequences 
of the measures on the grounds of risk, i.e. compensation. A government should 
establish a clear objective for its measures with the aim of mitigating risks so that 
the measures cannot be used as a means to another objective.  
For example, in the case of the US, it is true that risk estimation, risk assessment and 
risk governance have become a pivotal part of policy-making since the 9/11 terror. 
The trend of the US security policies has become more preventative with emphasis on 
risk assessment and anticipatory governance.14 Preventive actions are adopted based 
on a scientific premise15 – for instance, suggested by a research centre – that preventive 
action is required to mitigate or remove a specific risk which can develop into a serious 
                                                     
12 Here, such institutions include the mass media, legal systems and scientific research centres; see 
further, Chapter 1.3. Risk and U. Beck, Risk Society – Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage, 
1992, pp. 22, 23.  
13 H. G. Brauch, ‘Concept of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks’, H.G. Brauch et 
al. (eds.), Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security, Hexagon Series on 
Human and Environmental Security and Peace vol. 5, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2011, p. 
101; see further Chapter 1.3. Risk on how uncertainty plays a role in security and risk policies.   
14 See Chapter 3.2.1. on the development of the US Security Strategy Reports. 
15 Scientific knowledge and research based on past experiences often legitimise such actions due to its 
‘credibility’. 
 206 
 
threat to security. However, the premise can also be prejudiced and misrepresented. 
Because anticipatory governance often involves impinging on interests of some group 
of people, a host state should be able to demonstrate why such governance is 
imperative; for example, without appropriate measures/policies, unrecoverable 
repercussions could occur. Otherwise, the concept of risk can play a detrimental role 
in the context of national security by jeopardising the legitimacy of security measures.  
By the same token, the UK’s security policy also highlighted the importance of a risk-
based approach. 16  Preventive, precautionary and pre-emptive actions may not be 
legitimate on their merits, but by acknowledging the broader scope of national security, 
a host state can be equipped with resilience and preparedness, which can help the host 
state react promptly. On the other hand, military security remains more important than 
other types of security matters, such as energy security. Considering the UK’s strategy 
report, energy security lies at Tier 3 whereas military security and issues related to 
military security are Tier 1 and Tier 2, respectively. This trend shows that while the 
concept of threat broadens in the sense that risks are understood as falling within the 
scope of threats, the scope of security issues in the national security strategy report 
remains narrow to the extent that the report mainly covers issues closely related to 
military security. As aforementioned, this type of development with the emphasis on 
a risk-based approach can increase the possibility of arbitrary measures because a 
visible threat does not exist, which makes it difficult to contrive appropriate policies 
and measures, no more than necessary. Therefore, governments should periodically 
review their risk policies to examine the adequacy of the policies and curb 
excessive measures which go beyond the required level of implementation.  
Although countries have increasingly incorporated the risk-based approach in their 
security policies, the status of risks in IIAs is questionable – unless it by no means 
exists – insofar as no provision in IIAs allows for the possibility that a host state can 
invoke a measure on the grounds of risk. Whilst the definition of essential security 
interests in IIAs was never agreed upon, what is more questionable is whether the risk 
                                                     
16 See Chapter 3.2.2. European Countries, especially on the UK’s national security strategy with the 
tier-based system.  
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could fall within the meaning of ‘the protection of its own essential security interests’ 
in IIAs.  
Depending on whether the risk could be included in this scope or not, there are two 
potential scenarios: 
(i) If the risk could be included in the scope of essential security interests, a 
measure against the risk may be legitimised on the grounds of security, hence 
no obligation for a government to pay compensation.  
(ii) If the risk does not fall within the scope of essential security interests, any 
measures to tackle/address the risk should entail an obligation for a host state 
to pay compensation for loss caused by the measure in question because it 
would be regarded as an indirect expropriation or a violation of fair and 
equitable treatment and so forth. 
However, before determining whether to encompass risk within the scope of essential 
security interests, the definition and scope of essential security interests in the context 
of IIAs should be established. If the definition draws upon necessity under customary 
international law – although this thesis does not support the idea that the interpretation 
of international investment law should not entirely draw upon general international 
legal principles, i.e. necessity – there should be a grave, imminent peril. This denotes 
that provided that risk is not a threat, there would not be a visible imminent peril, which 
disqualifies risk from falling within the scope of essential security interests. On the 
other hand, if the definition is agreed upon by contracting parties and specified in IIAs, 
the potential status of risk would be different. For example, contracting parties can 
state that nothing in the IIA shall be construed to preclude a party from applying 
measures it considers necessary to prevent a potential threat from developing into a 
threat in their preparatory work.  
Regardless of which interpretation contracting parties prefer between whether drawing 
upon or being independent of the principle of necessity, contracting parties should 
endeavour to specify the definition of essential security interests and types of 
threats – i.e. if a visible and imminent threat should take place. However, it is 
likely that contracting parties would agree that the scope of exceptions should not 
arbitrarily expand and that the notion of risk retains the possibility of leading to 
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arbitrary measures. With this idea in mind, where a government implements a measure 
which aims to remove or minimise risk, thereby impinging upon the rights and 
interests of foreign investors, the government is unlikely to be exempt from the 
obligation to compensation for causing indirect expropriation. 17  This implies that 
where foreign investors in a certain sector – closely related to national security with 
high risk – wish to invest in a host state, a host state should be more cautious of 
authorising their investments if the host state considers that it is highly likely that a 
certain sector would be more subject to measures based on risk assessment.  
2.3. The Peculiarity of Security Matters 
While the recommendations as to securitisation and the role of risk can apply to every 
state, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, countries might perceive, in a different manner, 
the pre-requisites of national and international security. Some countries could believe 
that economic aspects of security are relatively immaterial compared to military 
security because they have already achieved a certain level of economic prosperity and 
stability, especially in the case of developed countries. On the contrary, developing 
countries could argue that their economic security should be enhanced for the survival 
of their populations because economic insecurity is likely to cause other types of 
security issues. For example, with low economic stability, countries are more exposed 
to other types of security threats, such as wars and insurgencies.18 This approach may 
legitimise a measure aiming for a certain level of societal stability on the grounds of 
essential security interests in IIAs. Therefore, a host state should endeavour to respond 
to genuine security demands, thereby allowing for the evolution of the concept of 
security in parallel with the development of threats, core values and security demands 
in society. 
Furthermore, the types of measures on security grounds could be distinctive in 
response to security demands in developing countries from security demands in 
developed countries, provided that the Third World’s security interests significantly 
differ from the ones of developed countries. Therefore, to achieve economic security, 
                                                     
17 See Chapter 1.3. Risk for further discussion of governance based on risk.  
18 See further Chapter 1.2.4. The Constructivist School; K. Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, 
Review of International Studies, vol. 17, no. 4, 1991, p. 318. 
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developing countries need to redress widespread economic distress and chronic famine. 
In this case, it is not clear how to delineate the scope and type of legitimate actions on 
the grounds of national security insofar as, when invoking essential security interests, 
the legitimate intention could be questioned. That is, whether to enhance economic 
situation of developing/underdeveloped countries or only to redress a crisis. This is 
because, in most cases, a security measure is recognised as an emergency measure 
against a crisis, which implies that a threat should appear suddenly rather than having 
chronically existed. In response, a government should take an immediate measure to 
tackle it. However, if a developing country announced that it would implement a policy 
to tackle economic distress and chronic famine on the grounds of security, those, who 
argue that a security measure should only apply to an abrupt situation, would denounce 
such a policy and might claim that a security policy should not be utilised to achieve 
other goals such as economic development in the society. However, if a certain level 
of economic development is regarded as a prerequisite to socio-economic security, it 
can be controversial whether a measure with the aim of tackling chronic famine can 
be legitimised on the grounds of security in case it causes a loss for foreign investors. 
Therefore, a government should clearly define the target/aim/purpose of 
measures pursued. Such clarification is due to the possibility that a particular measure 
could be disguised as a security measure to achieve another policy goal, such as trade 
protectionism.19 
When introducing a security measure, a government should explicitly specify ‘for 
whom and for which values’20 the security measure in question is implemented; in 
                                                     
19 For instance, in the early 1980s, the US imposed import restriction against Japanese semiconductor 
goods for the protection of the domestic semiconductor producers on the grounds that the protection 
of the US semiconductor industry was pivotal to national security. However, during this period, the 
Japanese industry gained its international competitiveness over the US producers. It was argued that 
the measures taken were trade protectionism, disguised as a security-related measure. If a critical 
industry, which is closely related to national security, loses its competitiveness not only at the 
international level, but also at the domestic level, a government could face such situation. Therefore, it 
is controversial whether a measure taken with the aim of protecting a domestic critical industry by 
imposing a restriction on a foreign producer/investor can be legitimised. See further M. Okamura, and 
K. Futagami, ‘A National-security Argument for Trade Protection’, Journal of Economics, vol. 68, no. 
1, 1998, p. 39. 
20 D. A. Baldwin, ‘The Concept of Security’, Review of International Studies, vol. 23, 1997, p. 13. As 
argued in Chapter 1, the two specifications, i.e. security for whom and security for which values can 
help governments to set security targets (see further Chapter 1.4.).  
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other words, whether the measure is (i) for an individual, society, or a state and (ii) for 
economic stability considerations, political objectives, or eradication of poverty.  
To identify the beneficiary of security policy, a government should clarify its policy 
objective to the extent that the policies are implemented to secure its populations, for 
example, those who are suffering from chronic famine or violence or those against 
organised crimes. This is one of the ways to demarcate the scope of security and 
security policies in order to deter arbitrary expansion of security on this matter. To 
determine which values a security measure is aimed at protecting, firstly, a government 
should accept that the notion of security is multifaceted. This is because the ultimate 
national security cannot be achieved by focusing on one type of security. It is true that 
where a war was ongoing or was about to break out, the essential security concern 
would lie in national defence from military threats. However, this does not denote that 
the importance of economic security would decrease in parallel with increasing 
significance of military security. This is because national defence could be achieved 
based on economic stability and economic instability would give rise to another 
societal distress which threatens national security.  
3. Recommendations for Law and Policy Reforms on Conceptual 
and Analytical Dimensions 
While the previous section suggests a way in which a government understands the 
notion of security in parallel with the evolution of security – i.e. security has become 
multifaceted – this section argues that security should be disentangled from public 
order and necessity justifications.21 It is true that in reality, there can be an inevitable 
overlap between public order and security interests in the application. First of all, 
necessity is a principle under customary international law. In IIAs, while public order 
and national security/essential security appear explicitly, neither of the clauses makes 
reference to necessity. This means signatory parties did not intend to read such clauses 
by drawing upon the principle of necessity and the conditions for invocation.  
                                                     
21 All of the three justifications – that is, necessity, public order and national security – allow for 
measures which can be legitimate for the purpose of protecting an ‘essential interest from a certain 
threat. 
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As one has argued before, where every issue becomes a security matter, the meaning 
of security will be trivialised.22 Hence, a host state should be vigilant of how an issue 
becomes securitised and deter excessive securitisation in order to retain the legitimacy 
of security. As I have argued in this thesis that clear broadening can achieve mutual 
benefits for both host states and foreign investors, it is imperative to underline what 
can be gained by the broadening of security. While a host state can accommodate its 
policy space in relation to its essential security interests in an explicit manner, it needs 
to refrain from taking an arbitrary security measure. With the aim of preventing this, 
a host state should have a clear understanding of which issue should be incorporated 
within security and what should be excluded in the category. In particular, a host state 
should not be confused between public order and security interests. It is possible that 
those interests could be intertwined – such as the situation where a military coup 
occurs in a country, which endangers democracy, a shared social value that is 
fundamental for public order and, concurrently, gives rise to political and societal 
instability which engages a security concern. However, if a situation solely relates to 
public order, such as social disturbances, a host state should not take a measure against 
it on the grounds of security. For example, if a foreign investor is convicted of money 
laundering, or if a code of conduct of a foreign corporation in the host state is the 
violation of human rights, a host state should regard this issue as public order, separate 
from national security interests. 
International adjudicative bodies have confirmed that governmental measures ought 
to be the least trade restrictive, to minimise the loss.23 But countries as defendants 
might adopt the most effective measures to tackle the emergency. The tribunals 
recognised that necessity should be close to indispensable24 while public order does 
not contain the meaning of imminent urgency in contrast to national security. Although 
the traditional understanding of national security underscores that an imminent threat 
should exist to take a security measure, the emergency of risk in security studies has 
drawn keen attention and played an important role in security policies, as potential 
repercussion where risk becomes realised is too catastrophic.  
                                                     
22 Walt, 1991, supra note 5. 
23 WTO, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, Report of the 
Appellate Body, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, December 11, 2000, para 164.  
24 See further Chapter 2.2.5 Necessity.  
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Traditional understandings of security, consisting of military security or issues only 
related to military security, do not allow a government to protect critical infrastructure 
because of national security. And risk, even military risk cannot be included in the 
scope of traditional national security since there exists no existential threat, but rather 
a potential risk. 
The recourse to necessity, without taking into account the dynamics between the 
customary international legal principle, i.e. necessity, on the one hand, and treaty 
exception, i.e. essential security interests, on the other, can occasion misinterpretation 
of the treaty exception. The broad scope of its operation – meaning, this can be applied 
in international law in general – would logically make the requirements of invocation 
more stringent than a specific area of law such as IIL. Tribunals should also evaluate 
whether the exception is self-judging or not. Therefore, without an express link 
between a treaty provision and a customary international principle, tribunals 
should not apply operative requirements of customary international law in 
interpreting treaty provisions.  
The table below compares necessity, essential security interests in the US-Argentina 
BIT and “necessary” in Article XX and XXI of GATT:25 
 Necessity under 
customary 
international law 
Article XI. Essential 
Security Interests of the 
US-Argentina BIT 
“Necessary” in 
Article XX (a), 
(b), (d) and Article 
XXI (b), (c)of 
GATT 
Self-
judging? 
The ICJ seemed not 
to acknowledge any 
margin of 
appreciation to the 
states in Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros26 
Does not specify, hence 
uncertain. 
“This Treaty shall not 
preclude the application 
by either Party of 
Yes. 
Especially, Article 
XXI(b) states that 
nothing in this 
Agreement shall 
                                                     
25 See further Chapter 2.2.5. Necessity, which discusses “necessary” in Article XX(a), (b), (d) and 
Article XXI(b), (c) of GATT. 
26 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Hungary v. Slovakia, ICJ GL No. 92, 1997. 
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Project and Oil 
Platforms.27 
Also, the ILC 
commentary on 
State Responsibility 
does not specify any 
further explanation 
on whether it is 
self-judging or not. 
measures necessary 
for the maintenance of 
public order, the 
fulfilment of its 
obligations with respect 
to … 
or the protection of its 
own essential security 
interests” (emphasis 
added) 
Therefore, there exists 
some room for a 
tribunal to interpret. 
be construed “to 
prevent any 
contracting party 
from taking any 
action which it 
considers 
necessary for the 
protection of its 
essential security 
interests” 
Sector Having generality 
with wide 
application, which 
resulted in high 
thresholds for 
operative tests. 
International 
investment law 
specific, which 
concerns dynamics 
between a host state 
and a foreign investor. 
International trade 
law specific, 
which governs 
inter-state trade 
issues. 
Connection 
with other 
legal 
principles 
The ILC’s 
commentary did not 
specify any 
reference to other 
provisions in 
defining an 
“essential interest”. 
Does not refer to any 
other legal provisions 
for jurisprudence. 
“…identifies the 
source of 
obligations ‘for 
the maintenance 
of international 
peace and 
security’” in line 
with the UN 
Charter 
                                                     
27 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 2003.  
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Types of 
issues 
subject to 
government 
measures 
The ILC’s 
commentary 
considers a myriad 
of issues such as 
military, economic 
and political issues 
to fall within the 
scope.28 
Rather than static, an 
adjudicator retains 
some discretion to 
interpret the exception. 
The Argentine tribunals 
noted that the exception 
encompasses political, 
economic, societal and 
military concerns. 
Traditional, inter-
state security 
(mostly military 
and defence 
issues) 
Table 4 Necessity vs. Essential Security Interests vs. Necessary 
Jürgen Kurtz argues that international treaties offer their independent exceptions to 
allow for flexibility so that host states can take measures on the grounds of public 
interest. Kurtz sees the reliance on customary principles of necessity where 
interpreting necessity as an attempt to seek a “rejoinder of the criticism that 
international investment treaties are a self-contained regime at international law”29, 
independent of a wider meaning of international legal framework.  
In CMS, the tribunal analysed necessity first, and then considered the treaty provision, 
i.e. essential security interests. The Sempra and Enron tribunals showed a similar 
tendency to the extent that they combined necessity under customary international law 
and essential security interests in the BIT between the US and Argentina. This means 
that the tribunals applied the operative tests for necessity in determining the legality 
of measures on the grounds of essential security interests. As Kurtz notes, this way of 
conflating the customary rules and treaty provisions rendered the treaty exception 
ineffectual due to the highly stringent requirements for invoking necessity. The 
necessity and capability for tribunals to take an interpretative methodology are also 
found in the Nicaragua case30 where the ICJ stated that customary international rules 
                                                     
28 The commentary of Article 33 in the ILC “in a grave danger to the existence of the State itself, to its 
political or economic survival, the maintenance of conditions in which its essential services can 
function, the keeping of its internal peace, the survival of part of its population, the ecological 
preservation of all or some of its territory, and so on.” See further, Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its thirty-second session, vol. 2, Part 2, A/35/10, 1980, p. 35.  
29 J. Kurtz, ‘Adjudging the Exceptional at International Investment Law: Security, Public Order and 
Financial Crisis’, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 59, no. 2, 2010, p. 327. 
30 Nicaragua v. United States of America, Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports, 1986. 
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did not overlap with the treaty provision – in this case, Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations – and remained to exist alongside the treaty provision. Therefore, if 
the tribunals for the Argentine cases had not drawn upon the conditions for necessity 
when determining the legality of Argentine government’s measures on the grounds of 
essential security interests, the independent system for international investment law 
could have been achieved.  
Moreover, the Argentine cases tribunals, apart from the Continental tribunal,31 did not 
explicitly discuss the difference between public order and essential security interests. 
On the contrary, the Continental tribunal held that “[p]ublic order relates to 
fundamental societal value, such as morality, while security interest refers to the 
international security of the State in relation of external threats” by accepting that 
public order can be a synonym for public peace.32 Therefore, the tribunal found that 
actions necessary to maintain/restore peace and the normal life of society and to deter 
disturbances, such as looting and riots for civil peace and the legal order, shall fall 
within the application of public order.33 A similar approach can be found in the public 
order exception of the WTO GATS Agreement. Footnote 5 to Article XIV(a) states 
that “The public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently 
serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society”34 The WTO 
Panel examined the concept of public order in the Internet Gambling case, and 
concluded that the notion of public order “can vary in time and space, depending upon 
a range of factors including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious values.”35 
The Panel accepted that certain discretion of WTO member states in defining public 
order by ruling that “Members should be given some scope to define and apply for 
                                                     
31 The LG&E tribunal also seemed to pay attention to the term “public order” by stating that “All of 
these devastating conditions – economic, political, societal – in the aggregate triggered the protections 
afforded under Article XI of the Treaty to maintain order and control the civil unrest.” LG&E Energy 
Corp, LG&E Capital Corp, LG&E International Inc v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, Oct 3, 2006, paras 231–237. Yet, the tribunal did not interpret 
public order, distinct from security interests unlike the Continental tribunal. 
32 Continental Casualty Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, September 5, 
2008, para 174. 
33 Ibid.  
34 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, in World Trade Organization, The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 325, reprinted in 33 ILM 81, 1994, Art. 
XIV(a). 
35 WTO, United States: Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services – Report of the Panel, WT/DS285/R, Nov 10, 2004, para 6.461. 
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themselves the concepts of public morals and public order in their respective territories, 
according to their own systems and scales of values.”36 By drawing upon a dictionary 
definition, the WTO Panel defined public order as a concept aiming to preserve the 
fundamental interests of a society which involves the maintenance of the rule of law.37 
Adopting this approach, Kurtz suggests that coping with “disruption that threatens the 
normal functioning of a State” can be related to a State’s measure on the ground of 
public order.38 Therefore, more coherent guidelines by tribunals can clarify the 
scope and requirements for invoking public order, distinct from invoking 
security interests. 
4. Institutional Recommendations  
This section makes recommendations on dealing with each type of foreign investor: 
namely, a corporate foreign investor, a government-controlled investor, and an 
individual foreign investor under a citizenship-by-investment programme. 
4.1. Corporate Foreign Investors 
The characteristics of corporate foreign investors are clearly different from those of 
GCIs and individual foreign investors. While GCIs may well have public concerns to 
the extent that their investment mainly focuses on critical infrastructures, such as 
energy sectors and transportation, and is either governed or controlled by a foreign 
government, private corporates are more likely to aim to maximise their profits. 
Therefore, in principle, corporate foreign investors would be subject to less stringent 
rules than GCIs. 
Foreign investments are divided into two groups, Greenfield investment and takeover 
investment by as mergers and acquisitions. In the case of Greenfield investment, 
foreign investment by corporate investors tends to draw less attention since it is not 
expected that a transfer of knowledge, such as know-how, in a company will take 
place, although a host state still can require foreign investors to establish investment 
                                                     
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid para 6.467. And the Panel concluded that organised crime which could potentially stem from 
internet gambling would be against public order whereas the prevention of underage gambling or 
gambling addiction would concern public morals (Ibid para 6.469) – the term, which was defined as 
“standards of right or wrong conduct” by a community. (Ibid para 6.465.) 
38 Kurtz, 2010, supra note 30, p. 361. 
 217 
 
with the proviso of prior authorisation in the case of investing in a certain group of 
critical infrastructure or strategic industries. In the same manner, even in the case of a 
takeover, a government is less likely to intervene in such a transaction unless the 
industry in question has the feature or play a role to serve a public interest and essential 
security interests. Regarding corporate foreign investment, the most eminent role for 
national security is in determining whether a government, which takes measures 
during a crisis or emergency period, can derogate from its obligation to pay 
compensation for the loss occasioned by the measures on the grounds of national 
security or essential security interests on IIAs. As shown in the Argentine cases in 
Chapter 2, measures can range from changes in contract terms to denomination from 
dollars to its own currency – in the case of Argentina, Argentine pesos. Therefore, the 
question is whether loss caused by those measures, as foreign investors argue, should 
entitle a foreign investor to have adequate compensation by invoking indirect 
expropriation and fair and equitable treatment or whether a government can derogate 
from its obligation due to the emergency.  
Regarding this, BIT contracting parties should explicitly introduce the procedural rules 
in the treaty or their model BITs. It should clearly delineate the scope of national 
security and the requirements for invoking national security in order to derogate 
from their international and national commitments. This suggestion can apply to 
foreign GCIs in the sense that GCIs should also take into account the possibility of 
broadening the scope of national security. In other words, a host state may impose 
diverse regulations on GCIs on the grounds of national security.  
As mentioned in Chapter 5, there are two cases where a host state can take a measure 
on the grounds of national security: ex-ante and ex-post. As an example of the latter, 
the government of Argentina took measures such as pesification in response to its 
economic/financial crisis. In other words, the division/distinction between ex-ante and 
ex-post is made based on whether a crisis or a great exigency occurs. As the concept 
of risk has appeared and been discussed in conjunction with security, risk should 
not be overlooked in making legal recommendations. Although, technically 
speaking, there was no case before the ICSID regarding a regulatory measure on the 
grounds of risk, there are many cases where a state has intervened in transactions, in 
particular take-overs, which are mainly found in cases of GCIs, as Chapter 3 discussed. 
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Yet, if some sectors are open to foreign investment, and the only reason why a take-
over transaction is denied or intervened in by a host state is for the potential 
ramifications related to security ensuing from the transaction, this may lead a foreign 
investor to file a claim before tribunals.  
Increasingly, the definition of investors began to encompass a government in IIAs. 
This means that where an IIA does not differentiate treatment between corporate 
investors and GCIs, a tribunal must decide whether a GCI is entitled to the same 
status as a corporate investor. Otherwise, to avoid granting this discretion to 
tribunals, contracting parties should explicitly state whether a GCI would be treated in 
a particular manner, distinct from a corporate investor.  
Especially during a financial crisis, a host state may resort to some measures including 
“limitation of current payments and capital transfers”, “rescue/reorganisation of 
selected national financial institutions”, and “sovereign default and debt restructuring, 
currency redenomination”.39 Such tension between foreign investors and host states 
over a measure on the grounds of public interests has existed and will take place in the 
future due to the compensation issue.40  
Foreign investors should grasp the scope of public interests in order to calculate 
risks before deciding to locate investment. From the perspective of foreign investors, 
where a governmental measure was implemented, they would be willing to claim that 
the measure is an indirect expropriation so that the host state cannot avoid the 
obligation to compensation whereas the host state would wish to claim that the 
measure in question would fall within the ambit of national security interests.  
Therefore, the central issue in relation to national security between corporate foreign 
investors and a host state is whether a measure is tantamount to expropriation. In other 
words, this denotes that when a host state takes a measure – which adversely affects 
foreign investment – with the aim of protecting security interests, the conflict between 
the host state and foreign investors is whether a host state has the obligation to 
                                                     
39 G. Sacerdoti, ‘BIT Protections and Economic Crises: Limits to their Coverage, the Impact of 
Multilateral Financial Regulation and the Defence of Necessity’, ICSID Review, vol. 28, no. 2, 2013.  
40 B. Kingsbury and S. Schill, ‘Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State Actions 
in the Public Interest – the Concept of Proportionality’, in S. Schill (ed.), International Investment 
Law and Comparative Public Law, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 77. 
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compensation or can be exempt from such an obligation on the grounds of essential 
security interests in IIAs.  
From the perspective of host states, it is also imperative to understand the scope of 
discretion which can be legitimised for the protection of essential security 
interests, i. e. a type of measures and a type of industries subject to such measures. 
In other words, this is a question about whether a government retains the authority to 
dictate one industry has national security interests so that the industry is entitled to 
special protection. In the case of Argentina, the industry as such was the transportation 
and the distribution of gas. Without measures in such an industry, such as delaying the 
negotiation to increase tariffs, other industries and society could face more serious 
problems, whereby the crisis in the country as a whole could become worse. Again, 
this begs the question if a government can only take a measure for the industries with 
particular social needs. However, it can also be challenging to establish the meaning 
of industries with particular social needs. This is because some countries have 
champion industries which are distinct from critical infrastructure – for example, some 
countries have fostered a manufacturing industry for economic development; and this 
might not fall within the scope of critical infrastructure. But if the industry in question 
became the essential industry and produced the majority of jobs in the country, it could 
be difficult to simply exclude champion industries from the list of industries with 
particular social needs. 
Moreover, no agreement has been established regarding the characteristic of essential 
security interests. If an essential security interest is an overriding factor,41 a host state 
is less likely to be reluctant to take a measure when the requirements are satisfied. 
Otherwise, even though a host state finds it indispensable to implement a measure 
against a crisis or a situation which needs redressing, the state would have to take a 
                                                     
41 Chapter 5 discussed whether the doctrine of police power could be an overriding factor. While this 
debate has never reached agreement, those who uphold that this doctrine should not be influenced by 
other elements argue that there should exist an overwhelming public interest or the measure in 
question should be indispensable in order to have the measure fall within the scope of police powers. 
See further Chapter 5.2.2. Regulatory Space Accommodated by the Right to Expropriate and Police 
Powers and B. Mostafa, ‘The Sole Effects Doctrine, Police Powers and Indirect Expropriation under 
International Law’, Australian International Law Journal, vol. 15, 2008, pp. 272-273; A. S. Weiner, 
‘Indirect Expropriation: The Need for a Taxonomy of Legitimate Regulatory Purposes’, International 
Law Forum, vol. 5, no. 3, p. 170; M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 4th 
edn., Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 531. 
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variety of factors into account, such as the estimated amount of money the state 
potentially could pay to foreign investors as compensation when the essential security 
interests claim is rejected. Also, contracting parties should also define “essential”42 as 
absolutely necessary; extremely important, fundamental to the nature of something. 
Thus, as argued in Chapter 2,43 contracting parties need to be aware of whether there 
is a clear difference between national security and essential security interests, and then 
adopt a term which represents their intention.  
In the same vein, in drafting IIAs, first of all, a government should establish their 
preference on specific issues, such as whether the article of essential security 
interests or national security should be self-judging and whether they wish to 
define “essential”, as discussed in Chapter 2. In the case of the US 2012 Model BIT, 
Article 18: Essential Security is a self-judging clause, stating that “... measures it 
considers necessary”, whereas Article XI of the BIT between the US and Argentina 
may not be self-judging, “the application by either Party of measures necessary for 
the...” Where not self-judging, a host state government should bear in mind that the 
decision on what constitutes a measure as necessary can be made by others to gain 
legitimacy. The issue arose because the clause of Essential Security Interests in the 
BIT between the US and Argentina was not self-judging, which accords significant 
discretion to adjudicative bodies so that they could decide whether the situation 
required measures. Besides, even if the clause was self-judging, tribunals, depending 
on the severity of the situation, could question legitimacy. Thus, they could hold that 
the circumstance did not involve any security matters or the measures taken gave rise 
to damages more than necessary. This implies that a self-judging clause creates room 
for tribunals’ discretion, which could be against the intention of contracting parties. 
                                                     
42 If a state retains its regulatory space to define what is essential, even if essential security interests is 
not a clear self-judging clause, the clause can have the effect of self-judging to some extent. 
43 Chapter 2 argued that considering the terms “essential security interests” and “national security” do 
not coexist in one sentence, they share the same scope of situations. Provided that national security 
has been replaced by essential security interests, contracting parties have been increasingly inclined to 
adopt the term “essential security interests”. In Chapter 2, I also argued that adding “essential” to 
security can be also construed as an attempt to gain additional shields – this can be understood as a 
result of speech act. Accordingly, as a state declares that a measure is absolutely necessary for 
essential security interests, others cannot challenge the legitimacy of measures. Removing “national” 
from national security can be regarded as eliminating the clear demarcation between national security 
and international security. See further Chapter 2.2.3.; and UNCTAD, ‘The Protection of National 
Security in IIAs’, UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development, New York 
and Geneva, UN, 2009, (UNCTADDIAE/IA/2008/5). 
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Therefore, to avoid the confusion on the feature of essential security interests in IIAs, 
contracting parties should explicitly state the intended effect of security interests 
in preparatory works during the negotiation. They should also endeavour to 
establish the requirements for invoking essential security interests.44 
4.2. GCIs 
It can be sensitive to strike a fair balance between facilitating national security and 
guaranteeing the protection of foreign investment by, inter alia, GCIs. This is because 
restrictions imposed on GCIs can be more stringent than other corporate foreign 
investors given the concern that political reasons mostly motivate decisions of GCIs. 
Whereas national security mostly plays a role as ex-post – that is, once an economic 
or financial crisis takes place – with respect to corporate foreign investment, GCIs are 
more likely to be under scrutiny ex-ante, that is, before the realisation of risk or 
potential threat. In other words, a host state takes action or intervenes in the process of 
takeover of the domestic industry. Although scrutiny of GCIs is mainly ex-ante, it 
remains possible that a new discovery in affiliation between a GCI and the government 
which controls the investment in decision-making – the decision is made based on 
other reasons rather than profit maximisation – can become a ground for a government 
to intervene in the investment market. It is necessary to emphasise host states’ 
interpretation of strategic industries and critical infrastructure. Despite the similarity 
in countries’ definition of critical infrastructure, countries have different levels of 
openness, which is evidenced by the Dubai Ports World cases. And the openness can 
vary, depending not only on the countries but also on the types of industries. 
To minimise a host state’s intervention in any types of transactions taken by a GCI, 
GCIs should always have the burden to prove that there is no political motivation in 
making decisions. 
Regarding dealing with GCIs, four types of countries are considered below:  
                                                     
44 This can also help achieve the demarcation between necessity and security interests in IIAs as the 
essential security interests clause in IIAs has never referred to necessity to draw upon the 
requirements for necessity. Hence, they should be interpreted, as two separate concepts. 
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(i) a country which does not specify any restriction subject to GCIs;  
(ii) a country which imposes a specific restriction on GCIs in particular sectors;  
(iii) a country which restricts all GCIs (complete prohibition, unless 
authorisation is granted, for instance, Iceland); and  
(iv) countries which require GCIs reviews. Mostly, in the (ii) case, the 
particular sectors where GCIs cannot invest are critical infrastructures –
communications, transports, energy sectors.  
The rationale for applying a different treatment to GCIs stems from their potentials to 
cause market-distorting impacts. This is because their finance can derive from diverse 
sources, not just profits, and to be operated based on a political decision, which can 
impair public interests. However, as examined in Chapter 3, it is not predictable for a 
government to decide whether a foreign company has any other intention than the 
pursuit of company’s profits and to determine if the home state of the investor can 
influence a foreign investor. Compared to a private foreign investor, the proximity 
between GCIs and a home state government is inevitably close. Therefore, as 
illustrated in the example of Gazprom, – a Russian Energy Company stopped the 
supply of gas to Ukraine for a political purpose – the operation of industries where a 
foreign investor invested can be negatively affected by a political and diplomatic 
tension between the home state and the host state. 
While it is imperative to contemplate the potential effects of GCIs, as the UK is 
apparently aware, in decision-making for foreign investment policy, taking into 
account a public interest or national security concerns can easily taint transparency and 
predictability, which leaves some possibility of arbitrary decisions. The question is 
how a government can prevent this so that the justifications of security and public 
interest can continue. 
Most governments have stipulated laws to restrict foreign takeovers of particular 
industries, and such industries are mainly related to national defences, such as 
cryptosystems. However, as Germany amended its legislation, the government can 
restrict foreign acquisitions (from outside the EU and the EFTA) if the acquisition is 
considered to jeopardise public order or security or to pose a threat, which is not 
limited to cryptosystems. This shows that the type of industry, a take-over of which 
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could potentially jeopardise public security/order and public interests of the society, 
can extend beyond national defences.  
Whereas Germany places EU/EFTA member states in the same category as German 
citizens, France diversifies the categories in more detail: non-EU investor, EU investor, 
and French investor, who are all subject to different rules. This shows that from each 
country’s perspective, the level of risk is different. It is more effective to diversify the 
type of investors and different rules which each type of investors are subject to, to 
establish a precise policy goal and prevent foreign investors from being subject to 
arbitrary treatment. One may argue for more consistency in the standards. If 
consistency existed, the possibility of arbitrary measures could also decrease in that 
everyone is subject to the same legislation. Furthermore, a principal rationale for such 
different rules is based on the belief that a foreign investor could use its ownership 
against national interests due to the possibility that a foreign investor could be 
connected to a foreign government. Notwithstanding the above, it is not clear whether 
a domestic corporate will have less risk than a foreign corporation in this regard 
because all the corporates have the same goal, i.e. profit-maximisation. In this manner, 
differentiating between a domestic private company and a foreign private corporation 
may not seem visible. Proponents for restricting a foreign investor from investing in a 
sector would argue that domestic investors would pose fewer risks in that they could 
not file a claim before any international tribunal whereas foreign investors may well 
bring a case to claim for compensation if their investments were negatively affected 
by host state’s policies.  
Without express provisions such as periodic security checks, the sole concept of 
national security, by making use of a national security review, magnifies the latitude 
of discretion given to the authority. And this is evidenced in the case of Canada where 
SOEs are subject to more stringent rules while the Minister retains the authority to 
embark on a national security review.  
In the regulations which GCIs are subject to with regards to, inter alia, critical 
infrastructure, security has two main features in the foreign investment policy: one for 
the traditional security concept, such as cryptosystems, military security and the other 
for the newly incorporated security interests, energy security and societal security. 
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4.3. Individual Investor under a CIP 
The scope and types of national security issues are distinctive for individual foreign 
investors since individual investors are less likely to retain sufficient potential risk to 
a host state’s economy. Instead, an individual, who is naturalised under a citizenship-
by-investment scheme, can be subject to a higher level of vigilance from the host state 
given the suspicion that the individual having plural citizenship could represent a risk 
to the host state’s national security. 
This type of investors are subjected to two stages of security procedures: before and 
after naturalisation. First, in the application process, individual investors can be 
rejected on the ground of national security, due to either restricted nationality or 
criminal records. After being granted citizenship, naturalised individuals are still 
subject to revocation by periodic checks or international or bilateral sanctions on the 
country of origin of the investors. For instance, such citizenship can be susceptible to 
changes in diplomacy, international order and the relationship between the host state 
and the country of origin. Ex-ante, more discretion and arbitrary decisions can play a 
role for national security reasons while, ex-post, a host state should have a clear and 
legitimate reason to revoke citizenship. 
It is crucial to delineate the scope of national security in the application and revocation 
processes of citizenship in citizenship-by-investment programmes. It is also important 
to understand potential security problems which can arise from the programmes. 
Among the grounds for revocation, certain types of crimes, especially financial crimes, 
such as money laundering, may lead a naturalised citizen to lose his/her citizenship. 
Yet, this type of crimes should be regarded as separate from the withdrawal of 
citizenship on the grounds of national security unless money laundering is used 
to finance international terrorism. This is because a private financial crime may 
not be directly related to national security matters and does not affect the survival 
of the population in the country.45 In this sense, money laundering can fall within 
the scope of public order rather than national security in that public order refers to 
shared norms and social values which are fundamental for the legal order, indicating 
                                                     
45 Also, many citizenship-by-investment programmes stipulate the criteria of money-laundering 
crimes and national security separately in the provisions for ineligibility/eligibility and revocation. 
This means host states do not recognise them in the same category.  
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“normal and peaceful situations in the public sphere, patterns of values that are 
important in a community of citizens.”46 
The role of national security in this context is quite limited compared to the one in the 
case of corporate foreign investors and GCIs. As Chetcuti Cauchi Advocates have 
pinpointed, the revocation of citizenship based on national security47  is based on 
military and diplomatic security, such as treason and involvement in transactions with 
national enemies or with terrorist groups. 
The term “national security” often appears in the programmes. But it is also the case 
that the host states have failed to provide a precise definition of national security. 
Therefore, it is recommended that clear guidelines be established in this area. With the 
goal of preventing any security risks, periodic checks may be necessary, and this 
should be explicitly stated so that an applicant is well informed of what type of checks 
they will be subject to once naturalised. Although naturalised citizens would be treated 
similarly as a citizen by birth, this is not practically possible, given that where a 
naturalised citizen committed a serious crime, he/she can be deprived of his/her 
citizenship, which does not apply to a citizen by birth. 
The Cyprus programme, “B.3 Terms and Conditions of the Cypriot scheme” stated 
that a naturalised investor is subject to a periodic check to ensure he/she complies with 
all the requirements in relation to a residence and investment. However, unless a 
naturalised investor repudiates his/her citizenship after a certain period, the discretion 
to revoke citizenship is retained by the authority. This raises the possibility of arbitrary 
measures. Thus, schemes should provide sufficient procedural and substantive 
legislation regarding how and why citizenship can be revoked under such a 
scheme, thereby minimising arbitrary decision-making.  
Mostly, the countries implementing the citizenship-by-investment programme do so 
because of lack of domestic and foreign capital. From their perspective, an immediate 
                                                     
46 R. de Lange, ‘The European Public Order, Constitutional Principles and Fundamental 
Rights’, Erasmus Law Review, vol. 1, 2007. 
47 The grounds for revocation which are not directly related to national security includes (i) the failure 
to fulfil the requirement to purchase or lease a residency (property) or to retain investments and (ii) 
the involvement in a certain activity “which is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests to the host 
state.” See further Article 10. Deprivation of Citizenship on the Maltese Citizenship Act (CAP. 188), 
Individual Investor Programme of the Republic of Malta Regulations (L.N. 47 of 2014). 
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and a specific economic benefit outweighs security concerns, of which the host states 
should be aware. Thus, a host state trades security with the opportunity to receive an 
influx of cash and financial capital necessary for economic development and 
diversification of industries. Therefore, while the economic benefits of such 
programmes are high, it is not reasonable to deny any potential security issues which 
could arise out of the programmes. Hence, a host state should calculate the 
economic benefits and potential risks to public policy, public order and national 
security; then they need to revise the scheme or abolish it. 
The denunciation of the Irish scheme points out that a citizenship-by-investment 
programme should be equipped with enforcing stringent rules and transparency in the 
application process. Besides, with the goal of deterring corruption, host states should 
publish regular reports on whether the funds are spent as envisaged for economic and 
social benefits of the country.  
Moreover, citizenship-by-investment programmes are criticised for lax controls, such 
as allowing a citizen from certain countries to avoid international economic sanctions 
and an individual to commit illicit financial activities. Therefore, host states should 
ensure thorough background check during the application process and monitor the 
financial transactions of naturalised citizens.  
4.4. The Comparison among the Types of Investors 
The analysis regarding the effect of the broadened concept of security on the different 
types of investors necessitates the conclusion that the notion of security is somewhat 
fluid. It can be simplified, but it is often multifaceted and complex. Certain types of 
security can be thick or thin, depending on the type of investor. The table below 
illustrates how active each type of security may become, depending on the type of 
investor. Regarding corporate investors, each type of security equally takes part, as 
evidenced in the Argentine cases where the tribunals found economic security/societal 
security as equally crucial to military and political security. On the contrary, in the 
context of GCIs, although the significance of economic and political security would 
be maintained at the same level to the case of corporate investors, the implications of 
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military and societal security become augmented.48  Many GCIs tend to invest in 
critical infrastructures which serve public interests in society and can directly influence 
national defences, such as energy supplies and transportations. This presents the 
concern whether investments by GCIs could be operated not for the purpose of profit-
maximisation, but for inter-political purpose. Thus, a host state could become more 
sensitive to GCIs in order to protect military and societal security, thereby imposing 
more stringent rules and requirements on GCIs. While the notion of security is 
multifaceted in the case of corporate investors and GCIs, it becomes simplified in the 
context of individual investors under a CIP. This is because, as aforementioned, the 
scale of investment is rather trivial to affect national economy or society and the 
revocation of citizenship on the grounds of national security focuses on military and 
diplomatic security, such as treason and link with terrorist groups. 
Corporate Investor Government-controlled Investor Individual Investor 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5 The gravity of types of security by investor 
Therefore, as the notion of security becomes contextual and flexible, depending on the 
type of investors, security should not be understood as a stagnating concept.  
                                                     
48 Here, I make a separation between military and political security in the sense that political security 
would denote domestic political affairs whereas military security encompasses the international 
political/military concerns. This is because international tensions could often increase the level of 
national defence and implementing economic sanctions. For example, during the military tension 
between Russia and Ukraine, Gazprom, a Russian Energy Company, stopped supplying gas to 
Ukraine for political purpose. Therefore, although it has the economic, and societal aspects of 
security, this case could be more closely related to military security. (However, it is true that clear 
separation/distinction in this context is often improbable because security matters are likely 
multifaceted.) 
Military 
 
Military 
 
Societal 
Economic Political 
Societal 
Economic Political 
Military 
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5. Concluding Reflections 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the concept of national security varies because 
each country has different political and economic environments, and thus unique 
security concerns. In the past, as security matters were deemed inter-national, rather 
than intra-national, the sole emphasis on military security failed to take into account 
peculiar security demands and the evolution of security. While various security 
strategy reports began to deal with the broadened concept of security, the status of 
security – essential security interests – in IIAs was not clearly defined. Therefore, the 
recognition of economic crisis as a security matter in IIAs, by the Argentine cases 
tribunals, played the role of bridging the gap between IIAs and national policies in 
terms of national security/essential security interests. 
As aforementioned, I argue that broadening of security has taken place in the context 
of international investment and is necessary to serve security demands. Yet, host states 
should refrain from expanding the scope of security in the arbitrary/unlimited manner 
and encompassing other public interests claims, such as necessity and public order, 
within the scope of national security. It is true that differentiating those terms can be 
challenging insofar as the terms necessity, public order and national security share 
common features. However, they also have their distinct features.49  
As the figure below shows, there are overlaps between necessity and security and 
between security and public order; and often clear distinctions could be difficult to 
make. This could be as a result of the broadening of security which extends beyond 
military security (national defence) or the fact that only a few tribunals have made a 
clear distinction between public order and essential security interests in IIAs. If 
tribunals clearly distinguish between public order and security interests, host states 
could be dissuaded from undertaking excessive securitisation, by demarcating the 
scope of security interests.  
                                                     
49 All of the claims require a situation where there should be certain urgency to invoke an exception, 
but the area for applying each claim could be different: necessity in international customary law (wide 
scope); public order and essential security interests in international economic law, such as 
international trade law and investment law. 
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While this thesis argues that recognising the evolution of security – broadening and 
deepening50 – is imperative to reflect evolving security demands, it highlights the 
necessity of demarcating the scope of security so as to prevent the concept of security 
from expanding in an unlimited and arbitrary manner. This is because, from the 
perspective of foreign investors, the evolution of national security would be 
understood as part of investment risk, and categorised as a foreseeable risk. As 
tribunals have recognised, if a host state explicitly confirms that certain types of issues 
can be subject to securitisation including societal, political, economic, military, more 
specifically energy security, foreign investors calculate risks for their investment in 
host states and achieve more accurate risk estimation. In other words, clearly 
broadening the scope of national security can prevent arbitrary measures of a host state 
from the perspective of foreign investors. Therefore, by delineating the scope of 
security, foreign investors and host states can estimate the latitude of regulatory space 
on the grounds of national security/essential security interests, thereby diminishing 
unexpected risks.  
In addition to the clear understanding of closely related concepts, the connotation of 
risk in IIAs should not be neglected in recommendations. As section 2.2 demonstrates, 
the importance of critical infrastructure has increased for maintaining society and 
fostering the further economic development of a country, whereby host states have 
intervened in transactions on the grounds of security and public interests, based on risk 
assessments. Thus, though risk has become an essential part of security discourse, it 
                                                     
50 See Chapter 1.2.2. The Copenhagen School and Securitisation. 
 
Figure 7 The dynamics among the three concepts  
Necessity Security    Public Order 
National 
Defence 
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remains challenging to determine whether measures on the grounds of risk can be 
legitimate within the ambit of security interests in order for a host state to be exempt 
from the obligation to pay compensation. If a host state decides to nationalise or 
expropriate foreign investment due to the mere possibility that the investment in 
question might cause a threat to national security in the future, it is less likely to avoid 
the compensatory obligation. In contrast, if a home state and a host state become 
politically hostile, and the investment is security-related, such as telecommunications 
and transportation, a similar type of measures may trigger such an obligation. However, 
as discussed in the previous chapters, because risk is perceived by countries in a 
different manner, which connotes that measures adopted to tackle the risk should differ, 
it is not easy to reach an agreement regarding whether measures on the grounds of risk 
could be justified within the scope of security. 
Besides, it is also imperative to have a clear understanding of the purpose of IIAs. 
The approach to understanding the aim of IIAs should not be one-sided. It is not 
only to prevent a host state from misusing its sovereignty and impinging on the rights 
of foreign investors but also to recognise a host state’s policy-space by introducing the 
notion of exceptions. To achieve this effect, as analogous to the attempt in ILC 
Article 25 to clarify the scope of necessity and the requirements for the invocation 
of necessity, contracting parties and tribunals should endeavour to establish clear 
guidelines on the scope and the thresholds for invoking essential security 
interests. Considering that countries have unique security concerns, this is a very 
ambitious suggestion although establishing thresholds to legitimise measures on the 
grounds of national security can enhance the understanding of shared security interests 
and mitigate arbitrariness.  
The difficulty in harmonising the scope of security and covering a variety of security 
matters at the regional level is evidenced in the EU’s approach in Chapter 3.2.3. For 
example, the 2008 review of European Security Strategy was criticised for failing to 
suggest more explicit security aims and means of achieving security.51 This is mainly 
because, while the Member States share common security issues to some extent, 
                                                     
51 Council of European Union, ‘2014 Annual Report from the High Representative of the European 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament on the Main Aspects and 
Basis Choices of the CFSP’, Brussels, July 20, 2015, 11083/15, p. 16; see further Chapter 3.2.3. 
European Union. 
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countries have pressing and conflicting security interests. In other words, covering one 
security issue can be beneficial for one country, but can simultaneously impair another 
country’s interests. Hence, widening the scope of security and introducing a new 
concept into the regional/collective security can easily face controversies and 
oppositions. Therefore, where many member states are involved in security 
negotiation, they would confirm a common regional/international goal, mostly 
eradication of terrorism or any shared security concerns rather than aim for a higher 
level of security tasks. Moreover, the inclusion of diverse security issues in the 
regional security denotes the enlargement of the regional or international institutions’ 
jurisdiction, which can result in a clash or conflicts between a regional approach and 
a national approach.  
Another evidence of potential opposing understanding regarding regional/common 
security can be found in the notion of the economy in the EU’s CFSP. The EU 
recognises that the economy plays a role as soft power/sanction in the realm of security. 
However, for some countries, especially, Third World countries, economic security 
based on economic growth and infrastructure can be imperative. Where a myriad of 
security matters conflict, it may well be the case that military security agendas will be 
prioritised, such as terrorism, and cyber-crime over other types of security in the sense 
that there is no reference to economic security from the regional perspective. 
In addition, it is also challenging to introduce new rules, at the collective/regional level, 
where prior rules have existed for the past decades. Therefore, whereas introducing 
new principles is not easy per se, the failure to embrace newly emerging issues can 
lead a regional/international entity to stagnate. Besides, the lesson, which we can learn 
from the EU’s policy approach, is that the regional entity tends to provide the 
principles and focus on the due process of implementing security measures and to 
discuss the general global/regional agendas. This means that a country/a Member State 
can possess the authority to specify security rules in detail and establish security targets. 
In other words, regional and international institutions provide applicable principles in 
enforcing security rules, i.e. procedural at a minimum level, whereas national 
authorities can legislate more substantive types of security rules.  
 232 
 
Moreover, the progression to the regional/international understanding of security has 
been impeded even further by the whole global stream which involves the insularity 
of individual countries as a result of recent developments, such as Brexit and the 
American isolation tendency following the start of Donald Trump’s presidency. If the 
insulation of countries is accelerated, it will become implausible to achieve the 
regional/international approaches to security. Therefore, as a bilateral approach to IIAs 
and security is less onerous, contracting parties to IIAs should endeavour to reach 
agreement regarding the definition and the scope of security matters in the context of 
IIAs. The essences is to diminish investment risks from the perspective of foreign 
investors and to delineate the latitude of regulatory space in relation to security from 
the host states’ point of view.  
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CONCLUSION 
1. The Main Arguments 
This thesis has examined the implications of the evolving notion of security in the IIL 
context. Throughout the thesis, I have shown that there has been a gap between the 
understanding of security by states and the evolving security demands. In order to 
narrow this gap, a more flexible concept of security needs to be incorporated in the 
realm of IIL. The thesis was initially motivated by the Argentine cases where the 
tribunals examined the legitimacy of emergency measures taken by the government of 
Argentina following its economic crisis. The Argentine cases clearly demonstrated the 
conflicting approaches of foreign investors and a host state in terms of the 
understanding of security interests in IIL. Regarding the measures, the government 
invoked essential security interests and public order to be exempt from the obligation 
to compensation whereas foreign investors claimed that the measures were tantamount 
to expropriations and the measures did not fall within the ambit of essential security 
interests, as the clause only concerned military security, rather than other types of 
security. In this thesis, I have found the solution to this conflict in embracing the 
broadening of security, which can also help achieve a coherent understanding of 
security among host states and foreign investors.  
Alongside with an analysis of the incoherent application and interpretation of security 
in state policies, I also examined the dynamics between foreign investors and host 
states, as a result of internationalising a domestic investment market. Given the lack 
of domestic/internal capital, host states conclude IIAs and apply the recommendations 
of the IMF or the World Bank, such as privatisation of public sectors, to attract foreign 
capital and investment. Thereby, a host state should abide by more international and 
quasi-international commitments. This renders a host state potentially subject to 
disputes for measures it takes. In other words, the conclusion of international 
agreements has rendered regulatory space of states restricted in the sense that measures 
aimed at public interests – or in the context of this thesis essential security 
interests/national security – would be exposed to potential challenges by foreign 
investors.  
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In addition to this, the disagreement on the scope and definition of security aggravates 
this phenomenon insofar as host states would believe their measures would fall within 
the ambit of security. On the other hand, foreign investors would argue that the 
measures exist outside its legitimate scope. Therefore, I have assessed in this thesis 
whether it is possible to lessen the confusion with regards to legitimate measures on 
the grounds of security and thereby narrow down the gap between foreign investors 
and host states by defining security and delineating its scope.   
Exceptions are imperative to making international agreements viable and 
sustainable/legitimate. They function as a flexibility tool insofar as they strike a 
balance between foreign investors and host states by securing a certain level of policy 
space that could have been diminished as a result of concluding a BIT. Accordingly, 
throughout the thesis, I have explored the extent to which the notion of security can 
play a role as an exception or a ground to legitimise a state’s measure in the realm of 
IIL.  
In order to examine the role of evolving security in IIL, this thesis has sought to define 
national security first. This is because without the consistent and coherent 
understanding of security interests, it is not possible to analyse how the notion of 
security could be applied in IIL. Such an incoherent understanding would potentially 
cause more disputes between foreign investors and host states.  
As shown in Chapter 2, foreign investors claimed in the Argentine cases that security 
exceptions should be invoked only for measures to address a military security issue, 
not an economic crisis. Concurring with the tribunals’ opinion, I criticised this 
approach because it leads to an unbalanced interpretation of security exceptions since 
an economic crisis is as imperilling and serious to national security as military threats. 
Therefore, the purpose of the study has been to highlight the necessity of broadening 
of security, extending beyond military security and to incorporate evolving security 
demands in international investment agreements and policies to achieve more balanced 
application and interpretation of security exceptions. Moreover, while I argued that 
broadening of security has taken place and is needed to serve evolving security 
demands, I also highlighted the necessity of demarcating the scope of security in order 
to deter excessive securitisation. To do so, I have compared other concepts used for 
derogations, such as public order and necessity; yet this comparison led to the 
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conclusion that while each concept has its own area, there exists a certain overlap 
among those concepts. For instance, military insecurity could lead society to be 
dysfunctional and lack of economic security could diminish the ability of people to 
operate according to social values and norms established in society. To assess the 
implications of the broadening of security in relation to IIL more contextually, I have 
used a comparative research method for examining three types of foreign investors and 
demonstrating how the broadening of security would affect each type of foreign 
investors’ rights and expectations to host states. In conclusion, my research has found 
that the broadening of security has extended to every type of foreign investors. 
However, depending on the type of foreign investors, the notion of security can 
become simplified or multifaceted, as each type of foreign investors retains distinctive 
security dimensions.  
2. Contribution of the Thesis 
As aforementioned, this thesis seeks to tackle the incoherence following the different 
approaches to the notion of security between foreign investors and host states. I 
attempted to define security by exploring different security schools. Notwithstanding, 
as Art argues “security is ambiguous and elastic in its meaning”,1 the previous chapters 
demonstrated that the notion of security can become multifaceted or simplified, 
depending on the context. In security studies, many scholars acknowledged the 
evolution of security – in other words, security does not only indicate military security 
which concerns existential inter-state military threats, but covers a variety of other 
security interests, ranging from military to socio-economic security (Chapter 1). 
Although this thesis adopts the terms “national security” and “essential security 
interests” interchangeably, the accurate meaning of national security is not confined to 
the survival of state in terms of security referent object. Instead, the essential referent 
object should be population of a state as the survival of the population underlies the 
survival of state – for example, economic instability of population could place the 
survival of population at stake, and this could deteriorate the survival of the state. 
Therefore, the sole emphasis on military security, as the Realist School insists, cannot 
incorporate security demands for the survival of population as well as the survival of 
                                                     
1 R. Art, ‘Security’, in J. Krieger (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, New Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1993, p. 820, cited in H. G. Brauch, Environment and Human Security: 
Towards Freedom from Hazard Impacts, UNU-EHS, 2005, p. 8. 
 236 
 
the state. And this recognition of the broadening also can address incoherence between 
national security policies and investment policies. In the context of IIL, the previous 
research has examined whether concluding international investment agreements or 
implementing investment laws are only to protect the interests of foreign investors, 
and noticed the development in which tribunals in IIAs also recognised a measure 
against an economic crisis could fall within the scope of essential security interests. 
Although Kurtz discusses the essential security interests exception at IIL, the focus of 
research was placed on tribunals’ interpretation on exceptions, such as public order 
and security interests in IIL and the WTO and the way to interpret the concept, i.e. 
whether a tribunal should draw upon customary international law principles. Partially 
agreeing with his argument as to the relationship between IIL and customary 
international law, I attempted to apply the broadening of security in the context of IIL. 
As the Argentine tribunals held that essential security interests in IIAs does not exclude 
other types of security, it is increasingly recognised that economic, societal and 
political security should be also encompassed within the scope of security interests in 
understanding the relations between foreign investors and host states. However, the 
clear delineation has not been made, and this thesis can bridge between two areas, that 
is, security studies and IIL.  
It is true that the broadening of security can secure states’ regulatory space as this can 
help in expanding the latitude of legitimate measures on the grounds of national 
security/essential security interests in investment law. But the scope of security should 
be demarcated in order to retain the legitimacy of broadening. In other words, while 
recognising the broadening of security, which can help secure certain regulatory space, 
I denounce the excessive broadening of security. As one of the main arguments of this 
thesis is that the broadening of security in the context of IIL does not necessarily 
impinge on the interests of foreign investors, it is important to prevent an excessive 
broadening of security and securitisation. Hence, with the clear demarcation of its 
scope, enhanced certainty for both foreign investors and host states can be achieved.  
As opposed to conventional understanding that the rights and interests of foreign 
investors could be at stake, if a host state has the discretion to invoke exceptions, which 
enable the state to derogate from its obligation to compensation, I argue that this can 
be deterred by the effort made by a host state to draft a policy report as to how it 
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approaches national security and what types of security interests that the host state 
seeks to protect exist. 
3. Overview of the Chapters  
Throughout the thesis, I showed how the notion of security has evolved and how this 
evolution could influence the investment policies of host states and suggested how 
host states and tribunals could take this understanding into account for clear and 
coherent application and interpretation of the concept.  
In Chapter 1, I began my investigation with the chronological analysis of the evolving 
notion of security and the examination of the main schools in the literature on security– 
the Realist School, the Copenhagen School, the Paris School, and the Constructivist 
School. Firstly, the chronological examination on the evolution of security showed that 
security is not a static concept, but a fluid one that is subject to changes, and contingent 
on international and national environments. This implied that the expansion of security 
– with incorporating a variety of security interests, such as economic security, and risk 
as a newly emerging type of threat – can be accommodated within security studies, as 
the concept per se retains certain flexibility in itself. In addition, the analysis on 
security schools2 can lead to delineating the scope of security; in other words, to what 
extent broadening and deepening national security has taken – or should take – place. 
I contended that the Realist School cannot serve evolving security demands insofar as 
the school only places great emphasis on military security. 3  The significance of 
military security is undeniable in that the notion of military security has an establishing 
role in national security and security studies, but scholars and policy-makers should 
accept that the sole focus on military security may well lead to overlooking what 
causes insecurity because national insecurity can stem from variable threats, extending 
beyond military threats.  
With the goal of challenging and complementing the traditional approach to security, 
the Copenhagen School, with the sectoral analysis and securitisation, demonstrates 
how the notion of security could be broadened and deepened, which can help 
                                                     
2 Those schools have distinctive approaches to what should be securitised, who should securitise, and 
for whom they need to securitise issues. 
3 See Chapter 1.2.1. The Realist School regarding why a certain gap has emerged between strategic 
studies (the Realist School’s approach) and reality (evolving security demands). 
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understand changing security demands in reality and introduce security policies 
accordingly. Buzan, a scholar of the Copenhagen School, diversifies referent objects 
of security, ranging from a state through a territory to a society. This approach 
challenges the state-centric understanding of security and diversifies security 
concerns, including immigration and identity of local/religious groups. Moreover, the 
sectoral analysis of the Copenhagen School widened the scope of security from 
traditional military security to others by incorporating economic, political, societal and 
environmental security. Although the school is sceptical of securitisation of economic 
issues, given the belief that measures on the grounds of economic security are often 
implemented for pursuing other purposes, such as taking a protectionist approach in 
economic policies, the school argues that each security issue has its own contextual 
understanding. However, the school was criticised for failing to discuss how to tackle 
a situation where security interests are in conflict, in other words, which security 
should be prioritised. This issue might be resolved and complemented by the approach 
of the Constructivist School. By taking a more flexible and reflective approach to 
security, as opposed to the traditionalist way, the Constructivist School argues that a 
referent object should vary, depending on the types of security issues. Thus, regarding 
dealing with security interests in conflict, the Constructivist School would argue that 
individual (population) emancipation is the ultimate goal of security, which connotes 
that whatever keeps individuals from emancipation should be tackled as a top priority. 
To denounce the criticism for not explaining which security should take precedence, 
the Copenhagen School could also note that security issues could be intertwined – for 
example, societal insecurity could ensue from a failing government (political 
insecurity) and military insecurity can be caused by economic tensions with other 
countries. Therefore, it is pregnable to claim for a list of which security should be 
prioritised because a security priority should be determined on a case-by-case basis.   
The Copenhagen School also demonstrated how an issue becomes securitised by a 
speech act. Where it is not possible to deal with an issue within the realm of normal 
politics, a policy-maker who is sufficiently persuasive attempts to convince the 
audience that securitisation of the issue concerned is imperative. Along with the 
sectoral analysis, securitisation of the Copenhagen School is not confined to a military 
security issue, but encompasses the aforementioned security issues. With the concern 
of excessive securitisation, the school highlights that the ultimate goal of securitisation 
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is de-securitisation that results in bringing a securitised issue within the normal 
politics, as the objective of securitisation by the Copenhagen School is not to 
incorporate all the issues in the category of security. 
In line with the Copenhagen School, the Paris School also examines securitisation. 
While the Copenhagen School analyses the process of an issue becoming political, 
securitised and de-securitised, the Paris School looks at implications surrounding 
securitisation in depth/in detail. It examines competition among security interests and 
security actors, insecuritising the audience, and calling for extraordinary measures, 
which helps affirm the role of security actors. In addition, the Paris School discusses 
the possibility for a security issue not to represent a security target as initially planned, 
as the process involving competition between security actors and response from the 
audience modifies the initial security target. We can learn a lesson from this analysis 
that a policy-maker should undertake chronological reviews for the process of 
securitisation and in order to determine whether security measures and policies, as a 
result of the securitisation, tackle insecurity.  
In addition to the studies of security schools and the chronological analysis of the 
evolution of security, Chapter 1 also explored the burgeoning notion of risk, which 
arguably realises security in a more effective manner. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, risk is accompanied with cultural recognition and has room for diverse 
interpretations by the authority in charge of disseminating knowledge. This is 
analogous to securitisation by a speech act as the Copenhagen School argued. This 
signifies that risk has high subjectivity which can result in arbitrary definitions and 
different reactions, based on cultural orientations and the intention of policy-makers. 
Thus, it gives rise to potential discretionary actions which could be shielded with the 
fear of risk becoming a threat with catastrophic ramifications against criticisms with 
respect to the efficacy and legitimacy of such actions. Therefore, I argue that while it 
is inevitable to observe the significant role risk plays in security, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that risk is susceptible to abuse arising from misestimating potential 
repercussions of the risk concerned.   
Chapter 1 explored theoretical approaches towards national security demonstrating 
different security schools while Chapters 2, 3 and 4 showed the empirical application 
regarding how the broadening of security has taken place in IIL and how this would 
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affect each type of foreign investor: corporate foreign investors, government 
controlled foreign investors, and individual foreign investors. Chapter 2 analysed the 
Argentine cases that overtly demonstrated the conflict between Argentina and 
corporate foreign investors with regards to the understanding of national security in 
the realm of investment law, in order to examine how tribunals interpreted national 
security – essential security interests in IIL. To understand the international 
interpretation and highlight the differences, Chapter 2 not only looked at the terms 
related to security, such as public order, essential security interests, and national 
security, but also elucidated the relationship between security exceptions and a state 
of necessity. Whilst the examination of those terms aims to demarcate the scope of 
security for implementing legitimate measures on the grounds of security, it is true that 
the boundaries among these concepts are often fuzzy. This does not mean that the 
thesis argues that those concepts should cross into each other’s borders. Instead, while 
adjudicative bodies endeavour to clarify each concept’s definition and boundary so 
that host states understand their regulatory space in relation to each concept, it should 
be understood that in reality certain overlaps inevitably exist among those concepts.  
The attempt for adjudicative bodies to define the boundary of essential security 
interests is portrayed in the Argentine cases. The Argentine tribunals held that 
economic security should be understood as important as military and political security 
in the international investment arena, given that the exclusion of economic security 
interests from the scope of essential security interests in the BIT would lead to an 
unbalanced interpretation of the security exception. Thus, repercussions caused by an 
economic crisis can be as serious and imperilling as those stemming from military and 
political insecurity, although the tribunals had different interpretations on the 
requirements for invoking essential security interests in the BIT. The different 
interpretations generated contesting rulings regarding the legitimacy of emergency 
measures implemented by the Argentine government. However, an economic 
emergency per se was consensually acknowledged by the tribunals to be eligible for 
legitimate measures on the grounds of essential security interests, which means a host 
state having taken such a measure can be exempt from the obligation to pay 
compensation for the loss or damage onto other parties caused by the measure in 
question. 
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While Chapter 2 discussed the tribunals’ interpretation of national security and 
national security reports in general, Chapter 3 demonstrated how the concept of 
national security has been applied in national security strategy reports and investment 
policy of North American countries, European countries such as the UK, Germany and 
France and the EU. The gap between states in terms of approaches to security can 
signify a different threshold for each of them to invoke national security, which 
resultantly causes an international conflict. Comparing the approaches to security in 
the international arena and in national arenas showed incoherence in the security 
policies to the extent that while home states, mainly developed countries, attempted to 
construe security interests in a narrow manner in the IIL context, they sought to 
introduce a myriad of security aspects, including a risk-based approach and critical 
infrastructure in order to be more prepared and resilient for emergency situations. 
Chapter 3 also examined how countries define critical infrastructure in their policies 
pertinent to foreign investment, as the subject of critical infrastructure is closely related 
to national security. Before this discussion, the chapter analysed foreign investment 
controlled, owned or sponsored by a foreign government first, given the potential 
significant effect of such investment on national security and critical industries. As 
shown in Chapter 3, when dealing with GCIs, four categories of countries are 
representive of the practical reality: (i) a country which does not specify any restriction 
subject to GCIs, (ii) a country which imposes a restriction on GCIs in particular 
sectors, (iii) a country which have restrictions to all GCIs (for instance, a complete 
prohibition unless authorisation is granted in the case of Iceland), and (iv) countries 
which require GCIs reviews. Mostly, countries adopt approach (ii) above whereby host 
states specify particular sectors – mainly critical infrastructures, such as 
communications, transports, and energy sectors – where GCIs are not allowed to 
invest. 
Contrary to the case of corporate foreign investors where a host state seeks to address 
emergency situations (ex-post), decisions made by a host state, in the context of GCIs, 
are rather based on risk management (ex-ante). This means a host state is more 
concerned about potential ramifications arising out of GCI’s control over a certain type 
of industries. There have been many cases for a host state to intervene in a transaction 
where a GCI attempted to acquire a domestic industry, closely related to critical 
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infrastructure which involves socio-economic security interests. The protection of 
critical infrastructure and/or national champion industries does not simply denote a 
protectionist approach towards foreign investment but signifies the concern that the 
control over those industries can augment the risk based on the belief that the operation 
by GCIs could be made for non-commercial purposes. The inclusion of risk in 
assessing the implication of a foreign investor in relation to national security 
demonstrates that the broadening of security is more conspicuous in the case of GCIs 
than that of corporate investors. However, this approach is pregnable because it is 
improbable for a host state to determine whether a foreign GCI has any intention other 
than the pursuit of maximising a company’s profits. Thus, it may give rise to an unfair 
decision from the perspective of foreign investors, as the decision made against GCIs 
is often based on risk assessment. The UK also pinpointed the possibility of decreasing 
transparency and predictability and causing arbitrary decisions against GCIs, where 
the concepts of public interest and national security play a larger role in making a 
decision for foreign investors. Although all the countries take liberal investment 
policies in general, they have different approaches to national security in foreign 
investment policies. For example, the UK has more liberal foreign investment policy 
with less restriction related to critical infrastructure, whereas the French investment 
policy is more restrictive by introducing more industries on the list for which foreign 
investors require authorisation to locate investment in France.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, in the context of foreign investment policy, security has 
two dimensions: one in line with the traditional approach, that is, military security that 
covers the protection of war/defence-related industries, and the other with the 
broadened approach, which deals with the protection of critical infrastructure having 
socio-economic security interests. The latter approach has been increasingly 
incorporated in foreign investment policies by states and resulted in a more specific 
and fragmented policy; for example, depending on (i) the nationality of investor, i.e. 
whether domestic, EU or foreign, (ii) the type of investor, i.e. whether or not a GCI, 
and (iii) the type of industries, i.e. whether or not industries with security interests, a 
foreign investor would be subject to different rules.  
The reason for imposing stringent rules on GCIs in critical infrastructure is because 
any operational failure of critical infrastructures would give rise to a serious socio-
 243 
 
economic distress in a country. Given the concern of a host state that any political 
decision of a home state might colour the operation of the investment, a GCI in critical 
infrastructure is inevitably subject to higher level of vigilance. However, a host state 
should contemplate the implications of additional restrictions imposed on a GCI and 
interventions in takeover transactions by a GCI prior to making a decision because a 
wider application of security in investment policy can destruct the balance between the 
pursuit of a liberal investment policy and the protection of security interests.  
Chapter 4 shifted the focus from collective action to individual action – that is, the 
chapter examined if there is any relation between national security and individual 
foreign investors who become citizens or hold a certain residence permit under a 
special immigration programme. I examined citizenship-by-investment schemes in the 
Caribbean countries of St. Kitts and Nevis, and Antigua and Barbuda, and European 
countries including Malta, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania and Ireland. I also focused on 
immigrant residence permit programmes for foreign investors. Most countries which 
adopt the citizenship-by-investment programme face some form of domestic economic 
problem. Therefore, from their perspective, an immediate and certain economic benefit 
would outweigh the need to stabilise national security that could be negatively affected 
by a citizenship-by-investment programme. Thus, a host state may be aware that such 
a programme could be construed as selling sovereignty or trading security in exchange 
for economic development and cash flows, but as the state is in need of financial capital 
that is imperative for national development and economic diversification as evidenced 
in the case of St. Kitts and Nevis, the government of the host state may encounter such 
dilemma to choose between national security and foreign capital influx. After 
discussing the controversies surrounding such schemes and shedding light onto 
questions about their legitimacy, I argue that rather than denouncing potential side 
effects that could arise out of the programmes, a host state calculate the economic 
benefits and potential risks to public policy, public order and national security, and 
then revise or abolish the scheme, based on the calculation. Moreover, in order to 
minimise abusive usage of such a programme – for example, famous fugitives accused 
of corruption become naturalised under a CIP to avoid a passport control – host states 
should introduce a code of conduct on ethics and compliance and strengthen due 
diligence with great cooperation of law enforcement institutions to enhance security, 
controls and administrative process.  
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Chapter 4 analysed the implications of citizenship-by-investment programmes and 
immigrant residence permit programmes for foreign investors in the context of 
national security. It probed if those programmes can pose a risk to national security 
and what type of individuals’ citizenship can be revoked on the grounds of national 
security. Given the small size of investment located by an individual foreign investor 
who became naturalised, it is unlikely that an individual investor would pose a risk to 
socio-economic and political security, as opposed to a corporate foreign investor and 
a GCI. Instead, the citizenship status of an individual can be misused to avoid 
international sanctions against his/her original nationality. Alternatively, it can be a 
way to source international organised crimes, which can amount to treason and 
endanger military security. Thus, the broadening of security plays a relatively minor 
role in the sense that great emphasis is placed on military security in the context. Yet, 
certain broadening has taken place insofar as it does not only seek to tackle an 
existential threat, but also to address a potential threat, i.e. a risk to military security.  
Chapter 5 scrutinised the relationship between foreign investors and host states by 
examining tribunals’ awards and the rights of foreign investors in the IIL arena. 
Particularly, in relation to expropriation, it highlighted the necessity of striking a 
balance between those conflicting interests. The chapter underscored that despite the 
exceptions, as a flexibility tool, which are established to tackle the imbalance and to 
secure certain regulatory space, the IIL system has failed to have a clear understanding 
of the extent to which a host state can take a legitimate measure by invoking an 
exception. For example, to examine the regulatory space as a result of concluding 
international investment agreements, Chapter 6 discussed the doctrine of the police 
powers of state arising from sovereignty. Although there is a certain consensus as to 
the definition and scope of the police powers, which is contrary to the case of security 
exceptions, the applicability of the doctrine has been understood in a narrow manner. 
In the context of international investment, mostly under the NAFTA, the doctrine was 
invoked only to legitimise measures for the preservation of environment. This 
indicates that a non-discriminatory state’s measure for the protection of public interests 
may not fall within the ambit of police powers. It is true that exceptions should be 
invoked at a minimum level and read in a narrow manner to curb abusive uses; yet 
they should be sufficiently viable so that they can serve their role as a flexibility tool. 
However, in the case of security exceptions, given the lack of consensus regarding 
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types of situations requiring security measures and the procedural mechanisms, the 
exceptions become less viable. Therefore, I argued that exceptions in IIL have not been 
to strike a balance between the interests of foreign investors and those of host states, 
and the broadening of security could complement this imbalance.  
Lastly, in Chapter 6, I suggested recommendations for host states and tribunals based 
on the examination and analysis in the previous chapters. In relation to theories, while 
acknowledging the necessity of broadening of security, extending beyond inter-state 
military security, I recommended ways that a state could approach securitisation and 
perceive investment risks. In this regard, I argued that the broadening of the national 
security should not be interpreted as an attempt for an unlimited expansion of security. 
Rather, it should aim to incorporate evolving security needs. Also, the importance of 
de-securitisation should not be overlooked in order to prevent every issue from 
becoming securitised, which in effect would trivialise security matters and thus 
jeopardise the legitimacy of security. Especially, if a measure is implemented against 
a risk that has not become a real threat, a government should have a clearer objective 
of the measure against the situation, and understand whether the measure is adequate 
to rectify the situation so that it can be ensured whether the measure is used to achieve 
other objectives. To that end, a government should embark on periodic reviews for 
measures against threats and risks to examine the efficacy of the measures concerned. 
Particularly, a government should provide certain proof to demonstrate that a 
catastrophic result can ensue once a risk materialises, absent a certain measure.  
I also addressed the peculiarity of security matters in order to demonstrate that each 
country has its own security interests although many countries have common security 
interests. This feature implies that it is difficult to reach an agreement among states 
with regards to the concept and scope of security, more specifically, situations which 
could allow states to take legitimate security measures. Therefore, in order to minimise 
the confusion that can be possibly caused by the lack of consensus in this regard, I 
argue that a government should provide clear security targets in its security policy 
reports or foreign investment-related documents so that foreign investors can estimate 
potential actions for the protection of essential security interests of the host state.  
In addition, regarding conceptual and analytical dimensions, I argued that a boundary 
should be established between customary international law (in this context, necessity) 
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and international investment law (essential security interests or national security). As 
opposed to drawing upon the requirements of necessity, I recommended that unless 
there is an explicit reference to necessity in a treaty provision, tribunals not apply 
operative requirements of necessity to determine the legitimacy of measures on the 
grounds of essential security interests.  
Subsequently, I make a number of institutional recommendations for host states in 
accordance with each type of investors: corporate investors, GCIs, and individual 
foreign investors under a CIP. By comparing different types of foreign investors, I 
highlighted that the gravity of the type of security also varies by type of investor. 
Regarding corporate investors, military, societal, economic and political security have 
an equal weight, whereas, for a GCI, the roles of military and societal security become 
augmented with economic and political security. This feature was evident insofar as 
in dealing with a GCI, a host state implements more stringent rules for particular 
industries that are either closely related to war/defence and socio-economic interests, 
that is, critical infrastructure. Contrary to the two types of investors, in discussing 
individual foreign investors, naturalised under a CIP, military security plays a major 
role, as one foreign investor is not likely to cause national economic emergency, 
societal distress or political instability. Thus, the comparison of the different types of 
foreign investors showed that the notion of security is fluid and multifaceted rather 
than static. To that end, tribunals, states, and foreign investors should understand 
security exceptions in IIL so that they can have a clearer understanding regarding the 
latitude of legitimate security measures and measures outside this latitude.  
4. Future Research 
In this thesis, I examined the scope of measures that can be legitimised on the grounds 
of national security/essential security interests in IIAs/BITs. While its scope has 
become clearer throughout the thesis, more research is needed in order to examine 
whether risk can be incorporated within the scope of legitimate security measures. 
Whether a measure aimed at tackling risk – based on the premise that the measure 
taken was not intended to resolve other issues – can be within the scope of legitimate 
security measures is an important question since this could broaden the regulatory 
space of governments to a significant extent, as a host state would not be obliged to 
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pay compensation once the measure in question falls successfully within the aim of 
essential security interests.  
In addition, to scrutinise the evolving concept of security, future research could map 
the evolution with a view to the meaning of public order/public policy/ordre public. 
As all notions can evolve to some extent, it can be interesting to examine whether the 
evolution of public order has taken place or the notion has room for further 
development. In relation to public order, a fascinating future research proposal is to 
identify a possible overlap between public order and national security can be also 
studied or the correlation of those two concepts as exceptions in IIAs can be further 
examined.  
Another interesting area of research would be to examine the scope of legitimate 
security measures from the perspective of developing countries. In the previous 
chapters, I drew on examples from the developed world. But I also noted that it is 
questionable to legitimise measures aimed at enhancing economic development 
implemented by developing countries, in particular, the least developed countries. This 
is because measures against socio-economic insecurity could fall within the ambit of 
security, and in general, an emergency could be seen to be an abnormal situation, 
signalling societal dysfunctionality. However, often, in some developing countries, 
poverty is acute, so economic development can be the key to economic security. 
Therefore, in the future, the legitimacy of security measures aimed at eradicating 
chronic poverty (or improving the economic level) can be examined.  
Finally, a potential future research would be a more sustained attention to the 
relationship between GCIs and security interests. As discussed in Chapter 3, GCIs are 
more likely to be subject to more stringent rules. This is because host states fear that 
the involvement of another government in operating an investment can have a negative 
impact, especially since GCIs tend to invest in sectors very closely related to critical 
infrastructure and the financial sectors. On the one hand, it is reasonable to find a 
connection between such a tendency and security concerns that host states have as 
those sectors play pivotal roles in a society. On the other, as shown in Chapter 3,4 
                                                     
4 Especially, the conflicting interests between GCIs and host states are well portrayed in Chapter 3.4. 
National Security in Domestic Investment Law and Critical Infrastructure. 
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imposing either special or stricter requirements on GCIs is often criticised for giving 
rise to market protectionism, as opposed to more liberal economic policies. 
Accordingly, an inquiry regarding whether stringent rules should be justified either 
given the type of investors (private or governmental) or the type of sectors (critical or 
non-critical) can also shed light onto the legitimacy of stringent rules applied to GCIs.  
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